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'Managing the Diffusion of Medical Technology'
Ian K Harvey
Abstract
The aim of the study was to understand how and why medical technologies (devices,
pharmaceuticals and surgical procedures) are produced (innovated and developed) and
consumed (adopted and utilised).
Medical technologies are linked to the expansion of health care provision and costs.
Policy makers encourage technology assessment to ensure the value of medical
technologies (absolute technological efficacy and relative cost effectiveness). This policy,
which is underlain by a model of technological determinism, may be ineffective if other
factors influence decision making.
Three international (UK and USA) comparative case studies were undertaken, analysing
the innovation, development and diffusion of specific medical technologies. Annual
statistics were gathered on adoption and utilisation rates of Magnetic Resonance
Imaging (a device), Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy (a surgical procedure) and Prozac (a
drug). Literature review supported interviews with parties involved in decision making
processes.
The widespread adoption of Magnetic Resonance Imaging has been motivated by
professional and institutional competition, despite its often inappropriate utilisation,
uncertain efficacy and extremely high costs.
Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy (keyhole surgery for gallbladder stones) has diffused
rapidly, being driven by general surgeon's concerns over their control of the gallbladder.
The ease of the surgery has enabled total surgical volumes to almost double.
The diffusion of Prozac (an expensive antidepressant) was influenced by high profile
uncertainties regarding its safety and efficacy. Subsequently its range of applications
have grown, but many of these are unproven, whilst its long term safety profile is
unknown.
The study concludes that the decision making surrounding the innovation and diffusion of
medical technologies is only vaguely related to their clinical efficacy or their cost
effectiveness. lntra professional competition is central to the production and diffusion of
medical technologies. Technology assessments, being largely reactive, and dependent
on clinical reports, are unlikely to prove effective in achieving cost effectiveness. This
finding has significant implications for future health care policy making.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
1 Brief Summary- Study Focus and Purpose
This study is concerned with identifying the forces underlying the innovation, adoption and
diffusion of medical technologies. Three case studies are undertaken, each comparing a
different technology's innovation and diffusion patterns in the UK and the US. Such a structure
enables a comparison of innovation and adoption differences between technology types
(devices, drugs and surgical procedures) within different health care systems (the relatively
unitary UK and the pluralistic US). Technology is widely identified as a source of escalating cost
within health care systems, and an improved understanding of how and why technologies are
created and adopted will aid the future management of this process.
2 The Problem- Rising Costs and Falling Resources
There is widespread concern in most industrialised countries concerning the cost of health care.
Health care costs have grown rapidly in the post-war period. Spending on the UK's NHS has
risen four-fold since 1948, with costs in the US rising three-fold since 1980 alone. Health care
now consumes approximately 6.5% of GDP in the UK and 15% in the US, with an increasing
proportion of this being funded by the public sector (from taxation) (Macfadyen and Lenz 1994,
Breheny et al 1982, Appleby 1992, Ham 1993).
Most decisions taken within health care are made under conditions of ignorance, since either the
data does not exist, users are unaware of it, or it is disorganised and inaccessible (Smith 1994).
Consequently both the UK and the US have traditionally left health care decision making to
clinicians, who were judged to be the closest to the 'coalface', to have a professional and ethical
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duty to deliver care effectively, and who had the popular moral authority enabling them to make
rationing decisions. It was assumed that either administrative logic or market forces shaped
such allocative decisions. Thus the NHS attempted to institute various systems to centre
decision making around population needs and the means by which they can be met most
appropriately (Donaldson 1995, Hutton et al 1991). The US sought to regulate some market
failings whilst mopping up uninsured groups with public funding (which was channelled through
private provision).
However, both systems have failed to either achieve an efficient or effective allocation of health
care resources, whilst costs have risen. Thus administrative and market systems have not
operated to guide clinicians decision making effectively (Donaldson 1995). Simultaneously,
clinicians have been criticised for being part of an elite establishment, whilst their clinical
practices vary widely geographically and socially, reflecting local trends and social cultures, with
little apparent impact on health outcomes (Griffith et al 1987).
Such criticisms have become more pressing since the 1970s. The failure of the Bretton Woods
agreement, which fixed international currency exchange rates, and increasing global financial
mobility and competition, increased uncertainty and risk in economic decision making. In this
uncertain environment, governments embraced a theoretical version of neo-liberalism
(Monetarism), with economic and social dimensions. The states' role was to provide a stable
framework within which numerous independent individuals could make incremental decisions,
enabling quick reactions to changes in the environment (Keegan 1984).
This philosophy constructed the private sector as being efficient and wealth producing, whilst the
public sector was viewed as an inefficient bureaucratic drain on the economy, whose parasitical
taxation squeezed out productive commercial activity, and transferred resources to those who
had not worked for them, nurturing a dependency culture of lassitude. Governments' role was
thus to 'roll back' the public sector (reducing government taxation, spending and regulation),
whilst providing a stable currency which would support the validity of commercial decision
making and investment. It was hoped that such a policy would increase the level of exports and
hence boost domestic economic activity (Keegan 1984).
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Both the UK and the US strongly embraced this philosophy in the vacuum that followed the loss
of confidence in Keynesianism. Consequently, both governments became concerned at the cost
of health care, which was extensively supported either directly from taxes (e.g. Medicare,
Medicaid, local programs, the NHS etc.) or indirectly (e.g. tax deductible health insurance for
employers and employees). Crucially, most health care activity was produced and consumed
domestically, and could not be exported. Cost increases have particularly effected US business,
causing them to reduce wages and benefits. In both countries, therefore, health care costs have
become economic, social and political problems (Parker 1995).
This growth is judged to emerge from two main sources, the innovation and application of new
technologies, and the ageing of the population (the 'medical multiplier). Other sources of
inflation surround these, such as cost increases specific to health care and the rise in
disposable incomes (rising expectations) (Anonymous 1996j). Thus it is estimated that the NHS
requires a 2-3% annual increase in its real budget simply to maintain its standards (Parker 1995,
Anonymous 1996j), whilst annual increases in the US are much higher.
Demographic changes are very difficult to manage, particularly in liberal democracies. The
elderly consume considerably more resources per capita than any other age group, being
judged to account for 0.7% of the NHS's required budget increase annually (Parker 1995). Both
the UK and the US have emphasised the de-institutionalisation of care for the elderly
('community care'), which is essentially the shift of provision from public sector hospitals to the
private, voluntary or informal sector. Within healthcare specifically, both countries are narrowing
and tightening provision, with explicit rationing being introduced more implicitly into the UK
(Timmins 1995). Such policies are politically difficult and dangerous.
The role of clinicians in the escalation of cost is central. Clinicians apply intangible and tangible
technologies (e.g. cognitive knowledge, skills, devices, drugs, procedures etc.) to patients in
order to produce an effect. Industrialised countries, particularly the US, have become
increasingly dependent upon high technology and capital intensive systems, which have growing
capabilities and cost implications (Rublee 1994). e.g. 60% of NHS expenditure is spent on
hospitals, with spending on pharmaceuticals growing at 10% pa (Hutton et al 1991, Orton and
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Fry 1995, Griffith et al 1987). Such extensive and intensive use of medical technology is not
necessarily associated with more effective, efficient or equitable outcomes Rublee 1994 Thus
resources are spent on care which is ineffective (Bayley 1995), whilst decision makers can be
resistant to effective care (Pendrous 1991).
In summary, these sociological and economic criticisms of medical technology view the growth
in medical technology as inappropriate, inefficient, and perhaps counter productive. Such
criticisms mesh with wider criticisms of rationality, focusing on its constructed, negotiated,
contextual and uncertain nature, partially illustrated by the varying nature of clinical practice in
different areas (Hunt 1992, Webster 1991, Marton 1991). Meanwhile, resource scarcity means
that decisions to invest in the creation, development, diffusion and adoption of technology have
become politicised, pitting individual gains for patients and clinicians against welfare losses for
society as a whole (Paine and Siemtjam 1988, Durbin 1980). Traditionally subservient players
(e.g. governments, administrators, businesses etc.) have begun to challenge the discretion
which medical science enjoys (Drake et al 1993). e.g. reorganising and constraining the
resources which they allocate to health care, analysing the value of care and reorienting
provision from (technology dominated) acute, hospital based intervention and cure, into
community based preventative and primary care (Southby et al 1985). A primary tool in the
pursuit of this policy is the introduction of systems of managed competition (e.g. managed care
companies in the US, internal markets in the UK), which draw extensively on technology
assessment (Banta 1994) to constrain technological innovation, diffusion and utilisation.
Consequently, policy makers have sought ways to constrain these costs, and ensure that
spending was focused on areas where it would be the most productive. However, demographic
control is extremely politically difficult to implement, aside from being inherently morally and
ethically dubious, particularly in liberal democracies. Thus policies of explicit aged based
rationing are unfeasible. Simultaneously, the 'march of medical science' is seen as inherently
beneficial, making it politically difficult to constrain.
In the absence of their ability to effect either of the primary determinants of cost increase
(demography and technology), governments have concentrated on changing systems of
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financing and the structure of health care delivery. Essentially financiers (governments,
businesses etc.) have sought to limit the volume of resources going into the system of health
care provision, whilst expanding managerial control over the activity of clinicians (thus reducing
the realm of clinical autonomy). A key method has been to co-opt clinicians into management
functions, thus merging medical and managerial concerns within a single decision maker (e.g.
clinical directorates, resource management initiative)
These moves are clear in both the UK and the US. Since the 1970s financing has been limited
(e.g. introduction of cash limits in the UK, replacement of indemnity insurance systems in the
US) and methods introduced to limit clinical autonomy (e.g. limited list, pre-approval, selective
contracting etc.). Essentially these were regulatory and financing changes. In the 1990s both the
UK and the US adopted a policy of managed competition in health care. Essentially, provider
units (hospitals, health care delivery systems, GP practices etc.) would bear the financial risk of
providing care to a defined population for a range of services over a period of time. These
providers would compete against other such providers for purchaser (e.g. company, health
authority) contracts. Health care provision would thus become 'managed' to maximise efficiency,
giving rise to the term 'managed care'.
In the UK such a system was introduced by legislation in the NHS and Community Care Act of
1990 (the internal market). Attempts were made to introduce such a system by legislation in the
US, but failed (the Clinton health care bill of 1994). However, a system of managed competition
is emerging by default, sponsored and informed by various public and private financiers. Such
systems are premised around explicit and implicit rationing, and part of their appeal is that they
formally separate financiers (who remain, ultimately, responsible) from accountability (which is
born by providers). Thus in the UK conflicts over service changes (e.g. Trust closures) are often
fought locally, instead of nationally, whilst managed care companies in the US are largely
exempt from malpractice litigation by patients. To a degree, therefore, there is an element of
demographic control within these systems e.g. implicit age based rationing. However, the
underlying rationality within all these changes is that of controlling technology adoption and
utilisation. Such elements are frequently seen in key debates regarding expensive new
technologies e.g. Viagra.
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The health care market is thus characterised by market failure. In the classic transaction of
market theory, a knowledgeable buyer and seller exchange a clearly defined item or commodity,
with both parties knowing the other is equally knowledgeable, and both being personally
responsible for the costs and benefits of the exchange. However, within health care the seller
(clinician) acts on behalf of the buyer (the patient, who lacks the skill to know what services they
need). Both buying and selling functions are thus centred in the seller (clinician). This problem is
compounded by the system of third party payment (health insurance), which means no player in
the transaction (clinician, patient, health insurer) acts with both knowledge and motive to
constrain marginal costs to the point at which they equal marginal benefits. A similar situation
exists with reference to the adoption of technology, since often their is a very close relationship
between buyer and sellers, who are often both clinicians, whilst financing is supplied by third
parties. Finally, within this system dominated by profound ignorance (lack of information) and
high risk (health is a personal, public and political priority), health care is seen as a vital public
good, meaning that it is politically difficult and dangerous for financiers to constrain their
spending. Generally, the more fragmented the system, the worse these problems become, since
decision making and financial responsibility become more diffuse, whilst competition increases
(between separate groups doing similar things) and transaction costs grow (information flows
become impeded by proprietary rights or bureaucratic processes). Consequently governments,
as the ultimate financier and regulator of the health care system, can become captured by
technology, and not be able or willing to restrain technological excesses (Somers and Somers
1977). Within health care, therefore, it can be assumed that production occurs beyond the point
where marginal cost equals marginal benefit (Halm and Gelijns in Halm and Gelijns 1991).
For most of the post war period it was not considered important to analyse the costs and
benefits of technology, since health care costs were relatively insignificant, and governments
abrogated the difficult area of medical practice to clinicians. Consequently financing increased
without being constrained by any systematic form of outcome assessment. Thus governments
supported research, which generated technologies, which expanded the field of medical
practice, requiring increased financing for utilisation (e.g. public and private insurance) (Laubach
et al in Gelijns and Dawkins 1994). This proliferation affects the whole health care system e.g.
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epidemeology of mortality, morbidity etc., patent expectations, organisation and financing of
services, status balance between staff etc., whilst distorting expenditure towards more costly
(and arguably less efficacious) forms of health care provision (McKinlay 1982).
Consequently, health policy makers have become concerned to address the appropriate place
of intensive and expansive medical technologies (Rublee 1994). However this is difficult, since
the area is vast, interlinked and economically, politically, socially and ideologically sensitive. e.g.
the UK government sponsors both producers and consumers, and so seeks to balance these
conflicting interests whilst furthering the cause of patients and taxpayers (Hutton et al 1991).
Centrally, useable information to assess technologies and practices is not available, and
methods to implement such findings are clumsy (Tunis and Gelband 1994, Banta 1995).
As costs have accelerated, and resources become constrained, financiers have become
concerned to maximise the benefit (utility) gained from health care spending. In both the UK and
the US a new emphasis in the contracts between purchasers (financiers) and providers
(managed care organisations) has been the value of medical technologies, particularly emerging
ones. Thus technology has changed from something that is implicitly assumed to be beneficial,
to something whose benefit must be proven.
Gathering such information is difficult, and numerous means have developed to enable the
independent assessment of technologies. The UK has been particularly vigorous in this,
expanding the use of technology assessments, and experimenting with techniques such as the
QALY (Quality Adjusted Life Year) to act as a guide to aid purchasing decisions and clinical
practice. Thus the NHS Research and Development Strategy is a key component of the internal
market, and technology assessment forms the centre of the strategy. Technology assessment
consists of technical assessment (the inputs, throughputs and outputs of the technology) and
outcome assessment (in terms of the quality of patient care and outcomes), against an
assessment of costs (Frazier and Mosteller 1995). Such information can be used to analyse
alternatives and guide decision making (Drummond 1980), and such information is
disseminated with the intention that it should guide adoption and utilisation (Gelijns and Dawkins
1994, Blank and Mills 1989).
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However technology assessment is a very blunt instrument. The process is expensive and
laborious, meaning that few technologies can be analysed, and findings are liable to be obsolete
by their release. Ultimately, however, control over the adoption and utilisation of medical
technologies depends on the trust that can be elicited from the public. Such faith has traditionally
been placed in the medical profession, who can articulate this popular legitimacy through
extensive networks. Consequently, they have the power to shape popular definitions, and can
generate considerable public support for their perceptions (Donaldson 1995, Greer 1987, Klein
1979).
Crucially, technology assessment findings seem to have only a limited effect on adoption and
utilisation (the consumption of medical technology), and thus, through feedback mechanisms,
on research and development (the production of medical technology). It therefore appears that
there are other factors, in addition to technical issues, that drive the adoption of new
technologies e.g. economic, political, social, ideological (Gelijns and Halm 1991). A primary aim
of this study is to understand what forces do motivate and shape these processes. Health
services face major strategic decisions around the size of the healthcare sector and the shape it
should take (Donaldson 1995). The debate about resources allocation has become more
pressing, more open, and more emotionally charged by ethical and political issues concerning
the rights and responsibilities of individuals and communities (Calman 1994). In the UK there is
widespread uncertainty around health care issues and the NHS, with local disputes over
rationing mushrooming into heated national debates (Timmins 1994, Rogers and Driscoll 1994,
Ross 1994, Wall 1994, Freemantle et al 1993, Salter 1993, Barrett and Mcmahon 1990).
Although most research is still focused on clinical studies, the NHS has instituted a research
and development programme centred around technology assessment. The aim is to enable
decision making to be based on evidence (Smith 1994, Smith 1993), and hence inhibit the
inappropriate and premature diffusion of new technologies (Smith 1993, Laurance 1995). Aside
from the problems surrounding the production of technology assessments, their implementation
appears to be problematic. Therefore it appears that adoption patterns (diffusion) are influenced
by factors in addition to the technical costs and benefits of the technology itself. The purpose of
this study is to analyse what these forces may be, and what effects they have. Such
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identification is necessary before these forces can be addressed, and thus enable greater
managerial control over the diffusion of medical technologies.
In summary, policy-makers tend to base their policies on the assumption that if independent,
reliable information can be gathered and disseminated, then managerial and clinical decisions
makers will act be based on this information. The difficulty is thus premised around gathering
reliable and meaningful information and disseminating (communicating) this in an effective way
to receptive decision-makers. The subsequent adoption and utilisation patterns would then
inform innovation, guiding it towards cost effective technologies that delivered the 'most bang for
their buck'.
However, in order to understand whether such a scenario will actually occur, it is necessary to
understand the forces that motivate and shape technological innovation and diffusion. It is the
purpose of this study to analyse to what degree this macro rationality is liable to inform decision
making at the local level (micro rationality).
3 Dissertation Structure
To achieve this aim, the study lays out a basic framework of the factors that could be involved in
driving and shaping innovation and diffusion, and then uses case studies to analyse what factors
appear to have dominated in practice.
Chapter 2 lays the theoretical foundation. Substantive (motivating) forces and formative
(shaping) variables shape innovation and diffusion patterns. These motivating forces (economic,
political, technological, social and ideological) have been conceptualised by different theoretical
schools (Marxist, Weberian and technological determinist etc.). Such forces are shaped by
contextual variables, such as the environment, the form of the technology itself, the identity of
the decision-makers, and the way that information about it is communicated.
Having defined the conceptual tools necessary to understand innovation and diffusion
processes, chapter three describes the structure of the study and the form of the research
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methodology. Chapter 3 describes the decision process underlying the choice of an
international, comparative multiple case study approach. Essentially this technique was chosen
since the questions being asked were of a 'how' and 'why' nature in a contemporary context,
where the researcher could not control the situation. The study sought to analyse what
influenced decision making around technology, by studying how specific types of technology
(device, drug, procedure) diffused within a specific setting (the UK and the USA). The breadth of
analysis necessary to understand this area, and the lack of pre-existing knowledge, meant that a
quantitative study would be extremely unreliable. Of the qualitative techniques available, the
case study seemed the most appropriate. Consequently an international comparative case study
approach was adopted. This combined interviewing with a wide-ranging professional and lay
literature review.
The environment forms the context within which the substantive and formative forces operate,
and chapter 4 analyses the different environmental settings of the US and the UK. It shows how
the different cultures of the UK and USA are reflected in different governmental systems,
themselves directly effecting the production and consumption of health care. Essentially the UK
is a unitary state where governmental power is concentrated, whilst in the US the federal system
ensures that government power is much more diffuse and contingent. Government in the UK
has accepted an obligation to provide health care, essentially as a citizenship right, whilst the US
government has accepted such responsibilities to a much smaller and more contextual degree.
The government in the UK both funds and provides the bulk of health care, whilst the US
government substantially finances care, but has limited involvement in its provision. Recent
changes in the healthcare systems of both countries are causing their systems to converge, as
both governments actively or passively embrace systems of managed competition based on
managed care providers.
The post-war period was characterised by extensive government spending on the knowledge
base, particularly in the US. e.g. universities, research institutes etc. Such spending indirectly
supported the production of medical technologies, and constraints on public expenditure have
encouraged the commercialisation of academic research. Governments are generally positive
towards medical technology industries, exerting relatively little control over them, even in high
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profile areas such as pharmaceuticals. The pharmaceutical industry is extremely powerful and
profitable, enabling it to strongly influence government policy making. By contrast, the small
localised device companies tend to react to their environment, having little economic or political
power. Clinicians, meanwhile, occupy a powerful position, since their work is both highly valued
and vaguely defined, and they often hold important roles as both producer and consumer.
The comprehensive description of chapter 4 completes the setting for the case studies that
follow. With the aim of understanding the formative and substantive factors effecting the
diffusion of technologies, the theory chapter has described the principle substantive forces
(economics, politics, ideological and social factors) in addition to analysing two of the formative
factors (the adopter and the communication channels they are exposed to). The context chapter
has then analysed the environment within which decision-making occurs, whilst paying some
attention to decision making by adopters within the hospital environment. Consequently all the
substantive forces have been described, as have all the formative factors, with the exception of
technologies. The different technologies are the focus of the subsequent 3 case study chapters.
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 analyse the ways that a device (MRI), a drug (Prozac), and a surgical
procedure (Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy) diffused in each country. Such a pattern covers the
different categories of tangible medical technologies, whilst the specific examples exhibit
different degrees of implicit and explicit knowledge. The knowledge component of Laparoscopic
Cholecystectomy resides mainly in the surgeon, whilst MRIs' inherent technological capacities
require skilled operators to be realised, and Prozac requires only the clinicians diagnostic
knowledge.
Chapter 5 is concerned with Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) which is a powerful and
expensive device capable of producing attractive and detailed pictures of the body and some of
its internal structures. The principle argument of this chapter is that MRI innovation was
informed partly by scientific and medical prestige, and that it diffused rapidly and inappropriately
primarily due to professional competition between radiologists and other clinical groups, but also
because it was perceived as an emblem of high technology diagnosis. Consequently, hospitals
and imaging centres sought it to gain referrals and retain market share and institutional status.
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Chapter 6 considers Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy, the popularly termed 'keyhole surgery' to
remove the gallbladder. The argument of this chapter is that Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy
underwent rapid and uncontrolled innovation and diffusion, being motivated by general surgeons
fears over losing control of the gallbladder to less invasive technologies wielded by other
professional groups.
Chapter 7 turns its attention to Prozac, an anti depressant that swept the US from the late
1980s, but whose adoption in the UK has been much slower. The roots of this difference stretch
back into culture and professional competition. The key theme of the chapter is that although
there was little evidence to support the manufacturer's (Eli Lilly) claims about how Prozac
worked, Eli Lilly was able to successfully market Prozac as a 'cure all' since clinicians were
anxious to reduce their uncertainty and insecurity in dealing with idiosyncratic human behaviours
in the clinical encounter. This final case study differs from the others in that clinical gain seems
to have been the most compelling reason for adoption and diffusion, as illusory as this may be.
The final chapter summarises the theoretical underpinning of the study, summarises the case
studies and then compares them to the theories to assess which explanations offer the most
insight. Essentially they find that the forces motivating innovation and diffusion differ, but are
largely based around political and economic concerns. However, technical issues can be
important, but their actual value is more a function of clinical confidence and convenience than
any intricate analysis of cost and benefit, even in the financially more conservative UK. Crucially,
rationality is highly contextual and variable, so that macro rationality is rarely articulated at the
local level. Such a conclusion undermines the validity of much of the theory on which the
strategy for controlling medical technology, and hence health care costs, is based. Similarly, the
findings suggest that an increased emphasis on decentralisation and competition (between
professionals, institutions etc.) is liable to increase inappropriate innovation, diffusion and
utilisation.
However, the findings also suggest that if innovation and diffusion are driven by professional
competition, in the main, and by marginal clinical advantage in some circumstances, then
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policies aimed at these aspects may be more effective. Essentially, it seems that policy must be
oriented towards reducing clinicians' perceptions of their personal, professional and clinical risk,
since otherwise they are liable to engage in an inappropriate medical arms race.
4 Comment
This study is concerned with understanding what forces motivate and shape the innovation and
diffusion of medical technologies. This is a timely issue, since most industrialised countries are
facing burgeoning health care expenditures, which often outstrip economic growth rates, and
appear to demonstrate progressively smaller gains in terms of health outcomes.
Growth in expenditure is sourced in changing demography (the ageing of the population) and
expanding technology. Governments have either directly instigated, or provided the environment
for, systems of managed competition, in an attempt to increase competitive pressures within the
health care sector- and thus reduce the costs of care by producing it more efficiently and by
rationing it. These are policies to constrain medical technology. Technology assessment forms
the base for these systems, but it is notoriously shaky, being theoretically weak (studies in
scientific circumstances do not equate with their clinical counterparts), difficult to conduct
(changing technologies and applications), and difficult to pass into medical practice
(communication problems faith etc.).
Implicit in the theory underlying this proposed method of managing medical costs, is the
assumption that technical innovation and diffusion in driven by clinical gain (i.e. technological
determinism). Its is the purpose of this study to assess whether social factors play a role in
these processes.
Consequently, the study begins by outlining the different factors which could effect innovation
and diffusion, comparing the major structural differences and similarities between the UK and
the US in terms of these issues, and then conducting three case studies of different
technologies. A concluding chapter draws these strands together with some suggestions of key
factors and future research areas.
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Chapter 2
Technological Innovation and Diffusion: A Theoretical Analysis
1 Introduction and Guide
This chapter is concerned with theoretical perspectives on the issue of technological innovation
and diffusion. Innovation and diffusion patterns are shaped by substantive (motivating) forces
and formative (shaping) variables, and these will be studied separately in the following two
sections.
Section2 introduces the classical diffusion curve, which is a mathematical model of
communication. The importance of the model is that it predicts how adoption should occur in a
population over a period of time. Deviations from this model suggest that other factors are
influencing decision making processes.
Section 3 outlines five dimensions, which may motivate social action. These are economic,
political, social, ideological, and technological. A final category, termed contingency, would
envisage these acting together according to context. Different theorists and researchers have
emphasised the importance of these different factors, and their work is drawn on for illustrative
purposes.
Section 4 describes the factors that shape how these motivating forces are expressed. These
variables can be conceptualised as the place where it happens (the environment), the decision
maker(s) adopting the technology (the adopter), the thing itself (the technology), and the way
that information is communicated (communication channels).
Such an analysis defines the conceptual tools, which are necessary to approach a comparative
study of technological innovation and diffusion in the UK and the USA. The next chapter, on
methodology, will be followed by a contextual chapter (establishing the shape of UK and US
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health care systems). Subsequent case studies will analyse the similarities and differences in
substantive forces driving innovation and diffusion at the macro level, and the influence that
formative factors (the environment, the adopters, the technology itself, and communication
channels) have on this. Analysis now turns to the substantive factors which are theorised as
motivating behaviour.
2 The Classical Diffusion Curve
The section begins by analysing the classic communications curve. Diffusion is the process by
which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time amongst members of
a social system (Rogers 1983). Essentially it is a convergence model where participants share
and create information to reach a mutual understanding (Coleman et al 1966, Fennell and
Warnecke 1988). The Sigmoid curve relates the percentage of potential to actual adopters over
time (until saturation is reached), and is based on a standard distribution bell shaped curve (fig
1). This curve is based on a logistical function, whereby the greater the number of individuals
encouraging adoption, the greater the rate of adoption, until the point where half the finite
population have adopted. In general the shape of the curve remains constant, although the time
span varies (velocity of adoption). The curve can be theorised to reflect dominant processes and
players, or to illuminate the influence of policies and specific events on a technology's adoption
(Banta and Luce 1993). Thus initial adopters tend to be adventurous and independent with an
extensive network of relations and the resources necessary to take risks. They are followed by
the early majority, the late majority (initially sceptical but respond to economic and applied
pressure), the late adopters and finally the laggards, who are traditionally isolated and localised
in outlook (Uttley 1991, Girifalco 1991).
The curve is influenced by adopters' varying resistance to change, which is overcome as
information is absorbed and familiarity grows. This is principally related to the frequency of
communication, which is a function of the number of people who have adopted the innovation,
and their sociometric positions (Girifalco 1991). This typical pattern reflects increasing adopter
(e.g. manager and clinician) confidence, as uncertainty is reduced by increasing experience with
the technology and its outcomes (functional and evaluative information), and growing
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Fig 1 The Classical Diffusion Curve
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environmental support (e.g. the availability of payment). Thus initial cautious adoption develops
into rapid, commercialised, acceptance (based on expertise, experience, improvement and
decreasing costs), followed by stable use and eventually decline, whilst the format of the
technology changes. Technologies thus have life cycles, since they develop and metamorphose
over time, until they expire (through becoming obsolete, or losing institutional or professional
support etc.). e.g. respirators were replaced by polio vaccinations, and intracranial by-pass
surgery for strokes was abandoned when it was realised to be relatively ineffective (Banta and
Luce 1993).
The curve represents typical diffusion patterns, although it does not explain the prime motive for
adoption, which can be either technically or culturally motivated, but is eased by the availability
of information, resources and discretion. Quantitative patterns are relatively meaningless outside
of their qualitative explanation, and much of the effort invested in associating curve shapes with
particular processes has been wasted (Banta and Luce 1993).
Diffusion curves differ from the mathematical model outlined (fig 1). The following discussion is
concerned with analysing the substantive and formative factors that would shape the form of the
curve.
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3 Substantive Factors
This section analyses the factors which have variously been considered to motivate behaviour.
Each section identifies a force which can motivate social action, and illustrates it with examples
drawn from social research. e.g. economics (Marx), social forces (Weber, Fidler, Giddens,
Stacey), politics (Weber, Alford), ideological beliefs (Weber, feminist theory), technological
determinism (Marx, Weber), and contingency models (Weber, Giddens).
3.1 Economic Motives
Economic forces are frequently considered to be a major determinant of social action, and Marx
is often identified with this perspective. Marx's theory of historical materialism is based on the
assumption that people are social animals whose most fundamental requirement is to work on
their environment in order to survive.
Production, in common with most activity, is organised within the context of social groups, who
come to have a reality separate from the individual. Patterns of social organisation are strongly
influenced by productive forces, which form the base of society. The superstructure of society
(culture, ideology, social patterns, social consciousness etc.) comes to be a reflection of the
organisation of the material base (economic processes). Hence as material economic
processes change, so do the cultures and institutions of society. The theory of historical
materialism is based on the primacy of material over ideas as the causal agent in historical
processes. A link can thus be made from this crude and simplistic version of Marxist theory to
forms of technological determinism, where technological change acts as the interface between
society and production, and thus has a role in changing society. However, although economics
(production) has this pre-eminent role, it does not necessarily determine social organisation,
since there are degrees of relative autonomy between levels. Relative autonomy effectively
allows space for other factors to influence decision-making (e.g. culture, ideology etc.), which
can be expressed by decision-makers within particular contexts (e.g. institutions). Effectively,
therefore, relative autonomy allows meso-theory, context and agency entree (Giddens 1971).
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Changes in the material productive forces create a pressure for wider social change, as the
forces of production come into conflict with the existing relations of production, and conflicts
occur between the dominant class (wedded to older means of production) and a subordinate
challenging class (drawing its strength from developing forces of economic production). In this
way economic forces drive social change (class struggle) and this forms the motor of history.
This materialistic conception of history is thus based on the conflict between dominant (thesis)
and challenger (antithesis), resulting in a changed social order (synthesis). Ideas were thus
rationalisations for action, which had been initiated at the economic base (Giddens 1971).
This simplistic version of Marxist theory views the economic substructure as strongly influencing
the social, political, cultural and ideological superstructure, although there was a dialectical
relationship between subject and object in historical processes (enabling, for example, ideas not
to merely reflect physical reality) (Giddens 1995).
Historical materialism is thus founded on the concept that the satisfaction of human physical
needs is fundamental to the organisation of society, and that history is merely a sequence of
productive forms to meet this basic need (Appleby 1992).
The means of production (resources and technology) is the essential base of society, and the
ownership patterns which it establishes inform the class structure, which is the basis of the
relations of production (whereby ownership creates dominance and submission which is
supported in political and legal superstructures). These relations of production form the mode of
production, which is the way the means of production are made productive, and essentially
describes the historical epoch (Giddens 1971).
Ideas are thus related to the way that production is organised and the class relations which are
formed by the system of production. Ideologies are systems of attitudes, conceptions, ideas and
beliefs that have the power to alter our perception of objective social reality. Ideologies are
usually those of the dominant social classes, and function to manage the contradictions of
society (Giddens 1971).
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Three elements can be drawn from this discussion. Marx viewed economics as being the
dominant force shaping society (through its influence on decision-makers, both collectively and
individually). Secondly, technology had a role as a vehicle of social change (in that groups
adopted technologies which suited them and their environments) and also as an expression of
social change. Thirdly, groups used productive technologies in conflicts with each other, both in
the sense of artefact (e.g. steam engine) and process (e.g. factory). However, Marx failed to
clearly distinguish between the economic and the technological (Giddens 1971, 1995).
In relation to medical technology, Marxian perspectives would place a formative role on
economic forces. Innovations could be generated from a wide variety of sources, but only those
which were (basically) economically useful would be adopted. Consequently, in as much as
economic developments were linear, so technological innovation would be. Innovations would
be offered to potential adopters within the selection environment, but again, economic forces
would be the strongest influence over their adoption (Giddens 1971, 1995).
This section has illustrated the potential importance of economic forces in motivating social
action, and has drawn extensively upon Marx to illustrate this perspective. The following section
analyses the importance of political factors in driving social activity.
3.2 Political Motives
Political interests and designs are often cited as motivating social action. Although many
theorists, notably Weber, have written about this, this section illustrates the concept by drawing
on the work of Alford.
Alford views the health care field as dominated by interest group politics, the 3 groups of which
are clinicians, managers and the public. A groups' ability to advance its interests depends on its
consonance with the wider structural interests (forces) of society (which are expressed through
mutually reinforcing structural and ideological systems), with existing societal networks
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guaranteeing that certain dominant interests are viewed as legitimate (hence excluding
alternative possibilities) (Alford 1975).
Each set of interests is internally fragmented to some degree, and these ideological and
practical differences form the framework around which the shifting contours of health care
politics are expressed. Practical issues impact on this system, causing otherwise disparate
factions to coalesce and form strategic alliances. Thus whilst the medical profession will
generally cohere in opposition to bureaucratic control by management, aspiring clinical factions
may ally with bureaucratic ones to promote their relative power in a specific situation. Thus
internal divisions may be the source of strategic agreement under specific circumstances,
regardless of more general ideological opposition. Technologies come to form a way that groups
and fractions may maintain dominance (Alford 1975).
Having briefly considered the importance of political motives, the analysis can now turn to
another potential driving force which informs social action. Weber was central in recognising the
separate sources of power in society that could emerge from 'status'. Within Weber's
conception, status groupings are based on 'an effective claim to social esteem in terms of
positive or negative privileges' (Fidler 1981).
3.3 Social Motives
Weber conceptualised that various forms of skills, knowledge's, dispositions and social contacts
(cultural, symbolic, status and social forms of capital) are sources of power, although they have
no material reality (Milner 1994). This is apparent in everyday life, where individuals or groups
seem to be peculiarly well placed (although not in terms of material resources) to exercise
power. Indeed, Weber analysed 'charismatic authority', which was centred in a particular
individual. Similarly, diffusion and communication theorists have focused on the roles of people
who are perceived to have some special skill or ability, and become a nexus within the local
community (using sociometric studies to assess their degree of connectedness) (O'Toole 1984,
Milner 1994, Fidler 1981). A good example is Laskey, who is credited with drawing together
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many strands of economic, political and scientific interests, ultimately enabling the launching of
the War on Cancer by the US in the early 1970s (Moss 1991).
Status is thus separate from other forms of power. Thus British businessmen complained of
their low status by comparison to the (almost irrelevant) aristocracy, the 'jet set', members of
'cafe society', causing them to consider themselves almost a powerless elite, despite their
wealth (Fidler 1981).
Studies have identified the existence of local social status systems, often based upon
perceptions of 'breeding' in rural communities (Stacey et al 1960, 1975). More currently, status
has been conceptualised around 'consumption patterns', and these have been related to
theories about 'the body', and even recruited with a view to assisting public health measures. In
essence, certain objects and practices become associated with degrees and forms of status,
and this influences their desirability. Economists have long recognised this, with the existence of
'Giffen' goods and services. The demand for these, contrary to economic theory, rises as their
price does (e.g. luxury cars). Status is often associated with ideology. Thus the British
businessmen interviewed by Fidler complained of the low status accorded 'industry' or 'trade' in
the UK (Fidler 1981).
It is apparent that certain groups or individuals have sources of power which are related to
others' perceptions of their social prestige, whether this is based in some almost mystical quality
they possess, their connections to influence, or some indeterminate skill or value. Ultimately,
however, perceptions of social status underpin ranking, which strongly shapes the ability of
groups to challenge, shape or negotiate social practices. Groups thus perceive certain symbols
and emblems as connotating status, which itself is derived from an ability to influence (not
necessarily rooted in material power) (Giddens 1971, 1995). Such elements of power can
become expressed in technologies (which may also act as emblems e.g. surgical dress).
Although vague as a concept, status can be seen to emerge from other sources of power, be a
means of gaining power, but also be a power source in its own regard. Essentially, people or
groups with status (however defined) have the ability to mould social action, since they are
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viewed as having resources and legitimacy. Technology itself may act as a status symbol
(Giddens 1971).
Having defined social forces, the following section analyses ideological motives to action. These
are even more esoteric and abstract than social forces, but can be well illustrated with regard to
feminist theory.
3.4 Ideological Motives
Ideologies are systems of belief that explain the nature of something (how things relate to each
other, why they relate as they do, and whether this is good or bad). Usually they deal with a few
fundamental dimensions that inform multiple layers of social life, and consequently they tend to
guide broad social movements. Simultaneously, however, different ideologies can coexist, and
can debate with each other for definitional domain in an area of social life. Such discussions are
often posed using different languages and rhetorics. Whilst Weber's studies of 'The Protestant
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism' provide a good example of the theory that ideology (in this
case religion) can shape societies, a more current example lies in the theory surrounding
'patriarchy'.
Patriarchy can be understood in various ways, and so no explanation of it can be universally
agreed on. In essence it has become an emblem for social systems based around the
domination of females by males, and younger males by older males. Such domination is so
universal, ubiquitous and complete that it appears as 'natural', and is thus almost invisible. From
the perspective of many feminists, it overrides other forms of power, or is used to inform them
(e.g. class, race, status, economic systems etc.). Patriarchy is maintained by a process of
socialisation, reinforced by education, literature, media, religion, so that its values become
internalised (Bryson 1992, Kandall 1987).
Patriarchy's practical impact can be seen in the way that societies are structured around core
sets of ideas concerning the different gender roles, which are tightly applied and supported with
degrees of social stigma and alienation. Patriarchy has been analysed from numerous
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dimensions, including space, body, language, and knowledge, as the concept is used as a tool
to explore the new depths to social life (Evans 1997).
In a more concrete sense, the workings of patriarchy can be seen in the traditional conduct of
rape trials, where the woman's sexual history and dress was considered important information,
signalling the existence of a set of assumptions regarding the gender's correct, and expected,
mode of behaviour. Such ideas, primarily based around sexual control, stretch back through
history (e.g. Madonna's and Magdalene's, virgins and whores, good and bad girls), and
continued to operate as an acceptable framework of sexual values. Similarly, the continuing
gender division of labour, supported by women's place in the secondary labour market (with
lower wages, less security, and less benefits), has been used by radical feminists to argue for
the pre-eminence of patriarchal forms of (sexually based) exploitation over those of Marxist
(economically based) theories of domination. Finally, Stacey's 'Regulating British Medicine'
describes the General Medical Council as a pro professional, masculinist and racist
organisation, that systematically excluded women and female perspectives, in spite of the
genuinely well meaning nature of many of its members. Feminist theorists have traced the
impact of this ideology across the social world, producing new and intriguing perspective on
traditional social theory, and showing how the ideology informs social movements, whilst also
being recruited to support particular positions (Evans 1997). Technology, in its strictest sense,
can thus be seen as a gendered product, emphasising the control of nature through culture,
using technology (applied knowledges). Consequently, technology can be associated with a
masculine perspective concerned with social domination.
In contrast to the influence of ideological forces, which are abstract and intangible, the following
section studies technology itself, and the role that it can play as an agency for social action.
3.5 Technological Motives
Technological determinism covers a broad range of perspectives, from the hard determinism
(technology has the power to affect change) to soft interpretations (technology is one of a series
of causes). The common underlying principle is that technology has an internal logic which is
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separate from social forces, and which shapes social structures and individual action. Most
models, however, are based on the assumption that technological development follows a
sequential, incremental and determinate development along a frontier, as innovating forces draw
on available knowledge stock and technical expertise (ability to utilise this stock), giving rise to
technology which develops according to its own ('natural') law. Thus technology strongly
influences which technologies can subsequently emerge, giving a further form of sequential
ordering to the process. e.g. existing technologies such as writing give rise to subsequent
technologies, such as printing. Evidence for this is found in the frequency that innovations
cluster in time, with unrelated groups generating 'breakthroughs' almost simultaneously, and
these giving rise to Schumpterian cycles of bunching technological productivity (Lauden 1995,
Scranton 1995).
Drawing on this common foundation, different theoretical versions model the impact that
technology has on society and vice versa. Technology is assumed to be embedded with values
which then impose themselves on society. Thus classical determinist conceptions construct
technologies as being expressions of efficiency oriented principles, which then impact on
society. Technology can be viewed as autonomous and deterministic when the norms by which
it is advanced are removed from political or ethical discourse, and when the goals of efficiency
or productivity become surrogates for value based debate over methods, alternatives and ends.
Thus logic and efficiency come to dominate the organisation of society (Bimber in Smith and
Marx 1994). The underlying logic that is seen to drive technology in western industrial societies
is based in the ideology of science, which is understood to operate free from bias in its pursuit of
objective truth, with technology being science applied to the conquest of nature (Staudenmaier
in Smith and Marx 1994).
The primary difference between hard and soft conceptions of technological determinism is the
degree to which technology impacts upon society and vice versa. However, even multivariate,
non linear models enabled technology to be adopted by human agents as tools of expression,
but enable such technology (once developed) to direct the course of events. Thus a technology
can, at the very least, emerge from a complex context, become imbued with sets of human
meaning and purpose, and then become an agent of change in its own right. A simple example
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would be a hospital which adopts an MRI machine for research purposes, but then builds a
whole imaging department around it. Thus social, economic and political factors follow the
technology and are built onto it (Lauden 1995, Scranton 1995).
However, whether technology acts as original agency, or whether it develops into an agency, its
developmental course is perceived to follow a roughly ordered sequence, which imposes certain
social and political characteristics upon society, even whilst it is influenced by socio-economic
forces. Thus technology, at its weakest, can be seen to be a strong mediating factor, rather than
a determinant (Heilbroner; Smith and Marx 1994).
Awareness of the potential autonomy of technology is present in the work of both Marx and
Weber. Marx viewed productive technologies as driving social change. However, such a
definition is much broader than the strict artefact definition of true technological determinism.
Similarly there are aspects of technological determinism within Weberianism. Thus Weber
viewed the process of bureaucratic rationalisation as causing the convergence of different social
and political systems, driven by institutional and organisational logic. However, again, Weber's
conception of technology was broader than simple artefacts (Giddens 1971).
Technological determinism thus suggests that development and adoption should occur in a
relatively linear fashion, according to an underlying and universal scientific logic. Such ideas are
associated with progress, which is viewed to be beneficial. Broader conceptions, however,
suggest that technology can develop its own identity with time, as it stabilises and has human
effort and crafting embedded within it. In general technological determinist models would view
both innovation and development as being linear processes, driven by the inherent nature and
utility of the technology. Later in this chapter the relationship between technological
characteristics and adoption will be studied. Attention will also be paid in the dissertation to the
role of science as an ideology underlying the legitimacy of technology in society. In a sense, this
is the most important aspect to technological determinism, since it suggests that an ideological
force dominates social processes.
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Having discussed the role that technology, along with economics, politics, social factors and
ideology may all play in driving decision making and action, the final section highlights a
contingency approach, within which forces may share influence, or dominate in different
contexts. Weber, Marx and Giddens can all illustrate this perspective.
3.6 Contingent Motives
Each of the previous five motives can influence social action. However, a contingency approach
proposes that all such forces can play an equal role in generating social activity, according to
context.
Weber rejected economic determinism, and theorised that social life was influenced by separate
and overlapping spheres of social, economic, political and ideological factors, with none
dominating and all being having their role in informing the active decision making of individuals,
who were the agents of change. Hence Weber formulated a theory tracing the inception of
capitalism to a particular form of religious fervour (ideology), and ascribed human agency a role
in the making of historical processes. Thus Weber viewed people as subjectively interpreting
their surroundings and then changing the material world according to their conceptions, whilst
Marx viewed human subjectivity as being an expression of historical forces. Whilst Marx
accepted the role and importance of ideological and political forces, independent of economic
ones (e.g. in the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte 1851), the pre-eminence of economic
forces is generally recognised. By contrast Weber believed that ideas could overrule economic
forces, and scorned the view that society was a reified entity, separate from the personal worlds
of individuals (who Weber viewed as central to the study of sociology and social action)
(Giddens 1971).
Thus Weber strongly believed in human contingency as a factor fragmenting simple cause and
effect chains. Social action could only be understood by understanding the imputation of
meaning which the social actor applies to a situation. Thus patterns of social organisation are
rooted in the subjectiveness of individuals, who constantly recreate versions of social
relationships whilst being influenced by patterns of social organisation, which are differently
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perceived and experienced. Thus factors could be both cause and effect at once (Giddens
1971, 1995).
Weber was also concerned with rationalisation, which was seen as a way of objectifying
decision making, and which focused on regimenting decision making processes in order to
achieve standardised outputs. Thus nature, society and the individual were increasingly
controlled by an orientation towards planning, technical procedures and rational action.
Classically, therefore, Weber theorised that traditional and charismatic sources of power would
become increasingly rationalised, through mechanisms of bureaucracy (Giddens 1971, 1995).
Weber's conceptualisation of power sources operating in society is most clearly described in his
studies of individuals and their social relationships. Weber identified 3 sources of power which
people could use to exert in order to achieve their interests over opposition, and which also
formed the basis of co-operation. An individuals' social class was described by their life
chances, which equated to economic probabilities defined by their resources (e.g. unearned
income, land etc.) and opportunities (for selling skills and services on the market), which had
implications for their income. The market where goods and services were produced and
exchanged was entirely separate (theoretically) from the political and legal spheres of society,
although such a situation required certain social and political conditions. Class was, therefore,
based on production. By contrast individuals could belong to separate status groups, which were
based on consumption patterns (lifestyle), and gave rise to levels of social esteem. Thus status
groups evaluate social worth and bestow honour, and segregate themselves from other status
groups and monopolise status privilege. This dimension informs how individuals perceive each
other (e.g. equals, submissive, dominant). The final dimension of power was party, whereby
individuals worked collectively and deliberately to acquire political power (Giddens 1971, 1995).
In a similar vein, Giddens' theory of structuration links agency to structure. The individual seeks
routinisation (seeking, and thus supporting, a social structure) whilst being capable of actively
creating new structures by applying schemata's (mental maps) to situations where they have not
been applied before. However, the power to do this is influenced by the environment, as well as
the agent's ability to summon resources and legitimacy. Like Weber, Giddens seeks to
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transcend traditional dichotomies (determinism V voluntarism, society V individual, object V
subject) (Giddens 1995). The theory provides a degree of coherence where Weber provides
only scattered reflections, and adds a degree of indeterminacy (illustrated by the loss of the 'iron
cage of bureaucracy' which Weber gloomily saw coming to dominate rational societies).
However, weaknesses can also be identified. The theory is so comprehensive that it may cease
to be a theory at all (capable of prediction), but simply become a sophisticated tool enabling
explanation and description, whilst it continues to attribute a degree of rationality to human
actions (discounting the role of the emotional). However, the attention given to Giddens
demonstrates the continued resonance that many of these basic Weberian concepts have. With
specific regard to technology, these theories differ in the degree of contingency, determinism
and emotionalism which they posit as driving technological development (Bryant and Jury in
Bryant and Jury 1991).
Marx, Weber and Giddens all illustrate aspects of contingency theory, enabling individuals to
draw on different motives in their decision making. Weber, in particular, identifies the basic
systems of domination and control within which human decision-makers operate. Both
innovation and adoption could be influenced by any combination of economic, political, social,
ideological or technical forces, causing such processes to be lateral and contingent.
In summary, this substantive section has identified five major forces (economics, politics, social
factors, ideology and technology) which could guide decision making, and has proposed a final
model which emphasises that the primacy of any of these forces is contextual and contingent.
The following section will describe the formative characteristics which classical diffusion theory
views as central to shaping the diffusion of technologies.
4 Formative Factors
This section is concerned with analysing formative (shaping) factors. These shape how
motivatory (substantive) forces are expressed. Classical diffusion theory constructs adoption as
being strongly influenced by characteristics of the environment, the adopter, the technology
itself, and communication channels, and produces some form of bell shaped curve to illustrate
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the adoption rate of a single technology over time. However, this curve is really a communication
model (illustrating at what point groups of individuals receive information). It is only illustrative of
adoption when communication and adoption are directly linked (e.g. in the case where the
individual communicated to is also the sole decision-maker and able to make such decisions).
Consequently this analysis shall treat the bell curve as a communications model, and construct
it as the way in which various decision-makers receive information about various elements of
their situation e.g. environmental forces, adopter practices and expectations, technological
attributes etc. Analysis begins with the environment.
4.1 Characteristics of the Environment
Environmental factors are concerned with economic, political, social and informational aspects,
which are external to the immediate adopter and technology. They emerge from numerous
points, and affect both production and consumption at every level. The principal shaping factor
is the attitudes of decision-makers towards technologies (e.g. supportive, critical), and their
ability to articulate these views in practice (which depends on their access to decision making).
At the local level such general trends are moulded by other economic (e.g. competition), political
(e.g. public image and need) and social (e.g. clinician demand) factors, and distorted by
shortages of information (Hollingsworth 1986).
Societal support for medical technology is partly influenced by public support. Although the
public remains optimistic regarding the production and application of technology, growing
scepticism is being directed at the moral authority of clinicians as decision-makers, whilst fiscal
pressures are pushing payers to manage spending more vigorously and directly. However,
spending on health care remains morally justified, and changes are articulated more in the
sense of who should make decisions on what grounds, rather than whether spending itself is
appropriate (Banta and Luce 1993). The articulation of these different interests depends on the
nature of the economic and political systems, which are the main conduits through which
decisions are turned directly into resources. In general, the more unitary and homogenous the
political and economic system, the more decision making will be centralised within a limited
number of policy communities, whilst the more pluralistic and heterogeneous the system, the
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more decision making will be fragmented between competing policy networks. Essentially, if
resources and decision making capacity is diffuse, then the more access points there are for
interest groups to seek to influence decision making (Smith 1993a). Economic, political, social
and ideological forces and factors emerge from the environment and are expressed on decision-
makers within health care systems.
For example, a system based on budgetary control through a single financier is more likely to
constrain technology adoption than one relying on a plurality of providers drawing on unlimited
budgets (since a competitive environment could exist, where it was possible to externalise
costs) (Banta and Luce 1993, Laubach; Gelijns and Dawkins 1994). However, such
generalisations rapidly disintegrate at other levels and as factors interact. For example,
ideological factors, such as the declining faith in clinicians, can be represented through legal
changes (increased rates of malpractice litigation) which encourage manufacturers to produce
'defensive medicine' technologies (e.g. foetal heart monitors) which can be rapidly adopted by
unitary systems through administrative directive. Such administrative factors can themselves
influence adoption. Thus whilst it is administratively simple to quantify pharmaceutical
prescriptions, or the purchase of large scale capital equipment, it is much more difficult to track
the incidence of particular surgical sub routines, since they are less visible. Political factors are
often central to the macro, meso and micro decision making contexts. Thus political parties
commitments to expand spending on health care may translate into intermediate bureaucratic
systems which contain spending, whilst individual hospitals effectively draw on political
legitimacy to expand their services and their social prestige.
Thus social, economic, political and ideological forces express themselves and interact at
different levels (e.g. macro, meso, micro) and in different contexts (times and spaces). These
forces are articulated within situations of uncertainty (health care is an art and not a science),
where consequences are significant (social and ideological legitimacy creates high political
profiles and justifies high expenditure), risks high and information in short supply. Thus health
care resembles chaos theory more than it does Newtonian physics. The more pluralistic the
interests represented and the decision-making points, the more unpredictable the system
becomes.
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This section has illustrated the breadth of factors, within the rubric of 'environment', which can
effect the diffusion of technologies. In the main these can be considered as ideological (e.g.
preference for intervention over prevention), economic (e.g. private or public health care
systems) and political (e.g. structures of administration) structures. The next section turns to the
characteristics of the decision-makers, who act as the actual agency adopting the technologies.
4.2 Characteristics of the Adopter
This section begins by linking some Weberian theory (concerning the different types of
legitimacy) with analysis by Alford (who identified three groups in macro health care decision
making) and Learson-Greer (who analysed three groups of decision-makers in meso and micro
level decision making within hospitals).
Technological decision making is shaped by the identity of the decision makers, their values and
the processes they work within, situated within the local micro environment (Greer A 1987). With
regard to health care, three decision making systems can be conceptualised as operating in
adopting organisation, and Weberian analysis offers a convenient way to conceptualise the
power sources of these different groups.
Weber analysed decision making within communities. Communities are webbed together by a
decision making structure, which defines who can make decisions (according to systemic
position or individual criteria). Decisions made at these points are considered legitimate, and are
therefore unchallenged (effectively dominant power is granted to a system of decision making).
Weber identified 3 systems of domination, with each varying according to how it exercises
authority (e.g. claims it makes to legitimacy, the type of obedience it elicits from individuals, the
mechanisms through which decisions are executed) (Giddens 1971).
Charismatic authority is centred within the personality of remarkable individuals, who are
believed to have special powers not accessible to most people. Typically this is seen to emanate
from some mystical or divine origin. Charismatic leaders are often revolutionary, transcending
the mundane through their emotional indifference to everyday life. Charismatic authority resists
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bureaucratisation, and the imposition of rules and routines. However, it typically becomes
routinised (when the original founders die) by transferring their exceptional powers into core
texts, principles, and representations. These structural and process artefacts are used to inform
followers. e.g. the leaders arbitrary decision making may become a structured system. A good
example is in medicine, where the sacred doctor-patient relationship is one based on
inexplicable exchanges, and where such action is guided by the Hippocratic Oath. In medical
exchanges clinicians must understand the individual on a personal level, in order to understand
what profile of costs, benefits and risks they would be willing to tolerate. Such unquantifiable,
inexact and deeply personal relationships, implicitly based on trust, and concerned with unique
experiences at the edge of life, are the basis of charismatic authority, which is typically
concentrated within a single individual (Giddens 1971, Greer 1987).
Traditional forms of domination are based on tradition or custom. Leaders obtain their legitimacy
from the weight of history that goes with the position, and their followers perception that their
ancestors concurred with such a system. Individuals are bound to leaders through personal
obligations to the position. Commands are believed to be valid due to the weight of the position
and the decision makers rights to exercise discretion. In a sense this type of authority can be
related to hospital boards. Traditionally such centres of decision making were composed of
individuals who represented the community, either by prominence, some form of appointment
based on their professional positions, or election. These systems of appointment are thus based
on traditional deference to local notables, whose power is granted by access to physical
resources, resources granted by their representative roles within organisations, or by their
representation of a population. Only the first group is clearly a form of traditional domination,
whilst a rational legal perspective could be taken on representatives of organisations or
populations (Giddens 1971).
Legal domination rests on rationality and the inherent belief in the legality of enacted rules and
the right of those elevated to authority under those rules to issue commands. Power resides in
the office, not in the individual occupying it, with each level of authority being subject to the
authority of another within a hierarchical system. Technical procedures minimise personal
discretion at every level, with decision-makers following programmed instructions related to their
32
jurisdiction. The onus is on the procedure, which if correctly executed produces the desired
outcome, and the individual is simply a carrier of the process. Consequently the emphasis is on
process rationality as opposed to substantive (outcomes) rationality. Such systems are
associated with bureaucracy, and provide stable and predictable environments which are ideal
for decision making. Administration is a specialised task, enabling expert administrative
knowledge concerning process to be concentrated within the system (causing decision making
to be independent of the capriciousness of the environment) (Giddens 1971).
Systems can thus be defined according to where power emanates. In charismatic domination it
is held by the individual, in traditional systems it emanates from a specific historical source
which is transferred through position, and in rational legal systems it emanates from the
procedure by which decision makers are selected. The type of authority source informs a typical
pattern of administration associated with it. e.g. charismatic leaders have vast discretion and
their administration is usually through personally picked followers, traditional leaders are
supported by those with responsibility to the position, and rational legal leaders are obeyed by
offices related structurally to their own. The organising principle in each case is the individual,
the past and the process. Weber recognised that these classifications were ideal types
(theoretical propositions useful for analysis) that would rarely be found in practice. Consequently
this grants some leeway to their interpretation, enabling the allocating of principal characteristics
to organisational categories (Giddens 1971).
Having identified the theoretical basis on which different groups may justifiably make decisions,
the analysis now turns to Affords discussion of the different groups involved in health care
decision making at the macro level.
Clinicians are the dominant structural interest within health care, forming a professional
monopoly over the production and distribution of health services, which existing social structures
support in principle and practice within industrialised societies. No forces seriously challenged
the principle of professional monopoly, and institutionalised forces functioned to support all
existing (recognised) occupations, groups or organisations within health care. Consequently
internal squabbles were common (e.g. organising around specific issues), since groups had little
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need to act together, and incentives to gain larger chunks of legitimate (political) 'turf'. Such
professional monopolisers are oriented towards innovation and decentralised control, viewing
institutions as an organisational framework which sustains their primary functions (delivery and
research), and which represents their social and political interests. Thus hospitals become
physical fortifications representing the role of clinicians within society and the health care system
e.g. hospitals are constructed as being the centre of networks, surrounded by clinics, health
centres, medical schools, public health agencies etc (Alford 1975).
Technology is also essential as professional monopolisers seek to expand and maintain control
over their work. e.g. expanding outputs and outcomes, research, training etc. Such activities
boost the occupation's power (professional aggrandisement) for both the collective (e.g.
medicalisation of society) and the individual (e.g. professional and institutional recognition).
Consequently clinicians breed services and programs, which are controlled by various
organisational forms, which themselves are dominated by the interests of professional
monopolisers. Hence it is easy for these specialised institutions to gain resources from wider
society (since they are perceived as legitimate), whilst it is hard for society to exert control over
them (since they use bureaucratic, professional and semiotic screens to obstruct external
control). Professionals thus claim escalating autonomy from control, either from society or each
other, by becoming increasingly specialised (often using technology to facilitate this). Thus
speciality boards define their specialism's boundaries (content, function of certification, establish
recommended patterns of training, practice and behaviour) and thus define a profession, and
defend their place within it. Prof essionalisation is thus a political process of negotiation within the
medical profession, which itself has an interest in maintaining the principle of professional
autonomy and control, regardless of internal conflicts over the relative distribution of these
powers and privileges granted by wider society. Such 'breeding' creates endemic conflicts
between various sub specialisms, which centre their legitimate jurisdiction over various parts of
the body, different diseases, symptom clusters and technology. The difficulty for the profession
is that the more they are seen to squabble, the less popular legitimacy they are able to
command, and the more scientific they apparently make their decision making, the more
accessible it is to bureaucratic control. Hence development (movement) is essential for
professionals to maintain their collective independence from control. Thus without change,
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professional technology becomes amenable to control, whilst technology itself is central to the
maintenance of such autonomy (dominance) (Alford 1975).
Changes in society enable the emergence of challenging interests, who organise in opposition to
the dominant interests. Health care has been characterised by numerous changes within
economics (e.g. fiscal pressure), politics (e.g. fragmentation of the profession), society (e.g.
declining faith in the activity of clinicians), and technology (e.g. technological escalation). The
primary motivation behind the rise of these challenging interests has been economic pressures,
which have pushed health care delivery systems, and their component processes and
institutions, to become more concerned with planning, co-ordination, administration,
regionalisation and systems research, set within a seductive ideology of corporate rationalism.
Corporate rationalisers embrace bureaucratic models, viewing clinicians as subordinate workers
within a complex health care delivery system, organised according to aggregate rather than
individual criteria. Thus government has become more active in financing, licensing,
accreditation, certification, regulation, etc., and such forces have encouraged the establishment
of systems of bureaucratic control at numerous different levels of decision making. The degree
of control exercised over clinicians varies according to their setting and situation (Alford 1975).
Repressed interests are structurally excluded from power, and require extraordinary political
organisation and effort (or revolutionary changes) to get their interests addressed. Within health
care the community population represents such a group. Not recognising themselves as an
entity with an identity, they are consequentially disorganised, and have their interests
represented through weak social institutions and indirect political mechanisms. Traditionally,
hospital boards sought to represent, in a disjointed manner, the interests of the community. No
institutions or mechanisms ensure that community interests are served, although groups
occasionally form around specific tangible and apparent issues. However, repressed structural
interests must summon vast political and organisational energies to offset the intrinsic
disadvantages of their situation, whilst dominant interests are structurally advantaged by the
status quo. Beyond this, repressed interests require institutional and structural shifts for their
victories to become anything more than symbolic (Alford 1975).
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Different forms of Weber's legitimacy express themselves through Alford's work. A similar
model can be traced in work at the more micro level of the hospital itself, in work undertaken by
Learson-Greer on the location of technological decision making within the institution.
Clinicians, managers and trustees form three decision making systems within the adopting
authority, based around there being different participants, using different logic's and criteria.
Such a complex system, composed from these sub systems, is difficult to control. Recent
financial pressures have complicated these relationships, simultaneously forcing the systems to
work more closely together whilst increasing their level of mutual confrontation, as illustrated by
Alford's analysis of the fluctuating frontiers between corporate rationalisers (management),
professional monopolisers (clinicians) and the consistently repressed community interests.
Decisions about clinical processes rely on clinicians' advice and information, since they are,
collectively, morally empowered to manage the uncertainties inherent in the clinical encounter,
and so play a major role in the production and consumption of medical technologies. Clinicians
are thus central to decision making (although this varies, principally according to the nature of
the technology), maintaining considerable occupational discretion, and holding pervasive power
(based on their centrality to the delivery of health care) (Banta and Luce 1993 Greer 1985).
Clinicians are faced with uncertainty in dealing with variations in disease, patients, and
technology, set within a rapidly changing health care environment. Consequently they seek
technologies (and methods, such as specialising to minimise exposure to risk) to manage this
risk, and search for the 'magic bullet' which will impose a scientific predictability to their actions
(Altman and Blendon 1979).
Hence they are often motivated to adopt new technologies, which may grant improved clinical
outcomes (by increasing the intensity and range of services), whilst being cognitively (e.g.
interest), financially (e.g. incomes), socially (e.g. organisational, patient and peer prestige), and
politically (e.g. improving the range and outcomes of clinical services) rewarding. There is a
confluence of interests and influences encouraging clinical adoption (Gelijns 1992). Centrally,
clinicians rarely bear the costs or the risks associated with the adoption of technologies, whilst
difficulties in directing medical practice (prospectively through managerial control or
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retrospectively through penalties) means they rarely bear the total costs or risks of utilisation.
Hence the key decision making group enjoys only the benefits of technologies without bearing
full liability for their costs. Thus technologies may be adopted and utilised in sub optimal ways,
even when information is available.
Adoption processes have often been conceptualised as occurring in 4 stages- knowledge,
persuasion, decision and implementation. The exact shape of this profile depends on clinical
perceptions of costs, benefits and risks (Rogers 1983)., and such variations help explain the
large inter and intra clinical differences in the adoption and utilisation of all sorts of technologies,
including clinical practices.
The role and power of managers has grown as delivery systems have become larger and more
complex, and as economic pressures and social criticisms have undermined the authority and
autonomy of medicine. The fiscal-managerial system is formally controlled by management,
such as chief executive officers, finance officers, departmental heads and technical staff etc.
However, financial control is open to negotiation and interpretation, and its objectivity becomes
subjective. For example, costing's are often based on guesswork, prices on rules of thumb,
projections centre around belief and perceptions of what is good practice, and finances can be
moved between headings using virement. In addition, many of the staff guiding such processes
are clinicians (e.g. radiologists), whilst others are formally dependent on maintaining good
informal working relationships with the staff involved. Thus the apparent rational and quantitative
assessment of costs and benefits becomes a flexible game of fitting the budget to the
organisations political profile. The central difference to the medical individualistic system is that
such decisions are made in light of patient aggregates, and management may be more
concerned with their departmental gains, as opposed to clinician's concerns with professional
aggrandisement (Greer 1985).
Managers are a diverse group, whose attitudes towards clinicians vary with their proximity to the
'coalface' of medicine. Thus implementation level managers require clinicians' co-operation,
whilst strategic level managers are more liable to bargain with clinicians. Although it is becoming
more common, it is still rare for managers to effectively block clinicians' requests, and usually
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the 2 groups will seek a working consensus. Often, in the context of a fixed budget this will
mean allowing clinicians to determine priorities amongst themselves, thus abrogating
management of the responsibility (Banta and Luce 1993).
The hospital board gains its legitimacy through representing the interests of the community. This
may be through election, or, more commonly, through appointment as a result of holding some
prominent position locally. Typically they are engaged in (strategic-institutional) decision-making,
a role which expands during periods of rapid change and economic constraint. Thus hospital
boards are preoccupied with organisational manoeuvrings (e.g. mergers, affiliations, joint
ventures etc.), which often require the further development of fiscal-managerial systems. To a
degree, these political and administrative processes are merging. Hospital boards have the
formal authority to establish long term institutional objectives, and have the legal authority and
responsibility to develop services. Thus the strategic institutional system is concerned with policy
formation, strategic planning and organisational change, and although numerous groups
participate in this, the hospital board is the final arbiter (Greer 1985,1987). Within the orbit of
medical technology, hospital boards are liable to pass judgement on major investments or
policies. e.g. heart transplant. Their separation from the clinical level can be exaggerated, since
the greater the risk and uncertainty associated with a policy change, the more important it
becomes to have clinician support.
The size, complexity and focus of the organisation provides the structural backdrop for these
internal interactions between groups, and hence strongly influences the speed of technology
adoption. Organisations which are highly formal and bureaucratised, emphasising rules and
procedures, and concentrating power in a few centralised positions, are liable to be much slower
to adopt. However larger, more complex institutions have greater resources, more specialisms
(with more professional and occupational interconnectedness), and their clinicians enjoy more
autonomy (since the volume of activity dilutes scrutiny), encouraging faster adoption. These
factors are reinforced if the hospital is concerned with research or education (university affiliation
or a teaching hospital), since academic facilities are likely to be both formally and informally
exposed to information about innovations, and have stronger motives to adopt, thus accelerating
decision making. Similarly these links insure the adopters against failure by providing additional
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support and information, and a ready-made network in which to exchange information about the
technology (Rogers 1983).
Bureaucratic control within health care organisations tends to be difficult, since they are
composed from several coexisting occupational tribes, producing rich organisational politics, as
different groups pursue different goals underlain by different logic's and legitimacy's. Thus the
prevailing power structure is a consequence of the shifting resources different groups control
(e.g. money, employment, information, expertise. esteem, social standing, rights pertaining to
office, group solidarity, voting rights, educational qualifications, time, energy etc.), set within a
changing environment (Preece 1995).
It can be seen that classical decision making theory, with its emphasis on logical procedures
(Fennell and Warnecke 1988), disintegrates in the complexity of organisational life, where
different groups and subjects follow their own rationalities and objectives, interact in
unpredictable ways, trade resources as part of political exchanges, and invest significant
emotional resources in symbolic emblems of status and position. Severe shortages of
information (e.g. costs and benefits of the technology, future budgets, strategic shifts in the
environment etc.) feed into a system which routinely holds multiple, often contradictory,
objectives across a range of areas, related to economics, politics, and social aspects (Preece
1995 Rosenberg 1994). Organisations are rarely united by a single orientation, and are often
only vaguely aware of their environments. Information is not collected and processed by the
organisation as such, but in an ad hoc fashion by its internal groupings. Specialists, drawing on
information generated globally within their professional communities, are liable to be more
aware of possibilities than managers or trustees, whose affiliations are likely to be fairly local.
Within such an environment, multiple realities and rationalities exist, and it is their complex
interactions that produce adoption and utilisation patterns.
This section has analysed the decision-makers who are likely to be involved in adoption
decisions, and the context within which they make such decisions. Decision making about most
technologies is often limited to clinicians, whose adoption and utilisation decisions are closely
linked, but larger purchases or policies may require more active support of those controlling the
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organisations' resources. The organisation is very complex and unpredictable, but usually
clinicians, management and trustees will work together, and it is only in marginal cases where
overt conflict is likely, although decision makers' mutual knowledge of each other may lead to
situations where 'non decisions' are made. i.e. certain items are not permissible within the
decision-making agenda. A key factor, however, in determining to what degree different groups
are involved in decision making about technologies, seems to be the characteristics of the
technology itself, to which the next section turns.
4.3 Characteristics of the Technology
Technologies can be classified by their use (e.g. diagnostic, therapeutic, curative, preventative,
rehabilitative, palliative, supportive, organisational), form (drugs, devices, procedures,
organisation) and degree of embodiment (can the idea be applied without the technological
material ?). Their characteristics are important to their relative ease of adoption. As we have
seen, the principal adopters are likely to be clinicians, but other groups (managers, trustees) are
likely to become involved in some technologies.
Characteristics are generally concerned with the type and extent of a technology's relative
advantage over others (e.g. CAT scans over X rays), its compatibility with users' values (e.g.
does it fit into existing work processes), the difficulty and complexity of using and understanding
it (e.g. does it require new skills), can it be experimented with (e.g. customised for interest and
prestige), and its composition (architecture, technology, dimensioning, appearance etc.) (Preece
1995), and how visible is it to peers, administrators, patients etc. (e.g. status, prestige,
discretion). Organisations are more likely to adopt technologies which produce visible outcomes,
are unlikely to become obsolete, and which can be adopted experimentally (so that costs in
excess of confidence can be avoided). The technology should show some consistency with the
ideologies underlying payment policies especially as health care financing has been squeezed
by public and private fiscal crisis, and sociological criticisms of medicine (Banta and Luce 1993).
Generally the adaptability of a technology is the outcome of the interface between its inherent
characteristics, the evaluation attributed to these by various groups (clinicians, para-medical
groups, administrators, lay, patients etc.) and the visibility and impact of these on groups within
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the decision making process. Thus pharmaceuticals and procedures tend to be adopted quickly
(since they are relatively inexpensive, and relatively invisible, respectively), whilst devices are
more liable to delay, since they are frequently more expensive and visible etc. Technologies
frequently swarm in related batches and give rise to subsequent streams, which may be
adopted simultaneously, sequentially or haphazardly (Fennell and Warnecke 1988). Thus it is
often erroneous to think of a technology in isolation.
Whilst biomedical science is international, technological innovation and application is not, since
it is moulded by economic, political and social factors. The basic functional idea for technologies
are reinvented to achieve different outcomes, desired by different groups at different levels
(Fennell and Warnecke 1988). This illustrates how technologies are usually added to existing
technologies, and are rarely independently established (making their assessment more difficult,
since marginal effects are difficult to quantify and isolate) (Kervasdov 1984). Thus, in the current
financial climate, there is considerable emphasis on developing technologies that are • more
immediately cost effective (e.g. less invasive, safer, situated in outpatient settings) (Gelijns
1992).
Technologies are thus extremely varied and adaptable, and are associated with pre-existing and
subsequent technologies, making them extremely difficult to quantify meaningfully, and giving
them a complex profile of relative advantages and disadvantages as perceived by different
groups. Technologies, then, cannot be treated as simple physical manifestations which have a
unitary value, but as unique agents playing a role in developing discourses, whilst also being the
representation of scattered and fragmented interests.
The technology, therefore, is central to the pattern of innovation and diffusion. Different
technologies follow different patterns, and technologies may even vary within a category.
Consequently, not only is the environment and the adopting organisation individually
unpredictable, but the technology itself is highly malleable and flexible, creating a situation of
extreme variety and complexity. The way in which information is relayed to decision-makers
influences how they perceive their environment, and the possibilities offered by the technology.
Consequently, the final section illustrates the forms of communication channels that may exist.
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4.4 Characteristics of Communication Channels
This section discusses the context within which communication occurs, which is one of
'community'. The concept of community is based on similarities which people perceive in each
other. Cause maps are a useful conceptual tool with which to understand how people perceive
their environments, how they come to aggregate in communities, and how these communities
can be created by socialisation processes. Different types of community can then be studied
with regard to their impact on decision making (e.g. closed policy communities, open policy
networks). The essential concept is that for an individual to be swayed to adopt a new idea
(technology) they must receive sufficient appropriate information, and have sufficient faith in the
source of the information. Consequently, the closer the community, the faster adoption
processes are likely to occur (since the community has extensive internal networks, and
individuals trust each other), and this concept is illustrated with reference to clinicians.
Individuals use cause maps (models of cause, effect and meaning) to give them a sense of
order and purpose within their environments. These cause maps are drawn from socialisation
within communities, as well as personal emotional and cognitive experience and belief. Cause
maps are derived from, and contribute to, culture, which itself grants individuals a sense of
identity (a place in relation to others). Personal interactions are often concerned with comparing
cause maps to find commonalties or differences, and individuals are more likely to identify with
someone who uses similar cause maps to themselves. Often these are signalled by behaviours,
since people with similar cause maps are liable to believe similar things about the world and how
it should be approached. Individuals with similar experiences and contexts are more likely to
share similar cause maps (cultures), and to become aggregated in certain patterns of
production and consumption (Graber 1988, Davis 1992, Davis and Walton 1983, Hall 1976).
Consequently certain subcultures and similarities become established in certain areas of activity
(e.g. work, geographical areas, leisure), and processes of training can become intense periods
of enculturalisation e.g. clinicians training in medical schools. Whilst individuals and
organisations are more likely to be aware of others who are similar to them (e.g. living in the
same area, doing the same work etc.), they are much more likely to trust those who are
culturally similar to them (Howells 1994).
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Communication channels are usually based around some form of membership of a community
(e.g. family, geographical location, production or consumption based activity). Often
communication channels are structured by pre-existing economic, political, social and
ideological structures within the environment, which can either impede (e.g. the egocentrism of
regions) or expedite (e.g. family reunions, conferences) the transfer of information. Local
cultures become further reinforced since communication often occurs through nodes- such as
place (e.g. office, bar, living room), time (e.g. evening shift, winter skiers) or individual (e.g.
'busybody', organiser, 'insider' etc.).
These 2 factors, the substantive existence of community, and the processes by which
information can be shared between members, are central to the diffusion of information and the
adoption of ideas (technologies). These linkages are influenced by characteristics of the
community e.g. density (which affects the frequency of direct communication), stability (affecting
players confidence and awareness of each other), domain consensus (agreement about relative
positions) (Fennell and Warnecke 1988).
Typically exchange relationships occur through organisations, but are motivated and regulated
by individuals acting as bridges and liaisons (brokers). If these individuals are trusted by those
around them, then not only do they facilitate information transfer, but also its utilisation, since
they are the medium through which the unknown becomes the known. Nodal centrality can be
informed by many dimensions. The relative prominence of organisations and individuals is
strongly influenced by the control they have over resources desired by others (exchange power),
their strategic position (gatekeeping, centrality), and their relative position within the environment
(external linkages) e.g. density of competitors, relations within policy communities or issue
networks. These factors provide a structural base of leverage, but the actual shape of diffusion
networks is contingent upon social contexts, in which network structures develop (Fennell and
Warnecke 1988).
Having discussed the general characteristics of community, two polar examples of types of
community can be assessed. Some communities are closed, only allowing access to certain
individuals. Consequently, members often allocate more trust to their colleagues within the
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community, since they share a certain immediate commonalty. By contrast, in policy networks,
access is open, and so individuals are less likely to trust other members, since they may not
have a similar cosmological viewpoint. In a similar fashion, information is more likely to be
accelerated quickly through the closed community, since individuals (vectors) are trusted.
A close community of interests may form a policy community. These are generally composed of
small numbers of well integrated and related groups (focused on a narrow range of concerns),
who actively exclude other groups from their private deliberations, which are of a high quality
and frequent nature (both informal and formally based). Membership is stable and based upon
value consensus, equality of power and mutually beneficial previous exchanges. Frequently
membership is restricted to those in certain occupational categories, whose position within the
community is dependent upon their occupational position. Thus policy communities, in medicine,
are a variant of professional association, where para-medical technologists may be included at
the margins. Organisations involved (e.g. professional associations, hospitals etc.) are generally
hierarchical and internally coherent. The core is composed of key actors, who determine the
rules of the game (constitutionality, trust, reasonableness, private lobbying etc.), membership
and the overall interests of the community generally. A periphery may exist, composed of groups
who abide by the rules, in order to gain access and limited influence (e.g. street level
bureaucrats who depend upon medical co-operation) (Smith 1993).
Good examples of this 'core' are the senior groups who form the policy elite's of national
professional and scientific organisations. They establish criteria and define what are appropriate
interpretations of the technology, until a consensus is achieved. This consensus permeates the
entire occupational structure, via certain nodal points (e.g. journal reviewers, grant study
sections, professional leadership's etc.) (Fennell and Warnecke 1988).
The community is held together by a cognitive and normative ideological order, which shapes its
perceptual spectrum. Members trust each other, and act privately, often through some form of
formal or informal institution e.g. grand rounds of hospitals by consultants. Policy communities
rely on institutionalised exclusion and environmental stability to maintain their coherence.
Changes in the external (e.g. economic, social, technical) or the internal (e.g. group relations,
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horizontal pressures) environments threaten this stability. Consequently they seek to manage
the introduction of technologies, since these can be beneficial or damaging, according to their
effects on occupational power and autonomy (both generally and specifically) (Smith 1993a).
Policy communities are generally effective at articulating information, and in influencing
members' perceptions of that information, since the information is trusted.
By contrast, policy networks occur where exchange relations exist between groups or
individuals, but have less consensus, stability and hence trust than policy communities.
However, they may, due to their lateral relationships, disseminate information faster- although
the lack of trust inherent within the network causes the data to have less significance (since it is
viewed as more unreliable). Policy networks are often populated by combinations of professional
groups and administrative hierarchies (which rarely cohere meaningfully), and such
fragmentation breeds to become micro level issue networks, where information flows in
unpredictable ways, and is believed to have low reliability (Smith 1993).
Thus the local provider environment can be considered as one where a clinical policy
community forms a central bloc, with considerable power and autonomy, and has numerous
formal and informal relations throughout the structure. Several other para-medical hierarchies
interweave with it, with their own, separate communication channels. Finally elements of
administrative departments individually criss-cross this formation, and each other, duplicating
work in some areas, and leaving others entirely uncovered.
At the macro level, these ideal types generally intermingle in variations of policy network, and
often develop close working relationships within the medical world. Groups use the same
technologies (informal and bureaucratic contacts, public lobbying), but emphasise them
differently. Specific patches in the policy field may be dominated by formations resembling policy
communities, whilst the more general environment is characterised by issue networks, with
groups defending their areas of competency. The policy network profile will strongly influence
the outcome of pressures for change, regardless of the source of that pressure (e.g. internal,
external etc.) (Smith 1993). Traditionally the unitary British policy making system was more
reliant on medical policy communities than was the case in the USA.
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Having analysed the different sorts of communities and networks which exist, the ways in which
information flows through them, and the degrees to which this information is granted
significance by decision makers, it is now appropriate to analyse more specifically where
information comes from, and how it comes to infiltrate medical decision making communities.
Clinicians are exposed to information from numerous sources, including personal
communications with peers, sales representatives, personal involvement in technology
development and trials, journal articles, the mass media, patients requests etc. Different
mediums have wide variations in perceived quality and hence reliability (Girifalco 1991).
Clinicians are wary of the risks and uncertainties surrounding technologies, being distrustful of
reports from non clinical (biased) groups such as manufacturers and academics, whilst being
unable to understand the scientific literature, which is not oriented towards clinical practice (e.g.
indications, contra-indications, limitations, safety problems, unusual factors).
Clinicians therefore seek vicarious experience through trusted colleagues (usually locally
recognised informal specialists in certain areas e.g. diabetes). Various names can be attributed
to these players. e.g. change agent, product champions, gatekeepers, influentials, boundary
spanners etc. However essentially these are locally trusted opinion leaders who bear the risks of
uncertainty, and process opaque and distant information into immediately accessible
experience, for consumption by a local audience. Basically they use economic, political and
social resources in status gathering activities, the extent of which is determined by their
centrality in professional networks (McKinlay 1982, Rogers 1983). Generally they receive
information from 'cosmopolitans', whose geographical and conceptual mobility grants them
access to wider sources of information, but who lack local legitimacy precisely because of their
variability (Fennell and Warnecke 1988).
Clinicians place great value on information gained through personal interaction with their peers,
especially with opinion leaders. Experiential information is gained informally from local sources
(e.g. meetings, peer discussions), and also from more formal (but still direct face to face)
channels. Thus conferences and clinical practice meetings enable clinicians to meet
manufacturers, innovators, nationally or locally eminent clinicians, adopters etc., in an
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atmosphere where they can make personal assessments of an innovations' credibility, and of
the clinicians who have adopted it. Additionally they can directly discover specialised
information, thus reducing their overall uncertainty and indecision (Banta and Luce 1993, Gelijns
and Dawkins 1994).
Once received into the clinical community (through the opinion leaders' original realisation and
internalisation of the technology's capacities), this system of diffusion is replicated. Clinicians
symbiotically duplicate, breed and reinforcing each other's oral endorsements (through
processes of identification and compliance), which have been initiated by manufacturers,
researchers, and colleagues (Fennell and Warnecke 1988). Formal networks (based on
structural relationships e.g. office partnerships) (Rogers 1983) are complemented by informal
ones, and it is common for clinicians to adopt technology in groups or friendship pairs (Coleman
et al 1966). As innovations pass through these networks they are defined, redefined, reinvented
and transformed, and diffusion channels also adjust to transmit them (Fennell and Warnecke
1988, Kelman: Bennis et al 1969).
This section has shown how basic models of communication are based on models of
community. Communities may be closed or open to various degrees, illustrating the likely extent
to which their members share similar perspectives. Any individuals' adoption of ideas depends
on their receiving sufficient, useful information, and on the trust with which they invest the
transmitter of that information. Consequently information from close peers, friends, or trusted
specialists, is likely to carry more validity, and information disseminated within a community is
considered more reliable than that generated from outside. Such processes were illustrated with
reference to clinicians and their adoption decision making.
5 Conclusion
This chapter sought to identify the (substantive) forces which motivate technological innovation
and diffusion, and to analyse the structural (formative) factors which influence the form these
processes take.
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Section two outlined the classical diffusion curve, which is an equilateral bell shaped
communications model, devaitions from which require more active explanation. Section three
identified 5 major factors which could be considered to motivate social change. Each of these
factors can be illustrated by reference to social theorists. e.g. economics (Marx), social forces
(Weber, Fidler, Giddens, Stacey), politics (Weber, Alford), ideological beliefs (Weber, feminist
theory), technological determinism (Marx, Weber), and contingency models (Weber, Giddens).
The fourth section analysed the four main factors which would shape the innovation and
diffusion of technologies (environment, the identity of decision-makers, the form of the
technology, and communication channels). Within the environment, the main factors were
related to the political, economic and ideological structures, resources and legitimacy's that the
environment provided. These provided the overall context for the innovation and diffusion of
medical technologies. Adopter characteristics were primarily social, and related to the different
motives, structures and traditions within which different groups worked (clinicians, managers,
trustees, the public). Technological characteristics focused on the ease of the technology's
adoption and adaptation, and finally communication channels considered how information
diffuses through communities (primarily the concern is with volume and reliability of information).
These formative factors are essentially concerned with who makes the decision, within what
environmental context, about what particular technology, and how they gather and process
information. Essentially they are concerned with the costs, benefits and risks associated with
decision making.
Whilst the substantive factors define the range of criteria which may motivate behaviour, the
formative factors define the contexts within which decisions are made. Such a model provides
the conceptual tools with which to approach a comparative study of technological innovation and
diffusion within the UK and the US. Each subsequent case study will analyse the similarities and
differences in the forces motivating technological innovation and diffusion at the macro level,
and the specific influence of environment, adopters, and communication factors have on the
pattern of diffusion, whilst holding technology constant.
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Chapter 3 
Methodology
1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the rationale underlying the choice of the comparative case study
approach as the methodology used in this study, and gives a brief outline of some of the
research practices used.
Section two describes the literature review which underlay the search for an appropriate
methodology. It explains how the decision to study three technologies (examples), in two
different countries (contexts) was reached. Section three describes why the case study
methodology was chosen, and how the specific cases themselves were picked. Section four
briefly considers how the concepts of grounded theory could be utilised for this study, whilst
Section five outlines the actual processes of conducting the study.
Due to the absence of previous work in this area at the begining of the research, it was not
possible to identify who the decision makers were in any situation, or what influences would be
effecting them. Since it was not possible to conduct a true experiment (e.g. introduce a new
technology and observe developments) or to shadow decision makers (since their identities
were unknown, and access to them was liable to be severely limited), the only viable choice was
to conduct case studies. However, without knowing what was and was not a typical 'case' and
'context', it was reasonable to choose a wide variety of cases, and plot them at a broad level of
generalisation. Consequently, 3 types of technology (drugs, devices, and procedures) would be
analysed, at a national level (enabling the derivation of general trends), illustrated by
particularistic local examples. By comparing and contrasting the decision making sourrounding
these technologies in two distinctly different countries, the key dimensions which influenced
decision-making, and the identity of key decision-makers, could be made apparent.
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2 Defining the Approach
Having defined the basic research question (what are the forces that influence the innovation
and adoption of new medical technologies), this section is concerned with defining the possible
research techniques that could be used for the study. The process for discovering these was
mainly one of literature review, drawing on personal experience, and the knowledge of advisers
and fellow researchers.
Sociology aims at understanding and accounting for features of the world through theories,
methodologies and data. A vast range of theory, methodology and data exists which can be
drawn on, ranging between experimental and descriptive styles (Ackroyd and Hughes 1992).
The choice of methodologies is structured by the nature of the aims and objectives of the
enquiry. In this instance the study is concerned with identifying the factors which motivate and
shape innovation and diffusion. Literature reviews of this area (e.g. psychology, social
psychology, economics, politics, sociology etc.) revealed numerous terms which were
considered to motivate behaviour and shape decision making. The Weberian literature was
particularly helpful in identifying key umbrella terms for forms of motivation.
These dimensions can be considered as ideological (representing overall macro principles held
by a group, which then inform activity by them), political forces (meso-level ideas held by a
group, which also inform activity, and which are often concerned with achieving a beneficial
strategic position within the environment), social factors (related to specifically micro concerns
regarding social status and esteem, often centred around production and consumption patterns
which are often related to physical resources), economics (primarily concerned with immediate
tangible resources) and technological factors (where a technology's ability to deliver benefit
means it is rapidly adopted and used by virtue of its effectiveness).
The practical separation of these theoretical categories was potentially difficult. However, in
practice, it tends to be much easier, since key phrases or ideas are expressed (e.g. 'profit',
'status', 'belief', 'prestige'), or discussed within specific contexts (e.g. industrial trade magazines,
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philosophical journals, clinical studies). By placing events on a time line which is matched to
diffusion curves, the influence of key forces can be deduced.
For example, the use of endoscopes in surgery long before 1987 demonstrated that it was not
technical developments that drove the introduction of Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy.
Discussion within surgical, gastroenterological and radiological journals was concerned with the
gallbladder, and different technologies which could be used to manage gallstone disease.
Indeed, the surgical journals were singularly obsessed by this, discussing it in the context of
declining professional prestige and economic vulnerability. The rapid diffusion of the technique
was supported by a literature which frequently mentioned the inability of older surgeons to adjust
to the new method, and the status gained by surgical innovators. Such ideas were reinforced by
interview data.
It was apparent that the expression of these (substantive) motivatory forces would be shaped by
their context. Review of the diffusion literature highlighted the key factors which were identified
as influencing the diffusion of ideas and their likelihood of being adopted. Primarily these were
the environment, the technology itself, the identity of the decision maker, and the nature of the
communication channels.
However, the literature was largely dominated by studies of communication channels
(sociometric networks) and the factors influencing the adoption of ideas. Many of the studies
were very locally focused, and did not address either formative or substantive factors. With
regard to technology, few studies had been conducted in this area. The bulk of these were
concerned with either innovation, development or diffusion, usually from a single disciplinary
perspective (e.g. economic motives, effect of regulation, communication networks), either at
macro (e.g. whole society, global production of pharmaceuticals etc.) or micro (e.g. how a single
decision was taken) levels. Studies at a more intermediate level tended to focus on either a
specific technology, a specific community, or a particular instance. The literature showed a
complete absence of multidisciplinary, multilevel international studies, focusing on the history of
different technologies. Consequently, no ready made models (templates) of how to conduct
such research existed.
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It also seemed very useful to be able to change the focus of study between technologies (which
clearly differed widely by type) and environment (although the environment would have to be
sufficiently similar to enable meaningful comparison). At this point the research was taking the
shape of some form of comparative study of different technologies in different areas. Such a
study would enable the comparison of a single technology between different areas, and different
technologies within the same area. Essentially either technology or area could be held constant,
thus enabling the identification of the influence of either area or technology on the diffusion
pattern, annotated by a literature which would enable the derivation of the motivatory factors.
However, the volume of technologies and areas could not be too great, since this would add
substantially to the costs and time of the research. There was also debate about how to choose
the specific technologies to be studied. Many definitions existed for types of medical
technologies, according to numerous criteria. e.g. therapeutic, curative, diagnostic, half way,
final technologies, invasive, non invasive etc. However a simple and effective means to divide
them seemed to be based on technology type- devices, procedures and drugs. Such a system
was clearly supported by the administrative and regulatory systems, which treated the 3
categories very differently. This had the added bonus that the decision making processes
around these different types of technology appeared to differ- being regulated by different
government agencies and produced by different sections of industry, but potentially being
consumed by similar groups of clinicians and managers.
In terms of areas, it was considered useful to have countries which were culturally similar
(reducing the impact of cultural factors on innovation and diffusion). The US seemed an
excellent, and accessible, counterpoint to the UK. Consequently, 3 technology types encouraged
the limiting of research to 2 different locations (since more locations would complicate analysis,
whilst also being more technically difficult to do within the resource constraints). Consequently,
the research project settled on analysing technological diffusion in the UK and the USA, giving a
manageable but fairly illustrative range of examples from which to draw comparisons.
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This can be illustrated by the following matrix:
Country A
1
	
la	 lb
Technology,	 2
	
2a	 2b
3
	
3a	 3b
The innovation and diffusion of 3 different types of technology can be compared in 1 country
(e.g. la, 2a, 3a), or a single technology's innovation and diffusion can be compared between the
2 countries (e.g. la, 1b). This enables the teasing out of the effect of technology type and
country (environment). Meanwhile communication patterns could be judged to remain fairly
constant within each professional community, between countries. Consequently, each case
would expose the motivating factors informing innovation and diffusion, and, crucially, identify
the key decision makers.
The comparative method is the sociological equivalent of the controlled experiment in the
natural sciences, since by studying the same units of analysis within different settings, it is
possible to derive some understanding about the effects of different forces on these.
Comparative studies can illuminate new possibilities and perspectives, through enabling broad
thinking and conceptualisation, and identifying gaps in existing theory.
Comparative research can be seen as a natural outgrowth from the globalisation of
communities, cultures and social structures (although whether this will result in the
homogenisation or heterogenisation of social structures is a point of debate). Comparative
studies alert us to factors which may otherwise be invisible, allowing us to identify factors which
may have transglobal significance, whilst recognising the uniqueness of the locale.
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However, comparative studies are also difficult in that they require a thorough understanding of
other cultures and countries, and a knowledge of their history and perspectives. Comparative
methods can be complicated by cultural dissonance, the unavailability of comparable data sets,
and cultural differences in definitions (which underlie the very basis of study). Thus cross
national research demands greater methodological compromises, such as looser time frames,
and the comparison of categories rather than precise items. For example, as technology
changes new diffusion curves are launched, and, consequently, it becomes difficult to tell where
a diffusion begins and ends. e.g. MRI continues to diffuse in new forms. Researchers must
therefore be sensitive as to their definitions of a technology and a time, and recognise the
inherent difficulties with both broad and narrow definitions of both. Such research amplifies the
conceptual and methodological problems of definition, classification, methods and data source
experienced in national and comparative research in general (Hantrais and Mangen 1996).
This section has outlined the way that an extensive literature review identified the key factors
which could motivate and shaping innovation and diffusion. These factors could be classed
around dimensions (environment, technology, decision maker, communication channel) and
theories (ideology, politics, social factors, economic, technological determinism). The absence,
in the literature, of studies concerning technological innovation and diffusion, of studies linking
macro, meso and micro themes, and of internationally comparative studies, suggested an area
of enquiry that would be both fruitful and informative. However, the originality of the area meant
there were no readily accessible research structures. After much deliberation, an international
comparative approach (between the UK and the USA) was chosen, which would focus on 3
different forms of technology (device, drug and procedure). This study format would enable the
analysis of the motivatory factors in the context of different environments and technologies,
whilst holding factors related to decision makers and their communication channels relatively
constant). Having determined the basic structure for the study, the next stage was to determine
the methods used to undertake it.
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3 Defining the Method
Having decided on a multi-unit, interdisciplinary, comparative study, the next stage was to
determine the specific methodology. The methodology explores the interface between the
systems which inform social life, using inference, empiricism and speculation. International
comparative qualitative research is a methodology that is still in its infancy (Hantrais and
Mangen 1996), and so, again, no ready made models were available to inform this study.
Choices were based around observation either in the context of experimentation or non-
experimentation.
An experimental approach would be based on the introduction of defined natural information into
contexts and tracing the way that it was used to create innovations, and then introducing these
innovations into different provider contexts (e.g. systems of capped payment or fee for service
etc.). Such an approach would require considerable resources and the political ability to apply
them. Consequently, the experimental approach was not possible.
More possibilities lay in the non-experimental observational area, but many of these were
difficult. Participant observation was not possible, not least because of the time it would take,
and the team of researchers needed to study several technologies in different countries
concurrently. Any form of concurrent study would be impossible.
In terms of retrospective studies, it would be possible to undertake surveys and interviews of
decision-makers in separate areas. Although such data would be of a high quality, it would be a
highly localised, momentary snapshot, perhaps producing unrepresentative data. In addition, it
would be expensive to undertake. Crucially, however, it would assume a pre-existing knowledge
of the factors underlying innovation and diffusion, and a knowledge of the decision-makers
identity. The survey technique was inappropriate for a truly exploratory study. Similar problems
existed for longitudinal studies.
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The combination of a 'why' and 'how' type research question, the lack of control the investigator
had over events, and the focus on contemporary phenomenon, led to the choice of the case
study technique (founded along a combination of exploratory, descriptive or explanatory
dimensions).
The case study is an umbrella term for a family of research methods, which are concerned with
focusing an enquiry around a case, which Yin defines as a unit of investigation. There is no
standard research method, design, or specification for the content of a case study. Their highly
selective, and potentially individualistic nature, enables their methods and findings to be
significantly influenced by the researcher. Consequently, case studies are often criticised as
failing to be rigorous and scientific (i.e. data is neither valid nor reliable, and theories are not
reproducible or testable) (Howells 1994, Rosenberg et al 1995).
However, such criticisms can themselves be undermined. Crucially, statistical data is usually
qualitative data, which has been processed to become quantitative. Correlation between
variables (the hallmark of quantitative analysis) does not imply a cause and effect causation,
and the quasi-experimentation of analysing one variable's impact on an outcome by holding
others constant is open to the charge that it ignores the synergistic effects between variables, or
the assumption that variables affect an outcome simultaneously. For example, general surgeons
were motivated to adopt Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy for both political and economic
reasons, but these cannot meaningfully be separated, since these motives also shaped each
other. Consequently, a flow of events can be studied as a development, or the outcome can be
focused on in an attempt to analyse what independent variables caused it (Becker; Ragin and
Becker 1992).
Case studies are not concerned to prove or disprove theories, but to explore and understand the
intimate interplay of forces and factors producing social life. Case studies are thus ideal at
approaching complex issues which cannot be constrained, meaningfully, into simple theories or
existing models. Case studies sort and display factors and events, relying on induction and
presenting holistic descriptions and analysis which offer the reader the opportunity to apply their
own tacit knowledge and understanding to the case (Howells 1994). Multiple case studies are
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more reliable than single studies, especially since their purpose is to illustrate theory, and not to
define a population (Yin 1984).
The aim of social research is to produce general understandings of social life, whilst being
sensitive to local variations, linking micro, meso and macro practices and levels of analysis, and
enabling the exposition of theoretical understanding. A prime strength of multi-disciplinary case
studies is that they facilitate theorising (Vaughan; Ragin and Becker 1992). Particular cases (as
opposed to unusual instances) are real world examples of types of reoccurring social activity,
which can be observed and extrapolated through analytical induction. The strength of case
studies is that it does not seek to force a fit between its subject matter and theories. The core
theme is a descriptive narrative of the central phenomenon, from which analytical abstractions
and theories can be drawn (Vaughan; Ragin and Becker 1992). Case studies thus generate
ambiguity, and hence stimulate theoretical understanding and insight (Lieberson; Ragin and
Becker 1992, Vaughan; Ragin and Becker 1992). In fact, the findings from the case studies
undertaken caused the researcher to significantly alter the theoretical understanding that had
originally informed the studies.
Originally the researcher anticipated that the adoption of medical technology would be motivated
by a combination of technical, political and economic motives. A popular theme in medical
sociology was the 'shifting frontier' between the medical profession and managers, with the latter
increasingly encroaching upon clinical autonomy and medical dominance. Within this context,
clinicians would adopt technology partly for its own intrinsic worth, but also as a means of
maintaining clinical autonomy. Technology's would open up new areas for medical dominance,
whilst uncertainty sourrounding technological applications would provide discretionary space for
the practice of medicine (clinical autonomy). New technology was thus, intrinsically, a way of
maintaining independence from managers, who were continually advancing (e.g. using
technology assessment and forms of regulatory control on clinician's activities). However, the
case studies demonstrated that clinicians seemed only vaguely concerned with managerial
control, and were much more vigorous in using technologies against each other. e.g. general
surgeons used laparoscopic cholecystectomy to retain control over the gallbladder, which was
being claimed by interventional radiologists (using lithotripsy) and gastroenterologists (using
57
endoscopes and chemical therapies). Similarly, radiologists rushed to adopt MRI ahead of
potential competition from neurologists and nucleur medicine. In many instances, in fact,
clinicians and managers worked together. e.g. in gaining financing for MRI machines.
Consequently, it was not political competition between clinicians and managers which drove
technology adoption, but intra-professional competition within the medical profession.
Cases are usually picked according to prior assumptions about what defines a case or a
universe of possible cases. To imbue the study with analytical and exploratory value, each case
would have to simultaneously display potential similarities and differences (granting it an
additional descriptive element).
In defining what specific technologies to study, several criteria were important. Firstly,
technologies should be of different types (eg. drugs, devices, procedures) since these would
presumably be exposed to different decision making processes. Secondly, the technologies
should be of different investment levels (eg expensive, cheap). Thirdly, the technologies should
vary according to where they were used (eg. primary, secondary, diagnostic etc). Fourthly, since
the knowledge components of technology reside in combinations of the technology itself (e.g.
device, drug) and the users skill (Buxton 1987), the technologies should reflect these variations
(especially if part of the study was to assess the degree to which the technology could
themselves affect innovation and diffusion). The literature review threw up many interesting
examples of medical technologies, which matched many of these criteria.
However, in determining what specific technologies to use, the study sought high profile
contemporary examples, which were more likely to have been extensively written about.
Scanning the professional and lay media (particularly the areas of interest established by the
Technology Assessment component of the NHS Research and Development Strategy), it
became apparent that MRI, Prozac and Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy were good examples of
innovations, within the pattern of device, drug and surgical procedure. The costs involved in the
three technologis were very different, and they were clearly used in different settings by different
groups. Within MRI, the knowledge components were fairly balanced between the machines
basic capacities, and the users skills. In the case of Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy, knowledge
58
resided primarily in the surgeon, whilst with Prozac knowledge was largely centred in the drug
itself.
All three technologies had also revolutionised their respective areas, and were associated with
high costs (lending the studies a degree of currency). Thus MRI had revolutionised radiological
practice, laparoscopic cholecystectomy (keyhole surgery for gallbladder removal) was central in
introducing the concept of minimal access surgery into surgical practice, and Prozac was the
most prominent member of a new class of psychiatric drugs (the selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitors (SSR1s)). Consequently the technologies were major innovations, and were not simply
minor and incremental expressions of established processes of technological change.
This section briefly discussed the various methodological techniques which were available, and
the filtration process by which the case study method was chosen. Ultimately the combination of
'why' and 'how' in the research question, combined with the contemporary focus of the study,
and the lack of control which the investigator had over events, led to the choosing of the
(comparative, multiple) case study technique. The following section describes the search to
define what specific techniques to use within the context of the case study approach.
4 Defining the Specific Techniques to Use.
Having decide on a multiple and comparative structure, the issue was to determine the specific
research methods to employ. Choice existed around what types of data gathering and
processing techniques were to be used. This section outlines the relative validity and usefulness
of qualitative and quantitative techniques, and the way that potential difficulties can be managed
using the approach of grounded theory.
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A simple matrix describes the possible types of research technique which could be used for this
project.
Data Gathering	 Data Analysis
Qualitative	 Qualitative
Qualitative	 Quantitative
Quantitative	 Quantitative
Traditionally quantitative and qualitative research techniques are contrasted as a classic
dichotomy. eg . hard and soft data, explanatory or exploratory, objective or subjective, causal
interpretative or generalising particularising, rigorous or flexible etc. However, it was important to
be aware that qualitative and quantitative methods could be combined. This perspective is in
keeping with post-structuralist thinking, as the reductionist concerns of both classical science
and classical social science become replaced by a model highlighting the multi-dimensionality,
indeterminacy and open endedness of phenomena. e.g. theories of determinism have become
those of probabilism (Lieberson: Ragin and Becker 1992). Phenomena thus cannot necessarily
be built into either macro theories, or reduced to micro relationships, but only understood in their
entirety, perhaps as social action. Patterns recognised from these accumulated studies could
then form the basis for other forms of analysis, such as targeted research, or even acting as
guides to action (Ackroyd and Hughes 1992, Bohman 1993).
Such an issue strikes at the core of the debate between objective facts and subjective theories.
These debates are often phrased around empiricism (the relationships between objective data
inform us of subjective theory), induction (objective instances can be used to build up a
subjective theory) or deduction (subjective theories explain objective facts) (Gilbert 1993). Such
issues have been addressed widely in the literature, with empiricism being extensively criticised
by those in the social sciences (even Comte, who asserted the similarity between physical and
social facts, believed that researchers should understand human subjectivity). Weber trod a
more complex path, talking of verstehen (a holistic and empathic understanding of social life) as
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a way to transcend simple scientific methods of reasoning, whilst maintaining their usefulness in
recognising sequences and patterns (Gilbert 1993).
The key issue in attempting to divine some version of truth is the reliability of the underlying
data- principally how objectively can the phenomenon be measured, how reliable are measures
to gather it, and how accurate are the processes for analysing it. Both qualitative and
quantitative perspectives rely on inference, although this tends to occur in more highly
formalised chains within quantitative analysis. This 'chain' essentially underlies the claim of
quantitative analysis to superiority, since the chain can, theoretically, be reconsidered and
retested. However, quantitative analysis makes no claims as to the reliability of the underlying
data. Often, therefore, the major difference between qualitative and quantitative analysis within
the social sciences is that 'natural', analogue, data has been classified into digital data. A strong
argument can be made that this process is a source of distortion, as holistic, contextual data is
fragmented into a few, absolute, numerical dimensions.
Additionally, 'scientific' methods often lead to a narrow and restrictive view of phenomena, whilst
the practices of science are frequently more often allegation than demonstration. Hence
'empirical', 'systematic', 'rigorous', 'self critical' become incantations of belief, whilst there is little
real consensus on what these methods are and whether they are applicable to the study of
social phenomena. Science is now characterised by relativism and doubt, even about the
possibility of empirical evaluation and of scientific progress itself (Sayer 1992).
From this uncertainty principle, which blurs the boundaries between qualitative and quantitative,
and objectivity and subjectivity, emerges the technique of grounded theory. This is a meta-
technique for gathering, analysing and communicating data. It is a means of combining rigorous
systems of critical thinking with expansive creativity to identify the cascades of cause and effect
linking actions and reactions, centreing these around core concepts. Whilst much traditional
research is concerned with setting out to prove or disprove an hypothesis, grounded theory is
concerned with allowing the relevant factors in an area of study to emerge. It is thus not a top
down system of theoretical imposition, but a bottom up analysis which focuses on key events
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and analyses the factors generating them, essentially following a 'ripple in the pool' analogy -
tracing each cause outwards to larger causes.
Grounded theory begins by looking at an area and discovering what is relevant to that area of
study, instead of attempting to prove or disprove a particular hypothesis or idea. Essentially it is
a system of induction, whereby data is discovered, theory is developed and provisionally verified
through systematic data collection and analysis. By following specific procedures (significance,
theory-observation, compatibility, generalisability, reproducibility, precision, rigor, verification) it is
hoped that the reliability and validity of the data and theory are increased. Good grounded theory
should make sense, be explanatory, be generaliseable, and should provide the basis for the
control of the phenomena.
Consequently, it was considered valuable to use the founding principles of grounded theory-
although it was unlikely that such a modest study would generate theory, leaving such a task to
a later, more focused study which would be based on its findings. The research would thus veer
towards exploration of a relatively open field, enabling the classification of areas within it, which
could then become more amenable to measurement and division (Gelijns 1991). The following
section gives a brief over view of some of the research process.
5 Conducting the Research
Case studies require a balance between creativity and objectivity, whilst maintaining an attitude
of critical engagement. Within the context of a multiple, comparative, international case study
approach, it was important to ensure the validity and reliability of data gathered during research.
This section discusses the research practices undertaken. The methodology sought to be
descriptive, evaluative and analytical. By applying generalised theories to specific case studies
the deductive method could be used to confirm and refine a theory, and also generate new
theories (Hantrais and Mangen 1996).
The research strategy used was to identify key moments, disentangle the forces involved in
influencing these, and hence derive the identity of the main decision makers, and the forces
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which drove them. The multiple case study design draws on a larger population and thus
produces more robust and reliable propositions and patterns. The aim is to develop a theoretical
framework defining when a particular phenomenon is likely to be found (literal replication) and
under what conditions is it unlikely to be found (theoretical replication).
The research design sought to ensure that the indicators for the theoretical dimensions were
reliable, that the research itself was reproducible, and that the environment (within which its
generalisations purport to be valid) was defined. Methodological validity was achieved by using a
consistent method (composed of similar resources, sources, models etc.) applied to a large
database, and by focusing on similar issues in each of the cases. The key to ensuring validity
was to gather as much data as possible from varied sources, weigh it according to reliability,
analyse whether the data converged in any direction, and record it so that the research may be
reproduced (Ackroyd and Hughes 1992, Gilbert 1993). These data sources would form the case
study data base (lending the study reliability) and validity would be achieved through using this
chain of evidence to make explicit links between the questions asked, the data collected and the
conclusions drawn. The findings would enable the formulation of hypothesis for later, more
analytical, studies.
To analyse the influence of a factor, it is necessary to be able to define and then measure it in
some way. It was much easier to do this with the substantive factors (environment,
communication channels, technology and adopter) than with the motivating forces (technical,
social, political, economic and ideological). Generally the research defined these dimensions by
several criteria. The use of phrases was key. e.g. economic concerns could be recognised by
their focus on profit, loss, budgets etc., technological was represented by clinical or technical
reports and emphasis on these in decision making, social factors were apparent through cultural
concerns e.g. prestige, status, whilst political issues were represented by long term structural
concerns, focused on control of an area, and ideological issues surrounded appropriateness,
right and wrong, and conceptions of how issues fitted together). The source of data was also
central. e.g. ideological issues would be the concern of philosophy journals), or (more
commonly) the flavour of the text (as subjective as this may seem, in practice the orientation
and concern of an article is often readily apparent).
63
A wide range of textual sources were used, and a means of weighting these was developed to
reduce the likelihood of distortion. The most reliable sources were considered to be peer
reviewed journals, such as the New England Journal of Medicine, the Lancet, The British
Medical Journal, the American Journal of Roentgenology, the International Journal of
Technology Assessment in Health Care etc. Of equal reliability were chapters and books
published by major publishing houses (such as Routledge), or respected academics. Still
significant were publications from smaller, less well known, houses, such as Strawberry Fields
Press. Industry journals, such as Drug Topics and Diagnostic Imaging, provided useful data
which was presented by commercial interests. Newsletters, such as the Harvard Health Letter,
took their place alongside press releases and other sources of a potentially transitory nature.
Finally, mass market magazines and newspapers (such as The Herald, Men's Health etc) were
attributed the least credibility.
However, different sources were more and less applicable to different aspects of the studies.
For example, whilst clinical publications, such as the British Medical Journal, were useful for
analysing the value of Prozac, Psychiatry Today provided a useful context for the debates over
the ethics of the drug, and Rolling Stone (amongst others) provided useful specific examples to
illustrate the conflicts and issues sourrounding Prozac (and ultimately strongly influencing its
diffusion in the US), whilst the Indianapolis Business Journal and the Wall Street Journal
provided background data on Eli Lilly's financial woes.
The hierarchy of sources was reflected, to some degree, by a hierarchy within the sources
themselves. Thus editorials were considered primary sources, with editorials in peer reviewed
journals carrying the most weight. Articles were secondary, whilst letters carried the least weight,
but were useful for illustrative purposes (or to give insight into debates which were hidden in the
mainstream literature). Finally, advertisements were useful semiotic resources, indicating the
company's perspectives, and the means by which it sought to market its products. By
considering the likely audience for a source, it was possible to anticipate bias, and hence
dampen its influence. For example, 'Hospitals' (an industry magazine) tended to be enthusiastic
about expensive medical technologies (matching the excitement of its principal advertisers) and
resistant to forms of cost control (whether public or private).
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However, inevitably the borders between analytical dimensions are vague, and the intermingling
of categories expands as the level of analysis grows. Consequently, interviews were a central
and neccesary component of the study. By talking to many individuals from various professional
groups, a qualitative understanding of that groups cultural perspectives could be gained, and
this helped provide a basic framework for analysing their behaviours.
Since measurement of units of influence was difficult, the key would be to understand the chain
of events, identifying alternative routes that could have been taken, and therefore working out
which groups had been the key decision makers, and what factors had motivated their actions.
The aim was to determine what factors predominated, and such influences could be seen if
forces seemed to run in counter directions.
Within case studies is is often difficult to routinise data collection. Consequently it was important
to have a well defined plan of the process, enabling progress to be measured, and a budget to
be maintained. Certain tasks needed to be conducted in order, whilst many could be carried out
at on an ad hoc basis.
The first step in the process was to gather the basic statistical data. During the search, intense
use was made of references to data sources in other journals or articles, informal contacts,
advisers, phone referrals and the Internet (which proved an extremely useful source of
information). In the UK this was generally simpler, since the NHS collects comprehensive data
on many aspects of health care, and the researcher's formal affiliation with the NHS (through a
Research and Development Scholarship) and a UK university eased the path considerably.
For specific types of information, it was necessary to contact specialists libraries (e.g. the Royal
College of Surgeons library in London). Staff at the University of York were very helpful in
providing information, especially regarding the Cochrane Collaborations, whilst the NHS enabled
access to its internal search facilities through its library in Durham (the headquarters of the
Northern and Yorkshire Regional Health Authority).
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Generally, the researcher found it much more useful to fax an organisation than to phone or
email them, since front line reception staff are generally concerned with blocking questions. The
universities of Hull, York, Leeds, London, and Texas were all very supportive in their assistance,
as were the public library systems of Austin and New York, and the Library of Congress in
Washington DC. Often, however, data was not kept in readily accessible locations, and required
direct approaches to governments or industry.
However, the actual process of tracking down the right department or individual was mainly
through phone referrals, since official indexes were often not sufficiently detailed to indicate
what data each section held. Another problem was that some data was collected for the UK,
whilst other data was collected for each country within the UK. Essentially, therefore, data was
collected from the NHS for Prozac and Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy. The Prescription
Prescribing Authority (PPA) suggested that the number of private prescriptions for Prozac was
likely to be minimal. Gathering such data would be extremely difficult, since it was not routinely
collected by the PPA, and Eli Lilly was resistant to assisting the research.
By contrast, interviews with British surgeons, and articles from newspapers, indicated that the
volume of privately financed Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy surgeries was likely to be
significant. However, consistent data for these was not available from either of the UKs' largest
private health insurers (BUPA and PPP), although they provided the data they did have which
shadowed the data supplied by the NHS. Several university, governmental, and professional
libraries and institutions were contacted with regard to the missing years, without success. The
researcher even went so far as to contact private marketing companies in the UK, and
publishers of health care marketing information. However, these organisations did not collect
this data. This example illustrates a key problem of health services research, in that frequently
data is not recorded or stored. Many thousands of privately financed laparoscopic
cholecystectomy surgeries have been conducted, but are not recorded. Although private
insurers collect such data on an annualised basis, they tend to discard it after several years,
when it no longer has commercial significance. Within hospitals, despite managerial attempts to
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monitor clinical activity, information is not routinely (and reliably) collected and aggregated,
remaining instead in decentralised settings where it is inaccessible to researchers.
MRI posed particular difficulties in regard to tracing its diffusion. Despite making contact with
numerous organisations (including NHS Supplies, Regional Health Authorities, the British
Technology Group, the Medical Devices Agency, the National Radiological Protection Board
etc.), there seemed to be no records of sales, installations, licenses or upgrades. Attempts to
gather industry financial data, and then extrapolate from this, proved fruitless. Isolated reports
and memo's issued by NHS authorities occasionally mentioned total installations, but these
often contradicted each other. These statistical problems were exacerbated by the introduction
of the internal market, since machines were no longer allocated according to regional financing
decisions. Approaches to the British Radiological Society, and the Radiographers Society
(interestingly, located in the same building) resulted in referrals to assorted research groups,
and representative organisations. After 18 months, one of these, MAGnet, was able to provide
an abstract of its membership database, which itemised units which had been installed or
significantly upgraded.
Gathering data in the US was also difficult, since the US government controls neither the
financing or delivery of health care. The fragmentation of the federal system meant that different
types of the same information were gathered by agencies and bureaux scattered throughout
different departments (often with little knowledge of each other). Data was also highly politicised,
with different agencies and levels of government using their access to data as a bargaining chip
in dealing with each other, and civil society. Paradoxically, in the UK it was easy to identify where
data was located, but it was difficult to get access to the data (for instance, signing the Official
Secrets Act in order to see prescriptions volume data), whilst in the US it was difficult to find out
where information was located, but relatively easy to get access to it once its location had been
identified.
However, the vast range of data sources in the US eased data gathering, although much of this
data is based on industrial surveys and estimates. Professional organisations were unhelpful in
regards to Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy and MRI, as was Eli Lilly with regard to Prozac.
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Agencies of the federal government, such as the National Institutes for Health, the Food and
Drug Administration, the Department of Health and Human Services, generally collected
samples (if they collected data at all). Thus the National Center for Health Statistics had
produced estimates for laparoscopic cholecysectomy, which are as reliable as any national data
can be. However, industrial magazines were largely able to overcome these problems, supplying
information on both MRI and Prozac. The magazine, Drug Topics, published an annual review of
new drugs and best sellers, consistently featuring Prozac.
In the case of MRI, an internet search for sources related to MRI alerted the researcher to
several organisations, which were subsequently contacted. The editor of one of these
magazines (Diagnostic Imaging) provided information on MRI adoptions gathered from an
industrial survey.
Inevitably, data is unreliable to some degree. Not only is its base line reliability questionable, but
often there are difficulties in comparing like with like (i.e. is annual data based on the calendar
year or the financial year, is a UK laparoscopic cholecystectomy the same as an American
laparoscopic cholecystectomy etc.). Generally these problems were overcome by getting
professional advice from clinicians with experience in both countries. Usually such clinicians
could be located through either the editors of industrial magazines or professional journals.
However, the time frame for such verifications was slow, and it was usually better to simply
approach key oppinion leaders directly (where they could be identified). During the study it
became clear that clinicians tended to defer to a respected local 'expert'- who was usually
judged to be knowledgeable about some aspect of medicine. Thus it was easy to ask a clinician,
during the course of an interview 'if you were uncertain about (depression, gallbladder surgery,
the need for diagnostic imaging) who would you ask ?'. This basic approach is, in fact, used by
industrial and commercial interests in promoting their products through the medical trust
network.
Having begun gathering this data, which was a slow process, the next stage was to undertake a
comprehensive literature review. The information search strategy began by identifying the
sources of information available. Having established a working relationship with Professor
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Ronald Angel, it was possible to use the extensive resources of the University of Texas, which
supported numerous on-line and CD ROM databases. These were indexed (eg Psychlit,
Medline, Lexus-Nexus etc), and each was searched for various references (e.g. MRI, Magnetic
Resonance Imaging, Nucleur Magnetic Resonance, Radiology, Radiographer, Lithotripsy,
Minimal Access Surgery, Fluoxetine etc.). When references were found, the MESH headings
(subject titles and associated keywords) were recorded, enabling other keywords to be applied.
Most databases were screened out, since they produced no useable hits. A similar technique
was applied to the Texas Department of Health database, which also gave the research access
to H-Star, and 'grey' (unpublished) departmental literature. Generally, specific databases had
specific focusses. e.g. Medline, Grateful Med, CINAHL were concerned with more clinical
issues, whilst the Social Sciences Citation Index, Sociological Abstracts and PsychLit were more
broad based and social in their orientation. Lexus-Nexus proved particularly broad based, and a
useful source of stimulating ideas. The University of Hull supported several media databases,
whilst the British Library provided access to its on site search facilities. Usually the citations and
abstracts carried information about the source (eg journal, peer reviewed, article, letter etc)
enabling them to be easily tagged with an identifier indicating their overall reliability. Where this
did not exist (for example, The Guardian Online) a standard identifier was allocated to the
source.
Interesting and surprising variations became apparent. For example the Medline database has
both a European and US version, both of which are termed Medline. Similarly, key subject
headings in one database did not exist in another. However, by tracing specific key articles
through different databases, it was possible to track the subject headings under which they were
classified.
Such texts gave useful insights and an understanding of the issues, but centrally they provided a
framework to work within. Without this, the detailed studies provided by the more specialised
literature would prove confusing and scattered. Research and review enabled expanded
searching, and the combination of search terms to draw out more specific areas of interest.
Simultaneously, by using literature and resources from different sources, the reliability of
findings could be tested (cross checking, triangulation etc.).
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Most of the data thus collected was secondary- although such definitions are difficult to sustain,
since many of the studies were accounts of decision making by decision-makers, or by people
directly involved in the process. On line databases, such as Lexus-Nexus, would often give
journalistic reports which were invaluable in accessing the way social life was perceived at the
time, although such sources were often difficult to accurately cite, since they usually did not
include page references. It was important, however, to consider the audience for whom such
items were produced, but even in circumstances where perspectives were obviously biased, this
communicated significant information about the perspective of the group. This was particularly
true in the fractious combat between different clinical groups. Documents could thus be
understood through their totality and context (Ragin and Becker 1992).
Such perspectives, giving a semiotic insight into a group's sub-culture, were strongly supported,
and guided, by interviews. Interviews were very useful for giving an insight into general
perspectives and feelings about an issue, and they could be combined and compared
internationally to provide an understanding of the context of a situation.
The design of the interview strategy was difficult, since much of the research was concerned
with issues which were sensitive, in the context of groups who were defensive and somewhat
elite. Generally, the closer individuals were to the coalface of medical delivery, the less willing
they were to give interviews. Thus officials at government agencies were often willing to be
interviewed, whilst industrial interests became progressively more reserved, culminating in
clinicians who were often extremely difficult to contact. The most inaccessible group proved to
be psychologists involved with the pharmaceutical industry. The key issue was thus gaining
access.
In such an instance, a formal approach to an organisation, such as a hospital, was generally
unsuccessful, since clinicians and managers simply rebuffed such attempts. A more fruitful
technique was to use the trust networks which surrounded staff within organisations (such as
the Texas Department of Health) or friendship networks.
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Several interviews were arranged through such means- although the downside of such a
technique was that conversations were necessarily anonymous, and often of an informal nature.
This is a problem which has been identified in the literature on ethnography, but which was not
anticipated in this study. However, since the nature of the interviews were often concerned with
individuals' subjective understandings and feelings, set at a high level of abstraction, findings
often supported the literature. e.g. thus in interviews with radiologist's, they often commented on
the self apparent value of MRI, due to the clear and colourful pictures it produced. Where the
research concerned specific purchasing processes, then objective referencing became
necessary, and this naturally limited the flow of information and dialogue. Throughout the
process, however, it was ethically necessary to be honest concerning the nature of the research,
especially since many of the interviewees were contacts made were through friends of friends,
and to have deceived these people would have been both professionally and ethically
unacceptable (Gilbert 1993).
The interviews were generally open ended and semi structured, although gradually becoming
more targeted as experience with the subject and the interviewees' cultural perspectives grew.
Questions were centred around objective processes, and the interviewees' subjective
experiences of these. Why' questions were very useful in digging around issues. Most
interviewees were fairly open, and few of them presented apparently dubious accounts. Thus,
for example, surgeons openly discussed how they trained on patients, whilst family practitioners
talked about the perks of the business. Insights were also gained about the nature of the
relationships between different groups and interests within medicine. Thus some family
practitioners talked of the way that sales representatives from Eli Lilly recruited risk and guilt in
promoting their products. eg . emphasising that Prozac should be prescribed, despite being more
expensive than the tricyclic's, since it avoided the risks of overdose, whilst emphasising the
immorality of prescribing Prozac's more expensive (equally safe) competitors when the NHS
was 'strapped for cash'. However, even when individuals presented a standard view, these were
valuable examples of a 'party line'. e.g. general surgeons insisted that they had not changed
their indications for conducting surgery, although volumes had almost doubled.
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It was useful to leave the interviewees extensive space, since often their throwaway remarks
were significant (Ragin and Becker 1992). Using vignettes in interviewing proved a useful way of
understanding how processes were undertaken. Such concrete and detailed examples of
hypothetical social situations illuminated decision making practices and cultural presuppositions
(Hantrais and Mangen 1996). For example, in talking with surgeons about the adoption of
laparoscopic cholecystectomy, it was useful to guide them through decision making processes,
or the stories of what had actually happened. Similarly, in discussing the purchase of an MRI, it
was useful to guide managers and radiologist's through decision making processes, and present
to them options and problems, to analyse how they would deal with these. Such examples
highlighted the principles underlying the decision makers perspectives, and even led to the
researcher being compared to the National Audit Office (who asked similar 'leading questions').
Similarly, architects, designing commercial MRI units, talked of the need to minimise staff areas
(and hence ground rents) whilst building in vending machine alcoves, and emphasised the
strong role that clinicians played in these decision making processes as the projects were
progressing.
Another strength of such a technique was that it enabled the researcher access to clinical and
industrial networks and individuals, who would have otherwise remained hidden. Often these
rather circuitous routes led to contacts being made with key individuals. This was especially true
of the medical community, which tends to act in a very collegiate way. For example, a general
practitioner interviewed for Prozac happened to have been personally trained by a prominent
laparoscopic surgeon, who prided himself on 'never doing the same surgery twice'. In another
instance, an architect specialising in the building of MRI facilities provided a key referral to a
prominent radiologist.
An extremely interesting set of referrals highlighted, by chance, a key finding of the study. In
investigating MRI, the researcher was passed between informal networks between industrial
interests (Philips), licensing organisations (the British Technology Group), regulators (the
Medical Devices Agency), purchasers (NHS Supplies), clinicians (heads of radiology), financiers
(the Yorkshire Cancer Research Society) and local community figures who were instrumental in
bridging different networks to facilitate MRI purchase and installation. Thus nominally separate
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and formal organisations and individuals, were actually strongly interlinked by informal trust
networks. This finding, which was tangential to the study, was a key outcome of the research,
and is noted in the conclusion.
In all, 35 interviews were undertaken. Generally the first interviews were conducted on a face to
face basis, but once a basic understanding had been achieved, more interviews could be
conducted by phone. Successful phone interviews generally relied on referrals between friends
within the network, and the interviewer's knowledge of issues (particularly current ones) and the
language of the group.
Interviews, along with documents, thus passed into the triangulation of data, observer, theory
and methodology, Sources were evaluated and interpreted according to their authenticity,
credibility and representativeness (Gilbert 1993). Ultimately, the range and record of sources
used is this case studies claim to validity and reliability.
The studies sought to present each case in a reasonable and coherent form that was
appropriate to its individual characteristics, whilst retaining the complexities and contradictions
inherent in the data. The studies strengths are that it did not seek to fit cases into a template,
and was not concerned with reproducing a pattern (as is evident in the case of Prozac, the
history of which is very different from either laparoscopic cholecystectomy or MRI). Each study
sought to present a reasonable story and interpretation of the technology, whilst providing
sufficient information that the reader could make their own assessments. Most of the data used
in the study was drawn from readily accessible sources. This, in combination with the volume of
sources used, underlies the studies claim to reliability.
This final section has outlined many of the processes involved in actually conducting the
research, which has shaped the data found, the theories proposed, and the validity of the entire
structure. However, such a weighty responsibility does not imply that the researcher should
scurry away in search of some safe (but ultimately dubious) corner of quantifiable reliability.
Instead social action should be embraced in all its aggravating and elevating beauty. Holistic
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understanding grants flexible theories that can cope with a world that is infinitely varied and
intimately related.
6 Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the process whereby a comparative multiple case study approach
was chosen as the methodology used in this study. The final method sought to produce an
exploratory theoretical analysis, within the confines of technical (methodological) possibilities.
Various techniques of interview and literature review were used to increase the validity and
reliability of methods, and hence link different levels of analysis (across time, space and
concepts) in order to expose a previously under theorised area.
Basic statistical data were gathered, and when combined with a broadly based background
literature review and interviews, these provided information on key events and processes within
the innovation and diffusion of each technology.
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Cha pter 4
Context for the Case Studies
1 Introduction
This chapter is concerned with identifying the key similarities and differences between the US
and UK in regards to the production, distribution and consumption of health care. The countries'
different cultures produce and sustain (and are sustained by) different governmental systems,
which form the macro context within which health care decisions are made. The extent and form
of their support strongly affects the shape of technological adoption and utilisation patterns. The
key difference, studied in the second section, is the contrast between the pluralistic and
fragmented US (where the individual is in a contract with the state) and the unitary and
centralised nature of the state in the UK ( where the individual is a subject of the states'
paternalistic power). Ultimately, therefore, the state can exercise much more coherent and
comprehensive power in the UK than the US.
Section three studies the countries' different systems of health care delivery (consumption),
which have been traditionally informed by their different cultures. Theoretically the UK's NHS is a
unitary and uniform system, whilst US provision was composed of multiple competing sub
systems of state insurance, private insurance, and fee for service. However, similar problems,
such as expanding health care costs and declining faith in the effectiveness of clinicians, have
led to managed care and managed competition being embraced as an organisational solution.
Consequently, the US and the UK's health care systems are converging. Managed care systems
emphasise the control of medical technologies, but are impeded in their efforts by the
ineffectiveness of most technology assessment.
The fourth section analyses the production of medical technologies. Financing for these was
extensively supported in the post-war period, giving rise to a powerful system of symbiotic links
and relationships, being termed the medical-industrial complex (that mass of industrial,
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commercial, governmental and medical interests which engulfs the health care sector), and
which was traditionally shaped and legitimated by clinical culture. Government systems of
financing and regulation are analysed, before specific production systems (pharmaceuticals,
devices and surgical technologies) are analysed. Differences between the US and the UK
become much less pronounced as this level, since regulatory, industrial and clinical cultures and
practices tend to be increasingly similar (although the US tends to support innovation more
vigorously), partly due to the growth in transnational communications (e.g. capital, media,
production etc.). Having outlined the structure of the chapter, the study now shifts to describing
the cultural and governmental contexts within which decisions about health care production and
consumption are made.
2 Culture and Government in the UK and the US
This section analyses and compares the UK and US in terms of political culture and
governmental structures, illustrated by particular examples of the mechanisms governments use
to make policy, at specific points in time.
In the post-war period governments in the UK and the US have extensively supported the
production, distribution and consumption of health care. Technological development is assumed
to have its own inherent political merits (e.g. representing a country's dynamism), in addition to
its economic (e.g. exports, new technologies of production) and social (e.g. improved quality of
life from new health technologies and increased material resources) dimensions. Health care is
seen as being socially, economically and politically essential. Governments have sought, to
varying degrees, to compensate for private market failures in the delivery of care (Braun 1995).
The actual shape of such policies are guided by political culture (the ideologies and institutions
that characterise a state and its citizenry), which act through political systems. States support
developments that accord with their sense of the politically possible and desirable, and offer
support through direct and indirect funding and regulation (e.g. grants, tax breaks, ethics
committees, bureaucratic deterrence). The state, acting as f under, regulator, underwriter and
customer, encourages, discourages, directs and shapes innovatory developments, which
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communicate cultural messages that are so implicit as to be frequently unquestioned (Paley
1983).
Governments ability to make decisions and implement policy depend on where the locus of
decision making lies, and on the state's ability to exercise power (dependent on its abilities,
autonomy and culture) (Jacobs 1993). Policy making in the US and the UK is a strong contrast
between pluralism and centralism. Political authority in the USA is based on the explicit
citizenship rights model, where the bill of rights and the constitution effectively form a contract
between the state and the individual. By contrast Britain's institutions have developed from a
pre-industrial system in which individuals had 'privileges' as subjects of the Crown and where
power was centralised.
Decision making responsibility is diffused throughout US government, and such a pluralistic,
competitive and relatively open system enables much greater access to policy making and
implementation by interest groups, who often form coalitions with various politicised and
competing fractions of the government (Girifalco 1991). The UK, by contrast, is a much more
culturally homogenous state, organised around a centralised and unitary system of government
which is structurally able to control the decision making process, and is usually able to ensure
the execution of its policies (Hollingsworth 1986, Webster 1991, Braun 1995).
Regardless of the structural systems underlying government, all governments draw on groups
(who are politically motivated and technically capable) in their decision making and
implementation. Such matrices can be relatively conflictual (policy networks) or consensual
(policy communities), and are usually centred around some form of government agency. In
certain highly complex areas, such as health care, which are not amenable to easy analysis or
description, these policy networks can exert considerable power, even under state centralist
systems, such as that of the UK (Girifalco 1991). e.g. the public, private, voluntary, academic,
industrial and social interests which suppored the passing of the 1971 National Cancer Act,
providing vast research sums for interventional, and not preventative, care (Moss 1991, Epstein
1978).
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Definitions within health care have traditionally been based on medical concepts. Essentially the
medical profession's definition of costs, benefits and risks (components of ideology) has
dominated the health care field, with all the various players in this area (patients, public,
government, industry, researchers etc.) accepting this definition and playing by its rules.
Consequently, a medical hegemony (espoused principally by clinicians) informed activity within
the health care field. However, elements of this hegemony have been emphasised differently by
the UK and the US, informed by their different political cultures (Greer 1987).
In the UK health care has been conceptualised at a more communal level, placing an emphasis
on administrative (centralising) mechanisms (e.g. mass production and consumption, equality of
access), whilst in the US an orientation towards individualism has elevated the role of the
(decentralised) professional (e.g. innovation, specialisation, research, individual specialised
services) (Hollingsworth 1986). The systems have traditionally been neat illustrations of the
contrast between bureaucratic, centralised and unitary systems of decision-making (concerned
with identifying and regulating problems of cost control and care delivery), and decentralised
pluralistic systems (relying on the profit motive and market forces to inform decision making)
(Lefkowitz 1983).
Policy making, however, is complicated by governments' often contradictory aims (e.g.
promoting the device and pharmaceutical industry whilst seeking to contain costs), techniques
(e.g. tensions between centralised and decentralised systems of decision making), and
technological change (e.g. new technical possibilities are a source of uncertainty and
unpredictability in policy making) (Foote; Gelijns and Halm 1991).
This section has highlighted the factors influencing governmental power in policy making and
implementation. Generally the US governments' Federal system is far more open to influence
from policy networks, although the power and coherence of Britain's medical professionals has
enabled them to wield considerable definitional and practical control over the health care
system. Governments generally are hampered by difficulties in gathering and processing
information. Consequently they tend to follow incrementalist strategies, although dressing
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decision making in rationalist clothes. The following section studies the different structures,
systems and sub systems which deliver health care in the UK and US.
3 Systems of Health Care Consumption In the US and UK
This section is concerned with the structure of delivery systems within health care, and the way
that control is exerted over these through funding and regulatory controls. After highlighting the
similarities between the UK and the US, the study continues by analysing the common
organisational technologies that have been introduced (managed care and managed
competition), before focusing on specific types of regulatory control (e.g. through bureaucratic
processes in purchasing, financing restraints on adoption and utilisation, and attempts to shape
clinical decision making).
3.1 Funding
Generally health care financing in the UK is sourced from the public sector, and delivered, in the
main, through the NHS (a comprehensive and universal public system of financing and provision
supported from general taxation). This unitary system contrasts with the pluralism of the US,
where numerous sub systems of provision are supported from public, private and charitable
sources. The bulk of care is supported by either employers (for their employees) or the
government (for the elderly and defined groups of the poor). Between 55-75 million people (20-
30% of the population), however, have limited insurance, and rely on a fragmented combination
of public subsystems and charitable care (Paton 1990).
Although they have some glaring dissimilarities (e.g. privately funded, publicly funded, pluralistic,
unitary etc.), health care delivery in the US and the UK have many similarities. In the post-war
period, until the 1970s, both systems were demand driven, enabling clinicians to make decisions
on behalf of patients (the agency relationship) which were then automatically funded by the
financier (either public or private). Medical provision expanded rapidly, although this was much
more noticeable in the US than the UK. However, in the 1970s a generalised economic slump
set the context for analysis of the marginal costs and benefits of health care, whilst social
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criticisms were levelled at the medical profession. Consequently, attempts were made to rein in
medical expenditure (e.g. capitated payments, limited coverage), although this has been
politically difficult for governments (Higgins 1988). Managed care and managed competition
have been adopted as the means for achieving this.
Managed care organisations combine macro and micro management to minimise the delivery of
inappropriate care (ineffective, unprofitable etc.) by concentrating information and economic
power within the administrative (bureaucratic) system and removing it from clinicians (Gelijns
1992, Flynn 1992). These provider organisations operate within fixed budgets, and thus
internalise financial risk (Southby et al 1985), and may devolve this risk to individual clinicians
(e.g. allocating them capitated budgets). Such organisations can then be set within an
environment of managed competition, which is composed of organised groups of producers and
consumers. Decision making (and apparent accountability) is devolved to the 'private' periphery
(e.g. within managed care organisations) whilst the environment is structured by government
decisions (or the lack of them).
Both countries are institutionalising a separation between bulk purchasers and providers (e.g.
Health Maintenance Organisations (HMOs) and Trusts contract with companies and District
Health Authorities (DHAs) respectively). In the UK this separation operates within the NHS (the
'internal' market), whilst in the USA the system is developing privately, after the failure of
governmental attempts to mandate a national system. Both systems ration the consumption of
health care, by explicit (e.g. price, state controlled supply), and implicit (e.g. bureaucracy and
referral decisions, licensing processes) means, on both demand and supply sides (McKinlay
1982). These techniques of control combine both funding and regulation mechanisms.
Consequently common problems, interpreted in approximately the same way, have led to similar
proposals for their solutions, although again their are structural differences within the
environment, which shape the interpretation of the organisational technology.
In terms of the adoption and utilisation of medical technologies, these changes have had
paradoxical effects in the 2 countries. In the US the shift to managed care and competition has
reduced the number of competing providers, within a context of reduced public and private
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financing. Consequently, adoption and utilisation can generally be considered to be becoming
more restrained. In the UK managed care and competition have increased the numbers of
competing providers, and whilst public sources of funding have been constrained, the
government has nurtured private sources. Consequently, such constraints on adoption and
utilisation may be being reduced. In fact, US managed care organisations and hospital chains
have been establishing in the UK (Higgins 1988, Ham 1993). Having analysed the UK and US's
different systems of health care financing, the following discussion is concerned with how they
seek to regulate health care consumption.
3.2 Regulation
The UK and US display many similarities in the ways they finance health care, and these
similarities extend even further in the regulation of health care consumption. Health care
systems can be regulated through direct and indirect control over resources and personnel
(Foote 1992, but this is difficult in practice, since internal (e.g. organisational politics, objectives
etc.) and external (e.g. access to private donations, subsidies, time etc.) variable produce a
complex matrix of possible reactions to any regulatory intention. Similarly, the forces supporting
adoption are powerful, coherent and endorsed by wider society, complicating control. Although
the UK has more budgetary control at the macro level, often this power cannot be enforced,
since decision making is devolved to the local level, where it is strongly, and directly, influenced
by clinicians. By contrast, the decentralised nature of the US means that government is
structurally unable to easily exert control over fragmented systems of dispersed provision and
funding, but many private organisations can exert strict control over adoption decisions, since
their decision making is removed from the political arena, and becomes, effectively,
unaccountable (Uttley 1991, Gelijns and Dawkins 1994).
A key problem in this system of accountability and control is that of information. The range and
efficacy of most technologies is usually largely unknown at the early stages of development and
diffusion, undermining the possibilities of making predictions about appropriate adoption and
utilisation (Council for Science and Society 1982). Simultaneously, clinicians (whose culture is
largely hegemonic within health care) frequently support technology, since it usually expands
81
clinical possibilities whilst reducing clinicians' perceptions of risk. Manufacturers and patients are
natural allies to clinicians, and manufacturers can reduce the costs of technologies (e.g.
discounts etc.), while patients can increase the costs of not adopting technology (e.g. political
pressure) (Council for Science and Society 1982, ACARD 1986, Gelijns 1992, Hogg 1988, Ham
1993, Lefkowitz 1983, Banta and Luce 1993). Once formally adopted, a technology's range of
utilisations increase, and it becomes very difficult to withdraw. Aside from these formal
adoptions, often technologies simply slide into adoption and utilisation, without decisions being
taken. e.g. replacement, experimental technologies, employment of new staff with particular
interests etc (Council for Science and Society 1982).
Traditionally adoption and utilisation decisions were almost inevitably supported by budgetary
approval from either capital or current budgets. However, since the late 1970s attempts have
been made to limit budgetary allocations to health care. The public and unitary nature of the
NHS made this relatively easy in the UK, where global cash limits could be introduced by
administrative and legislative fiat. Since the introduction of the internal market, hospitals and
primary care practitioners have greater control over their purchasing and funding decisions,
within the constraints of this global limit, encouraging the devolution of budgets to various clinical
directorates and budget headings. Thus capitation in the UK is mainly based on allocations
(derived from a formula based on population) distributed to purchasers, who then negotiate with
providers and determine the prices paid for specific services. Similar patterns can be seen in US
managed care organisations, whilst Federal government has adopted a capitation system for
specific activities (based around utilisation, but consequently affecting adoption).
In theory a purchasing decision would be concerned with finding the most cost effective
equipment to meet a predefined (and pre agreed) need. This decision would be supported by
independent players who would apply their skills at the most appropriate points in the decision
making process. e.g. users would identify needs and determine preferences after seeking
administrative input from service planners, managers would allocate budgets to specialities in
accordance with hospital priorities, buyers would negotiate contracts and authorise procurement
etc.
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Various bureaucratic systems have been developed to impose some coherence on adoption
and utilisation decisions. Different types of technology would follow different types of approval
path. Some would require little or no approval (e.g. replacement technology, many drugs and
surgical variations), others would be more bottom up (with clinicians lobbying for their approval
since they required budgetary allocations. e.g. new devices) whilst a third group would be
implemented in a more top down fashion (e.g. strategic decisions by senior clinicians or
managers). However, most decisions are composed of many decentralised sub-decisions
achieved through the negotiation between different groups at different levels. For example the
decision to support a Heart Transplant Programme in the NHS would need Ministerial approval,
due to its costs, but the decisions concerning 'how, where and when' issues would be taken by a
combination of managers, clinicians and individual surgeons (having the lead role in policy
implementation). Generally, however, the closer the technology lies to clinicians, and the smaller
the immediate purchase price, the less likely it is to require, or receive, forms of managerial
oversight. Even where major programs are going to be undertaken, it is not difficult for alliances
of clinicians, patients and manufacturers to bypass administrative systems concerned with cost
control (Foote; Gelijns and Halm 1992, Hutton et al 1991, Rapparini 1984).
Controls on utilisation complement those relating to adoption, and mainly use systems of
capitation to bundle care costs, from the very precise (e.g. specific fee schedules), through the
more general (e.g. DRGs and Extra Contractual Referrals) to the global (e.g. primary care
providers, or GPs, receive patient capitation payments) (Gelijns 1992).
These controls have been vigorously pursued in the US, particularly by the government, since it
is unable to set global budgets, and so has instituted a system of approving and supporting
specific technologies for use in specific circumstances. The Prospective Payment System (PPS)
is a market based cost control incentive originally used in Medicare A (inpatient insurance for
the elderly), but now mimicked much more widely. Treatment for a specifically clinically
diagnosed condition (assigned to a Diagnostic Related Group) is limited to a fixed sum (the
average operating cost, with limited allowances for capital costs), with the aim of guiding
medical practice into cheaper (particularly outpatient) channels. (Gelijns and Halm 1991, Foote
1992, Gelijns 1990, Bronzino et al 1990). The impact on medical devices of Diagnostic Related
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Group (DRG) type regulation varies according to numerous factors, most of which are unknown
prior to extensive diffusion (Foote 1992).
It is increasingly likely that some form of Prospective Payment System (PPS) will eventually be
introduced into the NHS, as part of the shift to evidence based health care and the
purchaser/provider split. Similarly it also represents one of the most effective extensions of
administrative power into clinical autonomy (Flynn 1992). The fundamental problem of PPS is
that it needs continuous and reliable new data on costs and practices in order to recalibrate
DRGs to encourage the achievement of policy goals. Otherwise bizarre anomalies may be
generated (Southby et al 1985). However, frequently information is extremely limited, temporal
and expensive to get (Gelijns and Halm 1991, Southby et al 1985). The principle and immediate
problem with DRGs is that utilisation incentives exist as long as the technology is profitable,
regardless of whether it is beneficial for the individual patient or the population generally (Gelijns
and Halm 1991, Southby et al 1985, Abbott 1995).
The hospital is at the point of implementation, where clinical autonomy and administrative
discretion are maximised. It is difficult and expensive for external actors to regulate this
'coalface' activity, especially since it is so difficult to measure outputs and outcomes (e.g.
quality). (Gelijns and Dawkins 1994). Thus US clinicians and managers often unite to 'game' the
system, by channelling patients into profitable DRGs and unbundling services into their
components and claiming separate payments for each of these (Gelijns and Halm 1991,
Southby et al 1985, Abbott 1995).
US insurance companies will often question new, unorthodox, obsolete or unconventionally
applied technologies. They rely on claim review committees, assisted by medical associations
and speciality groups (e.g. Blue Cross-Blue Shield National Association Medical Advisory
Panel). However, these are slow and cumbersome processes, and often use the technology's
subsequent diffusion as indicator of its worth. e.g. standard practice, experimental,
investigational (Southby et al 1985, Gelijns and Halm 1991). Decision making, particularly in the
US, is also influenced by the legal environment. Individuals can often successfully sue assorted
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financiers and providers for denying them care which can be deemed 'medically necessary'
(Gelijns and Dawkins 1994).
Finally, policy makers often make decisions based in contradictory interests. Thus the UK
government, as the pharmaceutical industries' main customer and regulator, has to balance the
needs of the industry (profit maximisation) with those of the NHS (cost minimisation), and does
so through the easily circumventable (and largely informal) Pharmaceutical Price Regulation
Scheme (PPRS), which seeks to reward companies who produce domestically in the UK but
export internationally (Ruffen and Drummond 1994, Worth 1986, Chew et al 1985, Taggart
1993, Widgery 1988, Worth 1986, Spivey et al 1992).
As the UK and the US adopt a similar organisational solutions to common problems, their styles
of decision making are converging in some areas, whilst remaining traditionally separate in
others. Thus adoption decisions are becoming more devolved in the UK, and more centralised
in the US (e.g. Trusts, HMOs etc.), causing a merger in the systems, whilst bundling occurs at
the central level in the UK, but is largely devolved in the US (although this system is also liable
to merge as public, as well as private, provision moves to managed care models).
This discussion has shown how various techniques exist to regulate the consumption of health
care (primarily through bureaucratic and financial restraints on adoption and utilisation).
However, extensive difficulties exist with operationalising such constraints, as the section below
illustrates, and governments (particularly) often follow contradictory policies with regard to health
care consumption- seeking to constrain and expand it simultaneously in response to different
combinations of economic and political interests.
3.3 Technology Assessment
The previous sections have illustrated the similarities and differences between the UK and US
systems of financing and regulating health care provision. In many respects they appear to be
similar, and processes of convergence are occuring as both countries embrace variations of
managed competition (primarily as a means to ensure the cost effectiveness of treatments). A
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key technique for achieving this is technology assessment, which both countries are
undertaking. The main difference however, is that in the UK these tend to be sponsored publicly
by the NHS, whilst in the USA they are undertaken mainly by commercial (or non profit) private
organisations. This has implications for the intensity and form of the assessments and how
widely the information thus discovered is disseminated.
Ultimately, for regulatory systems to be able to control adoption and utilisation decisions, they
must have information on the absolute or relative efficacy of medical technologies, and this
information must be reliable, trusted, and implementable. The following discussion assesses
progress towards this ideal state.
Technology assessment is an umbrella term covering a range of techniques for assessing the
costs and benefits of technologies, which is considered essential to controlling the adoption and
utilisation of technologies. Traditionally such assessments were largely considered the purview
of the medical profession. However escalating costs have pushed both public and private payers
to investigate the anomalous variations in treatment patterns, costs and the use of technologies
(Gelijns 1992, Payer 1988, Bronzino et al 1990, Somers and Somers 1977, Southby et al 1985,
Gelijns and Dawkins 1994, Frazier and Mosteller 1995, Hoare 1992). Shifting control from
clinicians requires an independent source of information concerning clinical practice (provided
by technology assessment) and a legitimating process separate from the agency relationship
with patients (e.g. patient centred outcome measures) (Gelijns and Dawkins 1994).
The process of assessment is itself unpredictable and unreliable, and is usually criticised for
being narrowly focused. e.g. defining some issues as externalities and discounting them, or
never considering them (Kervasdor et al 1984). Many situations are not amenable to study (e.g.
the large scale and length of prevention and chronic care studies makes them vulnerable to
interference by uncontrolled, and unrecognised, factors), whilst relying on arbitrarily drawn
endpoints which are signified by proxies of uncertain validity (Council for Science and Society
1982). These problems are exacerbated when it is recognised that technologies generate a wide
range of effects, at different times in different situations, which interact with each other over
indeterminate lengths of time (Wechsler et al 1981). Thus devices and procedures undergo
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almost continuous development (complicating assessments), and their characteristics (visibility
to clinician and patient) complicates the use of randomised controlled trials (RCTs) (Gelijns
1990).
For example the efficacy of a diagnostic device (its ability to beneficially affect outcomes for
individuals or a population under ideal conditions) can be described by numerous aspects (each
of which may be important under different clinical situations) e.g. technical capacity, diagnostic
accuracy, diagnostic impact, therapeutic impact, patient outcomes etc. In assessing
therapeutics technologies, the 'objectiveness' of states of morbidity and life quality are
contingent upon who is assessing them. Thus clinicians typically consider success in terms of
medical benefit (altering the course of the disease process), whilst patients consider the
personal benefits to them (e.g. functioning, symptom relief, treatment requirements, effect on
self image). Even if decisions can be reached on the efficacy of the technology, decisions on
diffusion require consideration of its effectiveness (likelihood of benefit in actual use) (Bronzino
et al 1990).
A technology assessment should therefore be based on reliable and valid information,
processed logically, and giving rise to outcomes which are readily usable. However there are
extreme difficulties in this process, centred around the difficulty and expense of gathering
realistic data, and its subsequent inability to effect policy.
Bias can be introduced into studies through the choice of question (e.g. what are treatments
compared to ?), methodology (with RCTs being uncommon in outside of drug testing), and the
reporting of results (e.g. under reporting of negative reports, due to disinterest by editors etc.)
(Drummond 1986).
Data may be gathered from primary or secondary sources, both of which are riddled with
conceptual and practical problems. Uncontrolled clinical studies, composing the bulk of
research, are typically based on casual and unrepresentative observations by a small number of
clinicians. This atypical situation is exacerbated by the lack of controls, undermining the study's
statistical validity and generalisability, although it can provide illustrative examples for use by
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clinicians (Southby et al 1985, Ruffen and Drummond 1994). RCTs attempt to minimise the
affects of bias (e.g. in clinical observation, the placebo affect and externalities) by randomly
allocating different therapies to different groups, without participants being aware of this. Most
RCTs are not of the highest quality, having numerous methodological faults (e.g. failing to
itemise dosage variations during trials), whilst even ideal RCTs are so precisely focused as to
be inapplicable to most real world situations (e.g. combined technologies in application,
comorbidity, environmental and institutional factors, the value of placebo), whilst their complexity
and slowness means they are often obsolete before release, undermining much of their clinical
value and predictive worth (Gelijns 1992). Information from secondary sources (e.g. hospital
records, claims information, discharge databases) is often unreliable, inaccurate, and generally
suspect (e.g. the clinical fashions which influence the descriptions put on death certificates),
since data is normally gathered for a purpose which invalidates its neutrality. Thus the purposes
and means of original data collection often strongly undermine subsequent uses of the data.
Different sources of information cannot be combined, since their collection processes differed,
and a collection of faulty data has no more validity than individual sets of such data. Generally
clinical data are manipulated and reinterpreted according to political, social, economic or
ideological need (Gelijns and Dawkins 1994).
Such clinical studies are only applicable to small population subsets, and so decision analysis is
used to fill the gaps. e.g. decision trees, appropriateness methodology. These are all forms of
meta analysis, which attempt to combine multiple studies to establish significance by weighting
them according to their assumed scientific reliability and validity (Gelijns and Halm 1991). The
meta analysis process is often inherently subjective and political (e.g. expert panels negotiating
between themselves over the meaning of data). Finally, assessing appropriateness is very
complex, resource intensive, slow and cumbersome, making them vulnerable to subtle shifts in
clinical practice (Gelijns and Dawkins 1994, Gelijns 1992, Collingridge 1980).
Various techniques have been devised to compare the costs of care (e.g. Cost Benefit Analysis
(CBA), Cost Effectiveness Analysis (CEA)), in order to quantify the costs of different options.
These techniques are similarly riddled with theoretical (e.g. how to assess subjective outcomes)
and practical (e.g. finding identical outcomes, accounting for different case mix, location etc.)
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difficulties, which limit their abilities to detect marginal changes, and thus to guide policy. MRI is
an example of a technology where it is very hard to use CBA or CEA, since it is theoretically and
practically difficult to allocate outcomes to diagnostic machines. Similarly MRI may be efficient in
one clinical setting, but wasteful in another (Gelijns and Halm 1991, Southby et al 1985). Thus
the outcomes of a technology assessment depend on who is testing for what.
The primary problem technology assessment suffers from is timeliness (e.g. the pace of
evaluation falls behind the pace of innovation, especially in utilisation) (Drummond 1987,
Wechsler et al 1981). The more control clinicians have over the technology, the more frequently
this is likely to happen. e.g. new drug dosages and combinations are used, devices are tinkered
with, and surgeons frequently perform minor variations (Wechsler et al 1981). Problems with
dissemination (information needs to reach decision makers in an appropriately usable form) and
operationalisation (administratively based rationality is insufficient to change behaviour)
compound these problems (Hoare 1992).
The conception of research, development and application as a linear and sequential process,
enabling technology assessment prior to dissemination, is misconceived. Technology
assessments respond to clinicians' practices, not the reverse, and therefore clinical application
must occur prior to assessment. (IKH). Consequently assessments are more useful in affecting
utilisation patterns than adoption decisions (Drake et al 1993, Lefkowitz 1983).
Apart from being technically difficult, slow and expensive, technology assessment is very
sensitive to fashions and themes. Research is vulnerable to various economic, social and
political concerns (e.g. profit, employment, exports, such as the use of in vitro fertilisation (IVF)
treatments at private clinics, or political pressures to be seen to be acting in the case of AZT and
AIDS). Thus technologies can have great political value, even if they are of unproven medical
benefit and high financial costs (Hogg 1988). The effectiveness of assessments depends on the
strength of systems which seek to use them. In the US producer and provider groups vigorously
resist governmental regulation. e.g. debate concerning the eligibility of the Health Care
Financing Administration (HCFA) to consider cost effectiveness in order to make coverage
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decisions (Gelijns and Dawkins 1994). Research is thus typically uncoordinated and
underfunded (Banta and Luce 1993, Drummond 1987).
Even in systems where technology assessment is made a central priority, such as in the NHS,
only a minority of technologies can be analysed. Thus explicit decisions have to be made
regarding what concerns are informing evaluations, what types of information should be sought,
by what means, how it should be used, and what level of uncertainty and indecision is tolerable
(Drummond 1987).
However, most decisions are made locally. Managers are typically faced with limited data, in a
highly politicised atmosphere where industry, clinicians and patients clamour for the adoption of
the newest technologies (Gelijns and Dawkins 1994, Council for Science and Society 1982).
Such problems are compounded by the different decisions which are made at different levels,
creating regulatory, managerial and financial confusion. There has been a lack of convergence
in the intentions and practices of policy makers, payers, regulatory agencies etc. (even where
most of this power was centralised. e.g. the NHS) and so clinical behaviour continues to mould
decisions concerning technology purchases. Clinicians, often in combination with local
managers, have shown ingeniuousness in exploiting the ambiguities offered by the environment
in order to overcome constraints. Hence providers and payers are gatekeepers, but the
inadequacy of data for evaluation (costs and benefits) means adoption is shaped by a complex
set of social, financial and regulatory forces (Gelijns 1992).
The 'dilemma of control' usually means that a technology cannot be assessed until it has
diffused (and even then it is expensive, difficult and disruptive to do so), by which time it is
intrinsic to a range of economic and social processes, making mature technologies resistant to
control. Thus at the time when a technology can be controlled, insufficient information exists,
and when the information does exist the technology has become a self preserving entity in its
own right (Collingridge 1980, Gelijns and Dawkins 1994, Wolf and Berle 1980, Gelijns 1990).
Essentially measures of clinical and cost effectiveness are attempts to objectify the subjective,
and produce universal rules from contextually specific situations, set within a temporal
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dimension. The techniques thus have limited application, and are themselves guided by the
values of clinicians, with their findings being open to numerous interpretations according to the
interests of those commissioning or guiding the excercises (IKH).
Consequently technology assessment is far from being a science. Different groups produce
different assessments for the same technology, even when using the same methods, due to
their different underlying assumptions. Even when assessments are accepted within a society,
they suffer from severe practical problems, such as timeliness, appropriateness and applicability
(since it is difficult to influence adoption and utilisation decisions, as the previous section
demonstrated). Technology assessments are therefore reactive and slow, when they should be
proactive and quick. Confidence in techniques and their outcomes is, therefore, mainly a matter
of faith. The extent of investment in such techniques and systems illustrates the political shifts
that are occurring in the political economy of health care, as faith in the individual clinician is
edged out by faith in the mechanism of technocratic bureaucracy (which financiers believe will
be more amenable to administrative direction).
The response to common problems, within health care delivery, has been that of similar
organisational technologies, set within different structures and cultures. Both the UK and the US
have introduced version of managed care and managed competition, whilst blurring the public-
private divide. Control has been exerted through funding, such as capping budgets at various
levels, intermixed with systems of bureaucratic regulation, which are gradually shaving away
clinical autonomy. However, the difficulties in assessing the value of a technology, and the
extent of a disease, severely hamper these attempts. Meanwhile, clinicians continue to enjoy a
dominant moral authority, even as other elements of their hegemonic power are declining.
Finally, the implementation of structured market systems are likely to encourage the co-
operation of clinicians and local managers in gaming the system to benefit both their interests.
4 Systems of Health Care Production in the UK and US
The first half of this section is concerned with changing government policies regarding the
support of research and development, and the way that such funding has encouraged the
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development of the medical industrial complex. The second half studies the highly political
regulatory processes governing drugs and devices, with comment on the extremely lapse
regulation surrounding surgical procedures.
4.1 Funding
The post-war period was defined by the expansion of government funding of the 'intelligentsia'
sector (e.g. research, development, teaching, university, academia etc.) following numerous
technological successes and advances during the second world war. Such government
spending on the production and consumption of health care strongly influenced the
organisational structure of health care delivery. (Bowers and Purcell 1976, Southby et al 1985,
OTA 1984, Rosenberg et al 1995, Somers and Somers 1977, Centre for Higher Education 1991,
Becher and Kogan 1992, Hollingsworth 1986, Bronzino et al 1990).
Budgetary growth was particularly noticeable in the US (Somers and Somers 1977, Rosenberg
et al 1995, Hollingsworth 1986), skewing clinical education and practice towards biomedical
research and specialisms based on technology (Somers and Somers 1977, Rosenberg et al
1995, Ginzberg and Dutka 1989). These processes were much less evident in Britain, where
smaller grants were allocated to institutions and not individuals, much more separated from
industry. These different structures reflected and reinforced the typical scientific research
careers, which were based on mobility, vulnerability and competition in the US, and stability,
security and predictability in the UK (Hollingsworth 1986, Freeman et al 1972).
However, disappointment with the returns on this investment encouraged governments, from the
mid 1960s onwards, to exert far more direct (e.g. regulatory) and indirect (e.g. financial) control
over scientific research. (Southby et al 1985). This trend was exacerbated in the 1970s, when
the collapse of the Keynesian consensus and the emergence of intense global competition,
pushed states to reconsider their domestic policies. Within an economic policy vacuum,
governments embraced strategies of economic liberalism and fiscal restraint. Consequently
efforts have been made to reduce public spending, and commercialise decision making
processes (Webster 1991).
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The intention was that systems of publicly funded professional corporatism would be replaced by
a pluralistic and heterogeneous market, where different types of organisation and funding were
appropriate to stages in the career of an innovation. Publicly funded research was reduced
(although it continued to be concentrated at the basic level), whilst industrial funding of strategic
and applied research was subsidised (through tax incentives). Governments' concentrate
research support in selected strategic areas which were believed to be central to national goals
(e.g. information processing, biotechnology, and new materials) (Webster 1991), focusing effort
on specific initiatives (e.g. AIDS and breast cancer research), and encourage the accelerated
transfer of theoretical knowledge (in theoretical locations such as universities) into applied
technologies (in commercial locations such as industry). (Rosenberg et al 1995). Various tools
and techniques have been developed to help 'manage' science, and reduce its inherent
uncertainty by quantifying the productivity and likely results of specific investments.
Consequently, the structures and systems within which universities operate have been
commercialised (e.g. bidding for students, research contracts etc.), and they have been
encouraged to fragment into smaller units which can work more closely with the industrial sector
(reorienting research towards science and engineering and away from social sciences and
humanities etc.) (Centre for Higher Education 1991, Webster 1991), creating hybrid
organisations that cross traditional boundaries (Webster 1991). e.g. US academic departments
rented space to clinicians who established their own private medical practices. (Ginzberg and
Dutka 1989, Webster 1991). Laws and regulations were enacted to establish an infrastructure
enabling public institutions and researchers to assert private property rights over the outputs of
publicly funded research, and so accelerate 'technology transfer' (Rosenberg et al 1995, Becher
and Kogan 1992, Foote 1992). Universities grew to become dependent on research income,
and when public sources became constrained, they were forced to embrace commercial areas
(Porter and Malone 1992, Centre for Higher Education 1991, Webster 1991, Hollingsworth 1986,
Webster 1991, Rosenberg et al 1995, Ginzberg and Dutka 1989). Policies of fiscal constraint
and policy reorientation were pursued much more vigorously in the UK than the US, where
universities had always worked within a system which resembled a market, and government
lacked the unitary power to be able to impose its wishes.
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Simultaneously, the post-war growth in government funding for the production and consumption
of health care encouraged the development of the medical-industrial complex, since the sector
was viewed as being largely immune from most economic crisis. Market theory is founded on
the assumption that consumer can migrate from a market (e.g. if costs are too high for the
benefit obtained). There are numerous problems with this conception within health care (e.g.
information asymmetry between clinician, patient and payer). Such problems are exacerbated by
moral hazard and the pervasive uncertainty that sourrounds health and health care production
and consumption. The primary (and inevitable) market failure underlying the stability of the
medical-industrial complex, is that consumers (clinicians and ultimately patients) cannot
(realistically) withdraw from the market altogether. Thus consumers are locked into
consumption, giving producers (clinicians and technological manufacturers) an immense power.
The public and private sectors fund production and consumption in large, stable, captive
markets, with the public sector accounting for the unappealing slack (e.g. basic research and
chronic care). Consumption decisions occur in an atmosphere of apparent need (clinicians and
patients seek the best care available), informed by moral hazard (neither clinician or patient is
particularly concerned about cost, since third party insurers pay), and guided by the agency
relationship (where clinicians make decisions about both supply and demand, in acting as the
patients' representative). Thus services, consumed by an anxious mass of heterogeneous and
diverse patients can be marketed to a well defined and hierarchical group of decision-makers
(clinicians, managers etc.) (Smith 1983), who are relatively obedient to trends and fashions.
Development costs and licensing consolidates comparative advantage and the gleaning of
monopoly rents, whilst imbuing corporations with a benevolent image (McKinlay 1982). The size
of the medical sector assures manufacturers of profits, and the legitimacy and control exercised
by those street level providers (e.g. clinicians and unit managers) ensures the ability of a willing
manufacturer to bypass resource and regulatory constraints (Gelijns 1992).
Such features reduced commercial uncertainty, and large scale financial and industrial interests
began to congregate in the health care sector (Breheny et al 1992, McKinlay 1982, ACARD
1986, Gelijns and Halm 1991, Gelijns and Dawkins 1994). Many of these companies have
gradually merged (Webster 1991, Braun 1995), squeezing smaller competitors from the market
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(Gelijns and Halm 1991). These organisations are webbed together by formal (e.g. acquisitions,
diversification, joint ventures, interwoven ownership) and informal (e.g. cultural backgrounds of
major decision makers) means (Wohl 1984). Consequently they will collude both actively and
passively to maintain market stability (Bronzino et al 1990). Governments are anxious that such
powerful companies operate within their countries, and so will compete to offer them incentives,
whilst working closely with them. Centrally, public (government), private (industry and
commerce) and non profit (charities, foundations, universities etc.) usually work closely together
and form policy making communities (Webster 1991, Southby et al 1985, Bronzino et al 1990).
Consequently the industrialised world is meshed together by interchanges of technology,
personnel, capital and (increasingly) culture (Southby et al 1985).
In summary, the post war period was characterised by an expansion of government spending on
both the production and consumption of health care. This encouraged the industrialisation of the
sector by powerful companies, with the active support of government. Simultaneously such
spending fostered the growth of academic institutions and the research community. However,
reductions in government spending, and the reintroduction of laissez faire policies, have
propelled research and researchers into the private commercial sector, with such a move being
encouraged by governments. There has thus been an increased merger between academic,
industrial, public and private, research and development, effectively creating a powerful policy
community which actively seeks to produce technology, and is able to legitimate itself politically,
economically and socially. Essentially, therefore, post-war spending fostered the growth of the
components (industry and research) and post-Keynesianism has forced these components to
cooperate more closely. The following discussion analyses what regulatory agencies oversee
this production process, and what effects they may have.
4.2 Regulation
Regulatory agencies balance the contradictory goals of fostering innovation (enabling effective
technology to be quickly marketed) and protecting the public against ineffective and dangerous
technologies. Decisions are made on the basis of risk / benefit data emerging from industry
sponsored research (Epstein 1978). However regulation is a socially negotiated process (e.g.
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'safety', 'efficacy' and 'acceptable' are subjective terms), relying on interpretation, interaction and
feedback etc. at different levels, and regulators have considerable discretion in their decision
making processes (Webster 1991 (Gelijns and Halm 1991 (COIRS 1995, Gambardella 1995).
The legal system sits alongside the government agencies, retrospectively penalising unsafe
technologies, and is much more active in the US than the UK (Foote 1992, OTA 1984, Frazza;
L'etang 1983).
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Medicines Control Agency (MCA) and Medical
Devices Agency (MDA) are all very closely related to the industries they regulate. However, the
FDA is vigorously overseen by Congress, and susceptible to industry sponsored public pressure
(Gelijns and Halm 1991), making it less susceptible to industry pressure than its British
counterparts (whose decision making is much less publicly accountable). Consequently
regulatory decisions in both countries usually favour industry (Gambardella 1995), although the
FDA may take longer as it observes post marketing surveillance results from other countries.
The UK government is particularly supportive of the pharmaceutical industry, which is in the
beneficial position of being sponsored by both the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and
the Department of Health (DoH) (Taggart 1993). There is minimal parliamentary, judicial or
consumer review of the industry's practices. Regulatory history has been one of gradual,
permissive regulation, generally of a voluntary and negotiated nature, and usually centred
around budgetary control and not patient protection. Regulators have sought to rapidly approve
drugs, whose beneficence is implicitly assumed. Such interests have been encouraged and
reinforced by formal (e.g. agencies' reliance on user fees) and informal (e.g. staff transfer
between government and industry) relationships, with most employees being clinicians,
scientists and pharmacists. The MCA promotes itself as one of the fastest licensing authorities
in the world, following an FDA style process (since manufacturers wish to access the US
market) (Gambardella 1995, Hollingsworth 1986, Young 1990).
In both the UK and the US, drugs undergo 5 stages of assessment, with most of these being
directly controlled by the company (Weatherall; L'etang 1983, Young 1990, Spivey et al 1992,
Wells 1985, Hall 1995, Gelijns 1990). Pre-clinical testing occurs in laboratories using animals to
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show effect and safety. Subsequently small clinical trials are undertaken (Phase 1), followed by
a larger double blind RCT (Phase 2), which gives rise to multi-centre RCTs (Phase 3) (Gelijns
and Halm 1991). Only approximately 10% of drugs complete this process in the US, and
voluntary post marketing surveillance (Phase 4) may be undertaken subsequently (Southby et al
1985, Hall 1995, Gelijns 1990, Frazier and Mosteller 1995, Gelijns and Halm 1991). Post
marketing surveillance is easier in the UK since there are fewer providers under tighter
regulation within a centralised system (Uttley 1991, Hutchinson 1993). e.g. the Prescription
Event Monitoring (PEM) scheme (Gelijns 1990, Sneader 1986). This enables the UK to approve
drugs quickly (Uttley 1991, Spivey et al 1992), and it is rare for product licenses to be
subsequently suspended (Sneader 1986).
Whilst drugs can be exactly specified chemically, devices cannot. They are thus herder to
regulate, but their risks are usually more immediately apparent (Gelijns and Halm 1991), and so
regulation is more lenient (Gelijns 1990). Usually manufacturers produce a prototype and modify
it as a result of the initial clinical testing. These informal pilot stages, where materials and design
are tested to ascertain whether the device produces the postulated beneficial effect, give rise to
safety and efficacy evaluations of the final (non experimental) product. Ethics bodies review the
device studies, deciding if the device poses a significant risk via an investigational plan (device
description, objectives and duration of investigation, protocols, risk analysis etc.) before
approving clinical studies at their institution (Gelijns 1990).
Regulatory control in the UK has traditionally been lax, working closely with industry, and having
a deregulatory orientation (MDA 1995). The Manufacturers' Registration Scheme (whereby
products were immediately endorsed for use in the NHS if their manufacturers showed a level of
Good Manufacturing Practice) (ACARD 1986, Menzies; Rapparini 1984, Gelijns and Halm 1991)
is gradually being replaced by EU Directives (Foote 1992), which mimic, to some degree, the
FDA's requirements (MDD 1994).
The FDA Center for Devices and Radiological Health classes devices according to the health
risk they present, but its underlying legislation is concerned with encouraging innovation (Gelijns
1990 Devices are classified into 3 risk classes, and the more potentially dangerous a device, the
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more strictly it is regulated. Most devices are only subject to the most general of controls
(Gelijns and Halm 1991 (Southby et al 1985) and are mostly regulated by voluntary, independent
standard setting organisations (Foote 1992, Gelijns 1990, Mungavin; L'etang 1983, MDA 1994,
1995, MDD 1994, Gelijns and Halm 1991).
Having established that the regulatory agencies differ in their treatment of different technologies,
and are often supportive of the industries they seek to regulate, the following sections analyse
the roles played by different industrial and professional groups in the production of medical
technologies.
4.3 The Pharmaceutical Industry
The pharmaceutical industry is highly concentrated and international, although production tends
to be concentrated in the USA, UK, Germany, Switzerland, France and Japan (Taggart 1993,
Breheny et al 1992) and the bulk of consumption occurs in Europe, the USA and Japan
(Breheny et al 1992). The market is characterised by dependability (high entry barriers, well
regulated competition, with high returns and moderate risks), stability (strong relations with
customers, buyers, suppliers, creditors, employees) and profit (monopoly and monopsony power
in regard to clinicians and suppliers), which make the industry attractive to investors, and
produce a stability in corporate rankings. Companies are fiercely competitive and protective of
their markets, normally relying on a few brands to produce the bulk of their income.
However, pressures have been exerted on the industry, although it still enjoys very high profit
rates. Production costs have risen (e.g. research and development, less public financing, longer
development times, tighter regulation, shorter patent life) whilst consumption has become more
competitive (e.g. faster entry of generics, development of innovative biotechnology companies)
and cost focused (Corstjens 1991, Taggart 1993, Gelijns and Halm 1991). Centrally financiers
are imposing controls on pharmaceuticals (e.g. encouraging the use of generics through
formularies and the limited list, unwillingness to support experimental or off label uses, applying
effectiveness and appropriateness data to guide clinical protocols (Gelijns 1990, Gelijns and
Halm 1991), exerting deflationary pressures (e.g. changes in the PPRS system, direct buying by
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Medicare and HMOs). Often buyers concentrate to lever down prices and import from cheaper
countries (Taggart 1993).
The pharmaceutical industry invests almost as much in research as it does in marketing
(Rosenberg et al 1995, Epstein 1978, Chetley 1990, Rosenberg 1994, Braun 1995, Gelijns
1990, Gambardella 1995). Traditionally companies engaged mostly in screening compounds for
possible therapeutic effect, supported by some basic research. However, new technologies and
theories have enabled research to become more targeted and specific, as the research focus
shifts from finding an effective chemical to manipulating a biochemical process to achieve a
desired end, based on a theory. The process is slow, difficult and intricate, but is reputed to
have reduced the delay between research and development (Gambardella 1995, Taggart 1993).
Such expense and risks have encouraged pharmaceutical companies to organise risk bearing
interdisciplinary and interorganisational networks, based on the complementary skills and assets
which academic departments, biotechnology research companies and pharmaceutical
corporations enjoy (Rosenberg et al 1995). Universities supply ideas and compounds,
biotechnologists the therapies and applied research, whilst the large corporations furnish
complementary research capabilities and resources for large scale development and marketing
(Gambardella 1995). This illustrates the intermeshing of public and private resources, structures
and cultures within post-fordist production technologies, using flexible regimes to bridge cultural
gaps (e.g. commercialism relies on the concealment of information for success, whilst
academics gain prestige by freely exchanging information), which are actively supported and
encouraged by governments (Gambardella 1995). Usually research produces only small
differences in drugs, such as varying dosages, thus requiring greater spending on marketing
(Chetley 1990, Griffith et al 1987). Hence promotional budgets for new drugs are often inversely
proportional to their therapeutic novelty (Widgery 1988).
Pharmaceutical consumption decisions are primarily made by clinicians, but as cost controls are
exerted over prescriptions, and the over the counter market grows, the role of managers,
pharmacists, wholesalers and even patients has grown (Corstjens 1991, Taggart 1993).
Traditionally companies have not competed through price differences (Smith 1983, Taggart
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1993), but as financiers are exerting increased purchasing control, pharmaceutical companies
are increasingly conducting studies to support the cost effectiveness of their drugs (Gelijns and
Dawkins 1994, Gambardella 1995, Drummond 1986). Non price competition, however, remains
core (e.g. branding, introducing new features which are appealing to consumers and decision
makers etc.) (Bronzino et al 1990).
Marketing strategies are primarily centred around convincing individual clinicians that the drug
introduces greater clinical certainty into medical decision making (Corstjens 1991, Smith 1983),
whilst providing subsidiary support to the other decision makers who will be able to influence the
drugs use. e.g. payers and cost effectiveness information, pharmacists and profitable market
projections, patients and efficacy with ease of use. Companies use intricate campaigns to
influence each group at each stage in the acceptance of a technology (Smith 1983). e.g. passive
awareness, active awareness, experimentation, adoption (Taggart 1993, Orton and Fry 1985,
Corstjens 1991, Smith 1983). Much of this effort is concerned with building up a cumulative
stock of trust in the company's name, enabling a specific brand to be associated with reduced
risk and uncertainty in medical practice.
Campaigns usually begin years before the drug is released, with reports in the mass media
(Corstjens 1991, Smith 1983). Clinicians who have worked with the drug are encouraged to
publish their studies and give conference presentations (Heaton 1994), whilst the marketing
sales force visit prescribers bearing gifts and experimental packages, and may offer incentives
to local notables to undertake 'trials'. Publicity is usually dressed as 'education', with the industry
exerting considerable control over post-graduate training, which clinicians are required to attend
(Griffith et al 1987, Chetley 1990, Orton and Fry 1985, Gelijns and Halm 1991). Meanwhile, the
drug is promoted extensively in the professional and lay press, in advertisements, articles and
letters (Smith 1983). Such information is usually notoriously unreliable, but even when it falls
within the purview of regulation (the ABPIs voluntary code or the FDA's legal redress) it is rarely
challenged. The industry routinely flouts both laws and voluntary agreements (Chetley 1990,
Spivey et al 1992, Gelijns and Halm 1991, Heaton 1994, Corstjens 1991, Gelijns 1992, Worth
1986).
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The pharmaceutical industry is a major economic asset for both the US and the UK (Taggart
1993, Spivey et al 1992, Breheny et al 1992). However the expense of drugs has caused
reaction by purchasers (Spivey et al 1992), and governments are faced with policy
contradictions, in that they wish to support the pharmaceutical industry, but contain health costs.
e.g. the US government has increased the difficulty of bringing a new drug to market,
lengthened patents, accelerated the approval of generics and strengthened intellectual property
laws (Taggart 1993, Spivey et al 1992, Gelijns and Dawkins 1994), whilst the UK has introduced
the limited list, but resisted strengthening the PPRS system. Policy seems to attempt to
encourage research and development, but shorten profitable lifespans, thus encouraging rapid
export. However, the multi-national corporations (MNCs) are a powerful political and economic
force, whose strength is being reinforced by concentration, and which unite against regulation or
control. Consequently it is unknowable whether purchasers (including governments) will be able,
or willing, to control the industry (Chetley 1990), whist the industry remains adept at adjusting to
and circumventing legislation (Taggart 1993, Worth 1986).
4.4 The Medical Device Industry
By comparison to the pharmaceutical industry, the device industry is more diverse and less
concentrated. International trade in devices is relatively limited, but the USA is the worlds'
leading producer and consumer (ACARD 1986, Gelijns and Halm 1991), and the home to the
few multi-nationals which dominate production of expensive technical equipment (which
composes the bulk of the market in terms of finance, but not in volume) (Ham 1993).
The bulk of the industry is composed of thousands of small companies operating in extremely
localised markets (Gelijns and Halm 1991, Bronzino et al 1990, OTA 1984, Foote 1992, ACARD
1986), where they produce highly customised products for specific clinicians and hospitals,
based on networks of personal knowledge and relationships. The market is unstable and poorly
defined (Taggart 1993), being characterised by take-overs, mergers and the emergence and
disappearance of companies (Blume 1992, Southby et al 1985, ACARD 1986). Protection is
also weak, since patents can easily be circumvented (Taggart 1993, Roberts; Eke!man 1988).
Aside from the few multi nationals, most companies are in a weak position with regard to their
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suppliers and consumers, and have little political power, making them reactive with regard to
their environment (Foote 1992, Blume 1992).
The device industry invests considerably in interdisciplinary research (Rosenberg et al 1995),
often garnering some form of support from governments (Foote 1992, Gelijns and Halm 1991,
Wolf and Berle 1980, Rosenberg 1994, Gelijns and Halm 1991). Usually this is based on a close
symbiotic relationship with clinicians, enabling devices to be designed around their interests, and
tailored to suit the current environment (since they can be rapidly engineered and adapted)
(Gelijns 1992, Porter and Malone 1992, Rosenberg et al 1995, Gelijns 1990, Gelijns and Halm
1991, ACARD 1986, Council for Science and Society 1982). Users are critical in identifying
needs as a basis for innovation, develop technical solutions, and transferring the idea to
manufacturers or developing it themselves. Subsequently they work with the manufacturer to
guide development, evaluate clinical utility, and are instrumental in teaching industrial firms how
to solve complex manufacturing problems. Finally they inform product alterations through their
advice and feedback.
Most innovations are incremental changes, which can be accommodated within existing
resources, skills and knowledge, since radical innovations may disrupt and threaten existing
relationships e.g. professional competence, market position etc (Blume 1992). Development is a
continuous and disorderly process of modification and clinical evaluation (Gelijns 1990), based
on personal relationships, feedback, and co-operation. Thus whilst the production of
pharmaceuticals is influenced by the underlying culture of the society (e.g. concern over cancer,
acceptability of drug use for certain conditions etc.), the culture of medicine (e.g. clinicians,
nurses, management etc.) strongly influences the actual development of devices.
Once devices have been approved on minimal grounds by regulators (e.g. safety) they are
usually financially supported by payers. Most devices require little marketing, since clinicians
have been extensively involved in their development. However, companies may engage in
similar activities to the pharmaceutical industry e.g. ornate launches, discounts, trade shows,
visits to clinicians and purchasing managers etc (Style; Rapparini 1984, Gelijns 1992), especially
for more radical and expensive devices which may require managerial approval (Gelijns and
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Halm 1991, Rosenberg et at 1995, Blume 1992, Frazier and Mosteller 1995). Marketing efforts
are usually focused on teaching hospitals, where training will ensure a career cadre experienced
with the technology (ACARD 1986).
The shape of device industries is determined by domestic purchasing decisions. e.g. the DTI
encourages the NHS to purchase domestically produced goods, enabling them to be showcased
to foreign medical students or purchasers (ACARD 1986). Fiscal restraint has forced the
industry to concentrate on producing devices which suit administrative and patient concerns, in
addition to those of clinicians e.g. emphasising cost effectiveness, patient comfort, increasing
insurance against medical litigation (Gelijns 1992). However regulation and financing, although
altering the shape of the market in relation to technological sophistication and application, has
not generally caused price and cost to develop into determinant factors, or fostered the
development of devices for preventative or rehabilitation purposes, meaning that few companies
routinely engage in outcomes research to justify their products (OTA 1984, Gelijns and Dawkins
1994).
Study of the pharmaceutical and device industries has shown that governments are generally
supportive of them (in fact, enthusiastic in the case of pharmaceuticals). Consequently, their
appears to be little restraint acting on the production of health care, and the key decision makers
defining the value of medical technologies are clinicians, who are often extensively involved in
the development of pharmaceuticals and devices, and, as the following discussion shows, are
central to the development of surgical procedures.
4.5 The Medical Profession
Since the 19th century, clinicians have claimed that the combination of their technical education
and subjective understanding of the patient, enabled them to uniquely apply scientific (objective)
medical technologies. These alleged skills become a resource to support claims for discretion,
which were justified by clinicians' philosophical consonance with the social, economic and
political elites, who could grant them the discretion to use social resources. e.g. clinicians
successfully persuaded prominent elites to grant them monopoly over health issues (Swazey
103
and Scher 1982, Larkin 1983, Drake et al 1993). Consequently, the medical profession has
been successful in achieving a significant degree of discretion within society, being granted a
state mandated monopoly (professionalisation) which gave them the right to determine the
content and terms of their own, and others, work within the medical division of labour, according
to an underlying code of ethics (Flynn 1992, Chandani 1985), and to thus regulate society as an
agency of the state (Uttley 1991, Flynn 1992, Saks 1995, Larkin 1983, Wardell in L'etang 1983).
The medical profession is, however, characterised by vertical and horizontal mobility, being
composed of intertwined occupational groups who attempt to negotiate positions of control.
These occupational groups form associations with governing bodies which define their borders
and cultures. Individuals working within an occupation gradually mesh their identities with that of
the community, which is a significant determinant of their status in society. The community
forms a behavioural and moral contract, which ultimately controls the delivery of a valued
service, and whose members are typically unwilling to criticise each others exercise of
judgement within the vague uncertainties of the clinical encounter. Consequently, it is difficult for
external organisations to discipline or control clinicians (Swazey and Scher 1982, Ham 1993).
Skill is considered a crucial value within the medical hierarchy (e.g. access to technology,
research and educational functions) (Durbin 1980), and occupations seek to monopolise
particular skills or control the context of their delivery (Larkin 1983). Groups seek to mould the
introduction of new technologies to suit their preferences, since these can radically alter
hierarchical advantages (Gelijns 1992). Such competition can feed the medical technology
'arms' race, as fractions of the medical profession struggle for various forms of resources and
areas of control (Paine and Siemtjam 1988, Durbin 1980, Drake et al 1993, Moss 1991). Such
pressures have been intensified by the efforts of financiers to constrain costs and limit the
exercise of professional control (Uttley 1991). An ongoing struggle thus occurs over various
dimensions of authority. e.g. economic (remuneration), political (authoritative expertise) and
clinical-technical (standard setting and performance control) control (Flynn 1992).
Simultaneously, however, clinicians seek technology for more mundane purposes. People are
reluctant decision makers, since they are beset by uncertainty and anxiety (Dowie 1983). Clinical
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decision making is informed and guided by clinical culture, which encourages personal
(behavioural) discretion within (cultural) boundaries defined by the medical hierarchy (Gelijns
and Dawkins 1994, Goodman and Baratz 1990, Teeling-Smith 1986, Gelijns 1992). Technology
aids decision making by reducing uncertainty (e.g. providing more information and control) whilst
expanding the range of possible situations in which it can be used, and hence the power of the
groups using it. Technology, therefore, can grant its users reduced risk and increased
autonomy.
The cultural patterns of clinical behaviour are moulded by various levels of political, economic
and social forces. Clinical practice in the UK Is underlined by an orthodox conservatism of
economy and empiricism, which is more accepting of morbidity and mortality. The contract with
the state, that formed the basis of the NHS, gave clinicians collective clinical autonomy over the
use of resources, but required them to ration care according to need within resource constraints,
giving rise to a humane clinical conservatism (Payer 1988, Swazey and Scher 1982, Dowie
1983). US clinicians are much more aggressive in their use of technology, reflecting an ideology
based on human perfectibility, underlined by payment and provision systems which reward and
encourage activity etc (Drake et al 1993, Swazey and Scher 1982, Wolf and Berle 1980, Gelijns
1992). Such cultural factors are central to decision making practices, since they determine
definitions (e.g. desirability) and hence perceptions of risk.
The creation and adoption of technologies is consonant with individual clinicians' personal,
professional, social, economic and political interests within their immediate community, and
(usually) within wider society (Swazey and Scher 1982). Such an orientation has been termed
'the technological imperative' (Council for Science and Society 1982), and provides the setting
within which surgical innovation, adoption and utilisation occurs. These technologies generate
significant costs, but are largely uncontrolled, since the component processes are centred within
the medical profession e.g. professional associations, individual surgeons, clinical decision
making.
The surgical community is socially homogeneous and closely interlinked, and surgeons have
access to substantial social, economic and political resources and discretion (Uttley 1991,
105
Blume 1992, McKinlay 1982). Innovation traditionally emerges from the academic setting,
although minor variations are often initiated in community settings. Surgeons tend to maximise
the skills required in developing new procedures, since although they cannot be patented, they
grant both individual and institutions prestige, income, grants, social esteem, etc (Gelijns and
Halm 1991, Wolf and Berle 1980, Gelijns 1992, Uttley 1991, Gelijns 1990).
Innovation is undertaken by teams or individuals, and is overseen (obliquely) by professional
associations and bodies. Animal experimentation gives rise, with institutional ethical approval, to
trial and error experimentation on patients, which often occurs with little supervision (Gelijns and
Halm 1991, Hogg 1988). These unreliable clinical observations become widely reported within
the community, forming the basis of administrative decisions concerning coverage and
regulation, as well as those of adoption and utilisation by individual surgeons. Formal and
systematic review is rare, and procedures are often not tested for efficacy, safety or
effectiveness (Gelijns and Halm 1991).
Innovations are not liable to government regulation (McKinlay 1982, Somers and Somers 1977),
whilst medical societies avoid directive assessment since they consider themselves a collegiate
community of equals. Consequently, they usually seek to decentralise control and responsibility
to individual clinicians, enabling the collective community to avoid the risks of explicit
responsibility. Often the manufacturer of associated devices or drugs will sponsor, direct and
support training as part of continuing medical education, and lax control over these eases the
diffusion process. Thus approval, training and licensing are also centralised in the medical
profession (Frazier and Mosteller 1995, Ham 1993, Bronzino et al 1990). Innovations which
have significant impact are more visible, and their diffusion is liable to be more constrained by
factors external to surgery. e.g. managers (Gelijns and Halm 1991, Ham 1993). Conversely,
most minor innovations are relatively invisible, and can be implemented before any form of
efficacy, safety and effectiveness are understood (McKinlay 1982).
In principle, although not in practice, the innovation, adoption and utilisation of drugs and
devices can be controlled, since the producer, the supplier and the incidence are clearly
separated (and hence visible and unambiguous). However within surgery all 3 are united, and so
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regulatory control is hard to exert. It is generally harder to analyse the costs and benefits of
procedures, since immediate and apparent changes are usually not readily accessible, are
highly contingent upon the skill of the individual surgeon, and any outputs which can be
quantified can rarely be qualified (as they are refracted through various lenses). To analyse and
evaluate a technology, cause and effect relationships must be established, but observation
based surgical evaluation make this difficult to calculate (Bronzino et al 1990).
Diffusion tends to occur very rapidly, since innovation, adoption, and utilisation can often occur
almost simultaneously (L'etang 1983, Wardell; L'etang 1983 pp3-12, Gelijns 1990, 1992, Gelijns
and Halm 1991). Adoption decisions are dependent on surgeons' risk assessments (Ham 1993,
Uttley 1991, Gelijns 1992), which are often moulded by the behaviour of local peers and
competitors (Uttley 1991), which themselves are influenced by the decisions of regulatory and
financing agencies, and the recommendations of national, professional and scientific
organisations and associations (Gelijns and Dawkins 1994, Ham 1993). The narrowness of
specialisms, and the high status boundaries between them can, however, impede diffusion on
occasions (Gelijns and Dawkins 1994, Uttley 1991). Generally, however, such rapid diffusion
effectively impedes technology assessment, since surgeons are unwilling to conduct old
procedures on patients (even in trials) and a political community begins to form around the
surgery, making its abandonment extremely unlikely (Frazier and Mosteller 1995, Gelijns 1990,
Gelijns and Halm 1991).
5 Conclusion
The cultures and governments of the UK and the USA are based on fundamentally different
models. The US is a more competitive, pluralistic, and mobile society, emphasising individual
rights within an explicit contract with a fragmented and diverse government. The UK is more
homogeneous and static, with a greater emphasis on collective duties, and ruled over by a
unitary government. The countries' health care systems have developed in different ways, but
have been based on similar principles e.g. the clinicians' right to make clinical decisions without
restraint. However, both systems have experienced a lack of faith in this arrangement, and have
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sought ways to contain health care costs, primarily through giving direction to clinical decision
making. Common organisational technologies have been applied to these problems (e.g.
decentralised clinical budgets, cost constraint etc.), epitomised in the model of managed care
which is set within the context of managed competition, causing the 2 countries health care
systems to converge. A key criteria of this effort towards efficacy and efficiency is the control of
technology. However, technology assessment is extremely difficult, being riddled with
informational and timing problems, set within a general context of resource constraint and low
popular legitimacy.
The post-war period was noted for government support for the production, as well as the
consumption, of medical technologies. The growth in research funding fostered a burgeoning
academic and research community, which has had to reorientate itself towards commercial and
industrial ends, as public sector support has dwindled. Governments have encouraged this, as
part of their larger endorsement of the medical technology industry. The pharmaceutical industry
is particularly favoured, being a source of exports. Consequently, government policies towards
regulation of drugs and devices are vague and contradictory, especially in the UK, where the
pharmaceutical industry is one of the few resident high technology industries. Surgical
innovation remains almost entirely unregulated, enabling procedures to rapidly appear and
diffuse.
Finally decision making processes in hospitals was briefly mentioned, emphasising the profound
structural and cultural complexities engulfing such processes, and the lack of objective data on
technologies. Consequently, most decisions are driven by clinicians, who either directly make
such decisions, or inform the environment within which choices are made. Within situations of
such profound uncertainty, innovations tend to diffuse in a 'copy cat' pattern, with clinicians and
managers working together on most decisions, for the good of their institution.
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Chapter 5
Magnetic Resonance Imagin g: The Million Pound Polaroid 
1 Introduction
This first case study is concerned with understanding where Magnetic Resonance Imaging
(MRI) emerged from, and how it has subsequently diffused in a very different manner through
health care systems in the UK and the US (figs 2 and 3), in order to illustrate the larger
influences informing such processes. The central argument is that the clinical usefulness of MRI
does not account for its success, but that it has become a key technology in various forms of
professional and commercial competition, based around belief in its efficacy and the prestige
associated with it.
Diagnostic imaging is particularly significant, since the volume and expense of radiology
services has progressively increased (Anonymous 1983, Hall C 1995). Diagnostic and
interventional domains have expanded whilst technologies have become more expensive.
Services often duplicate each other, and give rise to cascades of services of marginal efficacy
(Ham C 1993). Radiology services are much more expensive in the US than the UK (Strasser R
1987, Kucharczyk; Rinck 1995, Werner C 1995, Steinberg E 1985) reflecting underlying pricing
differentials, but primarily due to the more vigorous and frequent use of these services in the US
(Strasser R 1987, Katz et al 1996), often in decentralised settings (Doyle C 1995). Similarly
there are large variations in imaging volume for the same condition (Anonymous 1983), which
are often unhelpful (Hall C 1995, Doyle C 1995) and even dangerous (due to ionising radiation)
(Sweeney K 1994). Consequently diagnostic imaging services are an important part of health
care systems.
Section two analyses the radiological profession, which is central to the diffusion of MRI. MRI
was developed outside of the radiology establishment who subsequently seized on it (as
described in section 3). Section 4 analyses the clinical value of MRI. The crucial point here is
109
that there was no realistic way to analyse the efficacy of MRI, and hence define an appropriate
place for it. Section 5 studies the decision making processes and contexts that underlay
diffusion in the UK and the US. A central motivating force seems to have been decision makers
perceptions of competition, and their adoption of MRI as a prestigious technology with which to
arm themselves. Section 7 offers a conclusion which will be integrated into the final chapter.
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Fig 2 Adoption of Magnetic Resonance Imaging Units In the UK 1979-1998
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Fig 3 Adoption of Magnetic Resonance Imaging Units In the USA 1979-1997
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2 The Radiology Profession and Conflict within Medicine
This section briefly describes the development of the radiology profession, emphasising its
vulnerability (since it is not a state monopoly and is often seen as trespassing on the clinical
territory of other professions), its reliance on technology to assure itself of status, and the strong
relationships it has established with manufacturers.
Radiology is not generally protected by a state mandate requiring diagnostic studies to be
conducted by particular medical specialists (radiologists). Clinical groups have traditionally both
diagnosed and treated disease, but the role of radiologists is to dominate diagnosis, across
clinical categories. Other clinical groups resist this incursion into diagnosis of their patients,
viewing it as essential to their clinical autonomy. Consequently radiology is frequently involved in
border disputes with other clinical groups, and these conflicts have increased as radiology has
become interventional (Schuman W et al 1988, Dodd G 1985) (conducting much more vigorous
diagnosis) and even curative (applying its technologies and skills to care for patients) (Blume
1992). e.g. using X rays in radiation therapy, sound waves in lithotripsy (Agee 1995). As
radiologists seek to expand their boundaries (Ham C 1993, Anonymous 1991i, Jordan 1996),
they gain attention from managers concerned with cost constraint (Anonymous 1994L,
Chapman 1997, Brehm and Mullner 1989), and open opportunities for radiographers (specialist
technicians) to challenge radiologists (the profession) monopoly of diagnosis (Paterson 1995).
Such pressures have encouraged the profession to move into management (Anonymous
1987b). Essentially the boundaries of the profession are not closed (Blume 1992).
Radiology's history is characterised by professionalising strategies, making it more exclusive
(requiring education and society membership), and dividing technical skills (radiographers) from
diagnostic ones (radiologists). Radiologists' claims to particular areas depend on their mastery
of technologies which are perceived to be more efficacious than those used by their
competitors. Occupational security thus relies on cultural legitimacy, which is increased by using
sophisticated (prestigious) technology (Blume 1992).This is largely because the more
sophisticated the technology is seen to be, the more efficacious it is believed to be. Thus cheap,
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flexible technologies such as ultrasound are overshadowed by clumsy and expensive ones such
as CT and MRI (Hogg 1988).
For example, radiological technology is frequently used by non radiologists (Anonymous 1983,
Radecki and Steele 1990), particularly in outpatient settings (James et al 1990). Particular
examples include the use of ultrasound by kidney surgeons in renal lithotripsy (Rosenberg 1994)
and the prolonged battle between radiologists and nuclear cardiologists over nuclear imaging
(James et at 1990). Claims to technical superiority are therefore essential to radiologists in their
numerous disputes with other professional sub groups, which are often characterised by
fragmentation into specialisms based around a particular technology (Agee 1995).
Consequently, radiologists are eager to consume technology and place it centrally within their
own departments (Blume 1992).
This section has outlined the nature of the profession that has come to dominate MRI, the
anxieties which underlay their dependency on technology, and the establishment of close
symbiotic relationships with major manufacturers. The following section traces the development
of MRI, the uncertainty over what its purpose was, and the conflict over who should control it.
3 The Development of MRI
This section is concerned with the innovations and developments leading to the development of
MRI, and its eventual ownership by the radiological profession. Early development occurred
outside of the radiological establishment (the profession and manufacturers which together
formed a community) and was largely funded by government through universities and research
grants. Upon recognition of MRIs' potential medical uses, new companies rushed to begin
production, and serve different groups of clinicians who would be interested in the technology.
However radiologists and large manufacturers (within the radiological establishment) struggled
for control of MRI, fearing dissolution of their community, and were able to dominate the
technology by the early 1980s. Subsequently, radiologists have used MRI to advance their
professional position, and have denied vigorously accusations that their endorsement of MRI is
based on medical politics and not clinical worth.
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Numerous moments of innovation can be identified, but the construction of these into a
developmental path is largely the work of retrospective reinterpretation, with any strand being
extracted from a tapestry of possibilities. Whilst logical and linear paths (Anbar and Schersten
1985) can largely be dismissed as cognitive projection, it would be unfair to discount
developmental trends, or the influence of technological determinism. However, the key point in
the development of MRI was that it occurred outside of the radiological establishment (Gelijns
1991), and that it was characterised by multi-disciplinary research (Blume 1992).
Magnetism was first applied in diagnostic imaging in 1838 by Dr. John Elliotson, who used
magnetically hypnotised women to visualise the internal organs of patients, and hence assist
diagnosis. Eliiotson's book, Human Physiology, was the standard scientific university text of the
time (Mourino 1991).
After Roentgen's accidental discovery of X rays, several physicists demonstrated the magnetic
properties of nuclei (Vaughan 1989, Steinberg and Cohen 1984a), successfully measuring this
Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR) in the 1930s, and indexing the resonance of different
atoms (Mourino 1991, AMA 1987a, Greenwood 1992a). In the 1940s separate teams led by
Bloch and Purcell demonstrated this magnetic resonance effect in solids and liquids (bulk
matter), and showed how specific chemical signatures were produced for different compounds,
giving rise to MR spectroscopy (MRS), an essential tool for chemists (Bloch in Partain et al
1988, Andrew 1990, AMA 1987a). Magnetic resonance thus gave rise to numerous streams of
enquiry, which intersected and followed each other, crossing the major disciplinary fields through
physics, chemistry and biology to medicine (James et al 1985a, Mourino 1991).
However, biological applications of NMR were limited (Persson 1985) by technical constraints
on the power of magnetic fields (Andrew; Partain et al 1988). Researchers worked on analysing
the behaviour and dynamics of the water content of tissue samples (Cowley 1994), testing the
theory of 'ordered water' (Mourino 1991), even applying NMR to living biological tissue.
Crucially, however, considerable social, political, economic and professional attention was being
focused on cancer in the early 1970s. Cancer was believed to be a localised disease (and not
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systemic) curable by local therapy (e.g. surgery) if it could be 'caught early'. However, no reliable
means of detecting cancer existed, although it was theorised (by Ling) that as cells became
cancerous, their water content increased.
Researchers from diverse backgrounds (e.g. physicists, chemists, clinicians etc.) worked on
using NMR to scan tissue for water in vivo (Blume 1992) In 1971 Damadian postulated that each
cancer tumour had its own spectroscopic signature, and that NMR could be focused on different
areas of the body, enabling screening for cancer (effectively in vivo spectroscopy). Despite filing
a patent for this in March 1972, attempts to produce such a pathology index proved
unsuccessful (Blume 1992). Lauterbur, a chemistry professor, modified the scanning technique
and produced simple images, terming them zeugmatography, and envisaging applications in
general medical imaging. (Blume S 1992, Lezzoni et al 1985, OTA 1984). Lauterbur's
conceptual jump was to use NMR in imaging, to demonstrate the spatial distribution of forms,
instead of Damadian's aim of determining NMR spectrum from different areas of the body
(Andrew 1990).
The essential concept underlying NMR is that the magnetic properties of atoms makes them
amenable to manipulation. NMR generates a magnetic field, causing the nuclei of hydrogen
atoms (almost ubiquitous in the body) to line up. A strong pulse of radiowaves disrupts their
alignment, and computers then record the time it takes for them to return to their aligned
position. 3-d images can be produced in any plane, angle or thickness, enabling the delineating
of precise structures and dimensions. NMR is especially useful for studying the brain and spinal
cord, and produces good images of organs, blood vessels and joints. More detail can be gained
by placing surface coils in areas of interest, or by using contrast materials. Essentially whilst X
rays relied on variations in density, NMR can define soft tissues (since they contain water, and
hence hydrogen), but is less effective at imaging bony tissues (Murphy and Murphy 1994, AMA
1987a, Freeman 1988).
The relatively isolated and strictly disciplinary research in the US contrasted with that of the UK,
where several interdisciplinary groups worked on improving the imaging of living tissue.
(Steinberg and Cohen 1984a, Blume 1992). For physicists prestige was rooted in the solving of
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technical problems, and the gradual scaling up of imaging. By contrast, for clinicians the
scanning of increasingly large areas of the body became the focus. However, researchers
became involved almost in a race to produce images of larger objects with more clarity (which
were eagerly consumed by journals and the media) to advertise personal accomplishment and
hence gain sponsorship (Blume 1992, Vaughan 1989). Centrally, they attracted the attention of
potential clinical users (Sochurek 1988).
The concept of a whole body scanner lay at the interface between medical applications and
scientific prestige. There was widespread uncertainty as to what medical applications could
actually result from the scanner, since images were crude, theorised applications were
unproven, and attempts to build applications (e.g. the tumour index) were unsuccessful.
Consequently there was a perceived need to build a scanner which could focus anywhere on the
body, and this medical application neatly complemented the competition between physicists,
who pursued the technical challenge of being able to image the largest thing in the quickest
time. A simple index of success developed, according to who imaged what first, with prestige
being attached to size, complexity and clarity (crucially, size mattered). Consequently a
progression is apparent. e.g. finger (1976), hand (1977), thorax, head and abdomen (1978)
(Persson 1985). For example, Damadian rushed to get his chest scan published in
'Physiological Chemistry and Physics', bypassing the more prestigious 'Nature' and 'Science'
since the feared review delays would enable his rivals to publish first (Blume 1992, Andre;
Partain et al 1988), whilst researchers at Aberdeen achieved technical successes in their
scanning methods, but were overshadowed by the more dramatic images produced by
machines in Hammersmith and the University of California at San Francisco (Vaughan 1989).
Knowledge, to create productive applications, could be gained through government sponsored
research (e.g. directly through support, such as the Department of Health and Social Security's
(DHSS's) support for EMI, or indirectly, such as basic support for university infrastructure, such
as M&D Technology from Aberdeen university, or through Medical Research Council (MRC)
grants to researchers in Nottingham University), through privately sponsored research (e.g.
within EMI, or Phillips, Siemens etc., where large corporations relied on there resources, links
and experience), or by purchasing researchers or companies (e.g. Picker International acquired
116
EMIs medical branch etc.) (Steinberg and Cohen 1984a). Early research was supported by
universities, government organisations, or charities. e.g. National Institutes of Health (NIHs),
National Cancer Institute (NCI), DHSS, MRC, American Cancer Society (ACS), Wolfson
Foundation. US support tended to be focused on basic science, conducted in unidisciplinary
settings (often through newly established units, such as the Diagnostic Imaging Research
Branch within the NCI), whilst UK sponsorship focused on incubating a technology for the
hospital sector, using a multidisciplinary approach (Steinberg and Cohen 1984a).
By the late 1970s many small companies (either research based or traditional manufacturers of
laboratory equipment) rushed to develop NMR (Blume 1992).EMI, fresh from its successful
experience with CT, fitted its NMR program into the template it had developed for CT e.g.
working with university researchers, focusing on the brain, seeking DHSS support for an early
model (Vaughan 1989). However NMR's applications were not immediately apparent, whilst
computerised tomography's (CTs) had been (since it was the intermixing of an old technology, X
rays, with a new one, computers) (Blume 1992).
The DHSS sponsored EMI to produce a single experimental whole body scanner, and clinical
trials began with it at Hammersmith Hospital in 1981 (Blume 1992, Vaughan 1989). UK support
was limited, being channeled from the perspective of consumers through the DHSS, and not the
DTI (Steinberg and Cohen 1984a), with the BTG working to license publicly funded innovations
(Kay 1990, Hadlington 1988). The UK tends to excel at innovation, but fail in development and
exploitation, partly due to issues around resourcing (fragmented and limited), culture (the innate
conservatism of the UK generally and NHS clinicians and managers in particular), and status
(biomedical engineering is considered to have low value) (Pendrous 1991, Fishlock 1991). In the
US, by contrast, support for industry was much more vigorous, with finance being channeled
through various agencies (e.g. the National Science Foundation's Regional Instrumentation
Facilities Program, the Small Business Innovation Research Program) (Steinberg and Cohen
1984a), reflecting a greater commitment to technological preeminence.
Rapid technological change and the uncertain market encouraged numerous new
manufacturers into the arena, soaking up the existing technical, scientific and medical expertise
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(Steinberg and Cohen 1984a, Hillman et al 1986). Over half of those British researchers
involved in the early development of MRI became employed by foreign companies (Fishlock
1988), and the climate of regulation and cost control encouraged closer co-operation between
industry and universities (Blume 1992, Gross 1985). Many of the companies were not medical
specialists, and there was a high rate of acquisitions, mergers and trade agreements (Steinberg
and Cohen 1984a, Hillman et al 1986).
The uncertainty about the feasibility and application of NMR encouraged wider claims to
ownership of the technology, by both professional and industrial interests, since it could image
either physical or chemical characteristics (Blume 1992). Clinical groups were at first slow to
express interest, with the radiological establishment being transfixed by CT (Blume 1992,
Trajtenberg 1990). Emerging turf battles between groups with legitimate claims (e.g.
radiologists, nuclear medicine specialists, pathologists, neurologists, cardiologists,
spectroscopists, biochemists, internists in metabolic physiology etc (Gross 1985, James et al
1990) were threatening to manufacturers, since the dominant group would define application
and hence construction (Steinberg and Cohen 1984a), and this discouraged investment (Loiten;
Rutten and Reiser 1988).
At this point, the discussion has described how there was extensive uncertainty as to what was
the nature of MRI. e.g. clinical applications (if any), who should use it, how should it be used,
who should produce it etc. However, there was a generalised perception that the machine would
have many applications, and that whoever controlled and produced it would have a secure
future, in an increasingly uncertain environment. The following description focuses on clinicians'
concerns and their attempts to gain control of MRI.
Clinicians foresaw an era of financial constraint, in which technology could be used to expand
medical applications, assuring individuals and the speciality a future (Hillman et al 1987a). The
radiology establishment viewed itself as particularly vulnerable (Gross 1985 (James et al 1990),
since if NMR replaced X ray and CT, and became the dominant imaging technology, and
radiology did not control NMR, then NMR truly would mean 'no more radiologists' (Blume 1992).
These risks were increased by the possibility that NMR could make interpretation less of an art,
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by quantifying pathology according to chemical structure rather than appearance, and hence
devalue the radiologists' diagnostic skills, whilst enabling the technology to become
decentralised within various hospital departments. Finally, MRI promised to transcend traditional
service boundaries, allowing its controllers to initiate both diagnosis and treatment, signalling a
breakdown in professional and operational boundaries (James et al 1990). These risks
presented problems for the established radiological companies, whose close relationships with
radiologists, and general dependence on incremental changes to existing technology, would be
threatened. Ultimately the community could be destroyed, and radiological companies forced to
compete with their smaller, perhaps more innovative, rivals (Steinberg and Cohen 1984a).
The radiological establishment viewed it as essential that they control NMR. Manufacturers and
radiologists worked closely together to define NMR as a radiological device (Loiten; Rutten and
Reiser 1988, Rodrigues 1987/88, Teplensky 1993, Blume 1992). The large radiology companies
began to invest in research programs, and once the technology was recognised as commercially
viable, they were rapidly able to catch up and colonise the area (Steinberg and Cohen 1984a).
Companies could utilise risk and uncertainty for their own benefit. For example, GE, in order to
recover the lead it had lost to other companies, claimed to be merging spectrometry with
imaging within powerful machines, purposefully to generate uncertainty and dampen purchasing
(Hillman et al 1986). Perceptions of technological risk were thus recruited for strategic
advantage. The radiological establishment strived to define research agendas, protocols, criteria
for technology assessment, and the terms in which NMR would be thought of (Blume 1992,
Steinberg and Cohen 1984a).
For example, the American College of Radiology strenuously sought to harmonise alien
concepts (e.g. quantum and classical physics) and languages with the understanding of its
members, producing guidebooks and glossaries (e.g. the American College of Radiology's
Glossary of NMR Terms) in an attempt to gain hegemonical control over the language of
description and hence debate. For example, Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (the language of
spectroscopy), became Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) (and hence physical-chemical
applications became visual ones) (Anonymous 1984a, Critchley et al 1987). Nuclear medicine
(with a history of physiological and metabolic measurements) refused to recognise the name
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change, regarding it as politically motivated, and radiologists responded by criticising nuclear
medicines attempts to control MRI by claiming the nucleus as their own (Hillman et al 1986).
Conflicts were concentrated between radiologists, neurologists and neurosurgeons (the
neurosciences) (Berggren 1996), for control of the central nervous system, which was the only
area where MRI realistically showed any promise (Blume 1992). Each group established their
own MRI training centres (Hillman et al 1986), free standing outpatient centres (Hillman 1984b),
and published in their own journals (Ramsey et al 1993). Groups were explicitly aware of such
competition, and would seek to expand their activities and make strategic alliances or unions
(Cronqvist 1993), whilst condemning those crossing the boundaries (Brehm and Muliner 1989).
In 1983 the American Hospital Association (AHA) warned hospital managers about these
tensions (Blume 1992).
However, both radiologists and the established radiological industry had strong interests in
maintaining their community (the radiology establishment), primarily as a way of reducing
competition and making their situations more predictable. Having resources of mutual
experience, trust and established formal and informal links, meant they could generate
innovations, which symbiotically served to exclude professional and industrial competitors. The
radiology industry, being mainly composed of large companies, had the resources to support
several product lines, whilst radiologists had the political legitimacy to define a wide variety of
clinical applications. Thus research and development, communicated through publications was
central to gaining state endorsement of radiological dominance over MRI.
In the UK radiologists successfully laid claim to MRI by controlling its use in research within
teaching hospitals and universities (National Consultative Committee 1987), making them the
only group realistically able to bid for MRIs within the centralised financing system (although
systems were usually installed adjacent to neurosurgical centres (Hall C 1995). US radiologists
had, by 1985, successfully asserted their control, when the Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Hospitals (JCAH) required radiologists to authenticate examination reports. Having defined
MRI as a diagnostic imaging device, radiologists could claim overall expertise in this area.
Hence expert bodies, such as the American College of Radiology and the Society for Magnetic
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Resonance Imaging would certify courses in MRI and endorse and defend their members
decisions. Consequently clinicians acting beyond their level of competence (e.g. training and
experience), which roughly translated as not being a certified radiologist, would bear the legal
risks of practice, and hospitals would be unlikely to employ them (being equally liable for suits)
(James et al 1990).
Radiologists and the radiology industry symbiotically co-operated in research and development,
emphasising the speed and efficacy of imaging (Bartvsiak et al 1994), and marginalising
alternative professional groups, companies and applications (Trajtenberg 1990). MRI articles
became concentrated in radiological journals, and new MRI journals emerged from the
radiological community, often with extensive industrial contacts. Some groups, such as
biochemists and biophysicists, gained limited entree into this new hybrid community. Some
radiologists, generally with qualifications in physics or chemistry, were actively involved in
research, viewing each change as a stimulating resource (Blume 1992).
The market gradually became a stable oligopoly (Trajtenberg 1990, Rinck 1995, Lavayssiere
and Cabee; Rinck 1995, Hughes et al 1995, Hillman et al 1986, Steinberg and Cohen 1984a,
Blume 1992, Steinberg and Cohen 1984a), with UK domestic production being one of the
victims of this maturation (Commander 1983, Fishlock 1988). Competition was based on image
quality (particularly the resolution of soft tissues), product features and capabilities (depending
on the buyers' concerns with research), reliability and support services. Many of these issues
were related to buyers' confidence in the company (e.g. 'good name') and the company's ability
to offer expanded services (e.g. education, collaboration on research, quick delivery etc.)
(Steinberg and Cohen 1984a).
By the mid 1980s, radiologists had been mainly successful in claiming control (definitional
domain) over MRI, and their industrial counterparts were successfully using their economic
power, and positions of trust within the radiological community, to squeeze out competitors.
Radiologists were excited by MRI, which they rushed to adopt, and they reacted vigorously to
criticisms that their extravagant claims about it could not be supported, and that their real motive
was further professionalisation.
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MRI was enthusiastically embraced, although radiologists in the UK were more conservative
than their US counterparts (Mulley 1986). Radiologists largely justified their claim on MRI by
reference to their skills in using it, and the clinical benefit they could extract from it (Lezzoni et al
1985). There was widespread clinical acceptance of MRIs' superiority (Gross 1985), based on
its technical efficacy and its imputed safety, and the radiological literature was, and is, replete
with pretty, highly detailed and doctored pictures (Lezzoni et al 1985). However, most
radiological studies were seriously flawed, being based on weak methodologies with limited
applicability, and did not trace MRIs' comparative benefits as regards patient outcomes (Kent
and Larson 1988, Larson and Kent 1989, Lezzoni et al 1985).
No large scale controlled trials were undertaken to inform policy options, contrasting with the
vast sums spent on MRI development by both private and public organisations (Gross 1985),
and publicly funded studies tended to minimise the advantages MRI held over CT (Berggren
1996, viewing it as a potentially useful, but unproven, imaging technique (MuIley 1986). Thus
diffusion was largely informed by political and economic factors, not clinical ones (Berk and
Siegelman 1988, Schuman W et al 1988).
When such criticisms were levelled at the radiological community, they responded sharply,
emphasising the difficulty of technology assessment and the immorality of delaying use, phrased
in characteristically prosaic faith based language e.g. 'pathfinding articles meant to point out
promising directions for subsequent prospective studies' (Berk and Siegelman 1988:1240). A
similar reaction followed a Lancet editorial, doubting the claims of radiologists to be the most
appropriate group to control MRI (Blume 1992).
Having gained control of MRI, radiologists have subsequently used it as a tool of
professionalisation, adjusting arguments to the prevailing environments, and usually related to
quality and cost. In the UK the Royal College of Radiologists has criticised the increasing
number of GP fundholders, osteopaths and chiropractors (Sweeney K 1994) who used their own
x ray and ultrasound equipment, arguing that they were wasteful and dangerous (Doyle C 1995,
Hall C 1995, RCR 1992, Chisholm 1991). MRI, being much more complex, is much more easy
for radiologists to control, and they promote its use as the first line diagnostic modality. The RCA
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launched a generalised attack on equipment using ionising radiation (although radiologists were
singularly ferocious in their support of radiation intensive CT in the 1970s) (Doyle C 1995), and
promoted the concept that the costs of MRI scans could be controlled by focusing it on specific
areas (Doyle C 1995). Such arguments have found favour in the governments' Health of the
Nation targets, and the MRC has begun funding trials for using MRI as a screening mechanism
for breast cancer (Anonymous 1996i, Leonard 1997).
In the 1990s radiologists struggled with management for control of MRI, as cost effectiveness
emerged as a central issue (Cowley 1994). Various means of managerial cost control were
created (Appleby 1995, Cowley 1994, Hard 1993, McLaughlin 1988, Alt 1992), to which
professional associations (e.g. Society of Magnetic Resonance) responded with their own
guidelines, to retain cognitive control of the technology (Appleby 1995).
The alleged breadth, complexity and skills required in using MRI place radiologists in a central
position in controlling the technology. Thus non radiologists' inefficient use of diagnostic
equipment (Radecki and Steele 1990) justify an expanded and proactive, consultative, role for
radiologists in determining diagnostic workups. Instead of simply responding to referring
clinicians instructions, radiologists would use their knowledge of the patient's clinical status (e.g.
medical history, clinical findings, laboratory data) to provide an appropriate sequence of
diagnostic tests. Clinicians would not order diagnostic tests, but request radiological
consultations (Shuman et al 1984). 'Consultant' radiologists have appeared, who conduct daily
rounds, determining imaging needs in consultation with various sub specialists, and occasionally
personally interviewing patients (Milliren 1989, Taylor 1994, Werner 1993c, James 1984).
The radiological community thus seized on economic forces (the inappropriate use of x rays),
safety issues (excessive radiation) and legal ones (1988 Ionising Radiation Regulations) to
argue for the replacement of x rays by devices which did not use ionising radiation, and the
centralisation of diagnostic control in the expertise of the radiologist, supported by the Royal
College of Radiology's handy pack of guidelines (Wolf and Berle 1980, Chisholm 1991,
Anonymous 1993n, O'shea 1987).
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This section has traced the development of MRI, which originally occurred outside of the
radiological establishment. Uncertainty regarding its function, but confidence regarding its
usefulness, encouraged many groups of clinical professionals and companies to rush to
produce and consume it, and thus claim definitional domain over the technology. However, the
established radiological community was able to dominate MRI, as radiologists and
manufacturers worked together to use their cultural, economic and political capital to
marginalise other professions and manufacturers. MRI, by threatening the community, caused it
to contract and more aggressively assert itself. Subsequently radiologists have used MRI as a
tool of further professionalisation, and the industry has gradually become more concentrated,
stable and controlled. The following section, however, considers the clinical worth of MRI, to
assess the validity of criticisms levelled at radiologists for their zeal in adopting it.
4 Technology Assessment of MRI
This section seeks to analyse the clinical efficacy and cost efficiency of MRI, drawing on many
studies that have been conducted in his area. Technology assessment is an extremely difficult
area, especially for diagnostic imaging, where the relationships between input (technology),
output (clinical effect) and outcome (effect on patient) are so vague. Consequently, MRI has
been endorsed largely because of the pretty pictures it produces, which are assumed to be
intrinsically valuable.
MRI usefully demonstrates the need for technology assessments, and the difficulty in conducting
them, especially in the face of rigorous resistance by users. A perfect diagnostic technology
would generate information on the technology relevant to the patients' condition, up to the point
where the (societally assessed) marginal costs of gaining the information was equal to the
marginal benefits gained (Wolfe and Berle 1990).
Technology assessments are concerned to trace the effect of one variable (in this case, the
diagnostic technology) on another variable (such as clinical, patient or societal outcomes). The
greater the distance separating these cause and effect variables, the more difficult it becomes to
link them, whilst the volume of collateral effects rises. Similarly the higher the level of analysis
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(e.g. technical, diagnostic, therapeutic, applied to the individual, the institution, the system or
society), the more variables must be considered, and the harder 'proof' becomes (Lavayssiere
and Cabee; Rinck 1995, Sorby and Baddeley 1988). Hence subjectivity is central to the
evaluation process. e.g. in 1984-1985 the Office of Health Technology Assessment (OHTA) and
the national Blue Cross-Blue Shield Association (BCBSA) association studied almost identical
published literature on the uses of MRI, and came to almost polar conclusions, since they
differed in their weighting of controlled trials (Milliren 1989).
Diagnostic technology assessment is thus notoriously difficult (Hogstrom and Sverre 1996),
since analyses must support many diagnostic and therapeutic pathways over a long period of
time (Gillespie et al 1985). A further complexity is that most variables are rapidly changing (often
under environmental pressures, such as financing) e.g. the technology itself (Sochurek 1988,
Chase 1996, Hughes C et al 1995, Freeman 1988, Agee 1995, Anonymous 1993n, Hughes C et
al 1995, Scott 1995b, Scott 1995a, Scott 1994a, Appleby 1995, Cowley 1994, Hillman et al
1986, Greer 1987a, Appleby 1995a, Werner C 1995, Brady 1994, Anonymous 1994n),
alternative technologies and the environment, whilst attempts to assess the technology were in
progress (Bowen 1993, Sorby and Baddeley 1988, Bautz et al 1992, Lavayssiere and Cabee;
Rinck 1995, Freeman 1988).
MRI changed form (Baldor et al 1993, Garner 1996, Hughes C et al 1995, Schneider 1995a,
Souhrada 1990) and new applications have been added (Schneider 1995b). Many non
radiological groups use MRI (Bronzino et al 1990, Wilkinson 1987c, Baldor et al 1993, Baldor et
al 1993), whilst radiologists seek to expand it into new applications (Hughes C et al 1995). It has
helped establish new areas of research e.g. neurophysiology (Gelijns 1991) and specialisms
e.g. neuropsychiatry (blending psychiatry and neurology) (Souhrada 1988d), whilst changing the
definition of optimal diagnostic in numerous areas. Such variations undermine attempts to
quantify the diffusion of a technology, and to assess its clinical worth.
Clinical efficacy can be demonstrated occasionally, although not necessarily in clinical situations
(Bowen 1993, Steinberg and Cohen 1984a, Cowley 1994, Hillman and Schwartz 1985). Costs
are difficult to assess, since they crucially depend on estimations of direct, indirect and imputed
125
costs, which fluctuate over time (Berggren 1996). Centrally, since most MRI costs are fixed,
their annualised cost depends on estimations of life expectancy of the equipment (Mulley 1986).
MRI frequently needed both hardware and software upgrades 'to remain acceptable to user
clinicians.' p39 (Berggren 1996). The costs of MRI vastly expand if research and development
expenses are included (Hill 1986). Consequently guessing is the modus operandi of MRI cost
assessment.
Cost per scan becomes central in determining care protocols within capitated (limited) budgets.
Predicting scan volume was difficult, being dependent on assumptions concerning scanning
speeds, opening hours, administrative procedures, different types of scans etc. Thus the Oxford
MRI Centre increased scan throughput rates by increasing operating times and smoothing
administrative processes to increase clinical efficacy (Golding; Rinck 1995). Each additional
scan had low marginal costs (since most costs are fixed), and so it becomes logical to maximise
throughput and thereby reduce cost per scan. Therefore, the more MRI was used, even in
marginally effective applications, the lower the cost per scan. Consequently cost effectiveness is
unknown, especially in relation to outcomes and quality of life over time (Bradley 1986).
Estimations require important elements to be excluded, and clumsy aggregates to be
constructed from delicate nuances. Ultimately such processes are based on investigators'
subjective values and assumptions (Gillespie et al 1985).
MRI was found to have little impact on patient outcome in neurology centres, since scans were
mainly used to confirm diagnosis and did not help identify a disease, merely its morphology
(Ahern and Scott 1992). Diagnostic improvements were only achieved in 20% of cases
(Szczepura et al 1991), meaning that MRI could be cost effective if selectively used. MRI was
merely complementary to other technologies (Hoare 1992, Dougherty and Hagin 1989). CT scan
rates have, in fact, increased (Bautz et al 1992). Outcomes research has not supported the
broad applicability projected onto MRI (Cowley 1994), and it is considered only marginally more
efficacious than CT (Webster 1991, Gelijns 1990, Bronzino et al 1990). However, as clinicians
became more familiar with MRI, their scan rates increased, particularly if some form of payment
was attached. e.g. General Practitioner Fund Holders (GPFH) or private patients (Berggren
1996, Chawda 1997).
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To then use such criteria to inform clinical guidelines is even more dubious, and complicated by
the need for comparisons to be intermodality specific, requiring multiple studies under different
circumstances. Finally, the decision as to when cost differentials should influence policy change
is an area of immense difficulty (Lavayssiere and Cabee; Rinck 1995).
Meanwhile, few factors can be held constant over the long time periods necessary for formal
evaluations, and any conclusions reached are temporal, contextual and vague, making them
open to challenge, and making them obsolete and weak as clinical guidelines (Sorby and
Baddeley 1988, Hillman and Schwartz 1985). Adoption and utilisation accelerate the range of
applications a technology is used for, and increase its overall aura of legitimacy, Consequently
technology assessments, even if possible, must be conducted quickly to have any value. Thus
by 1985 MRI was widely accepted and being utilised in increasingly diverse ways, far ahead of
analysts' ability to verify clinical efficacy, or to consequently influence clinical practices (Bowen
1993). In the UK, the National Audit Office and the NHS Research and Development Strategy
(Hermes 1994c, Fishlock 1988) continue to attempt an analysis of the cost effectiveness of MRI.
This pseudo-rationalism is set in a context of pervasive uncertainty. e.g. MRI could effectively
diagnose multiple sclerosis lesions, but there was no treatment for this condition (although it
may have a role in helping to develop these). Hence, current ignorance of a technology's use
mixes with uncertainty in the future, meaning an appropriate role for MRI within the health care
system cannot be predicted (Lezzoni et al 1985).
Consequently, most regulatory (e.g. US Office of Medical Devices, UK's Medical Devices
Agency) and financing systems rely on observational studies (Steinberg; Partain et al 1988)
combined with expert medical opinion (Gelijns 1991) as to technical capability and diagnostic
accuracy (Milliren 1989). MRI could produce pretty pictures (Bowen 1993) without using ionising
radiation (Steinberg and Cohen 1984a, and seemed to offer many imaging possibilities (Blume
1992, Brehm and Muliner 1989, Steinberg and Cohen 1984a). Clinicians were excited over its
promise (Hillman et al 1986, Hillman 1984b), and were confident that a use could be found for it
(Hillman 1984b), even if this was merely to mimic CT.
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Hence diagnostic devices, such as MRI (Gillespie et al 1985, Bowen 1993, Hillman and
Schwartz 1985, Blume 1992), are approved according to their imaging displays (an intermediate
output) instead of their ultimate outcomes (McGiveney 1988). However, the diagnostic and
therapeutic implications of MRI demonstrate much smaller support for its use than that afforded
by its technical capabilities (Kent and Larson 1988). e.g. outside of the central nervous system,
MRI was of limited efficacy (Milliren 1989, Bronzino et al 1990, Gelijns 1990). The pretty pictures
could become counterproductive: 'The downside of imaging is that you can get too hung up on
your beautiful scan. If you scan the wrong bit of the brain you might get a clear scan even
though the patient has a problem.' (Derrington 1997:1).
Neither clinical efficacy or economic costs can be effectively measured or used to inform
specific guidelines for action. Clinicians use MRI industriously to reduce uncertainty, and these
have low immediate financial implications, since most MRI costs are fixed. Consequently there
is little incentives to reduce the utilisation of MRI, but over time it becomes the standard
diagnostic modality, and so new machines are necessary to meet the demand. Higher
throughput rates do not necessarily equate with increased efficacy in the short term (Bradley
1986), and may be counter productive in the longer term (as new machinery is added).
This section has demonstrated the difficulties in assessing the cost effectiveness of MRI.
However, under such conditions of ignorance, it seems plausible that professionals would have
been anxious to constrain the spending of resources, enabling them to be focused on areas of
greater clinical productivity. An important point is that once an MRI was in place, utilisation
increased, and it would be applied to different areas. Thus, if it was there, it would be used, and
the more it was used, the more uses could be found for it. The ignorance surrounding MRI was
used, therefore, not to limit its application, but to expand it.
The following section studies how decision making occurred, generally, and with specific
reference to the UK and the USA. Essentially, gaps in current knowledge and uncertainties
about future applications were exploited to maximise funding opportunities for MRI.
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5 Decision Making Processes and MRI
This section is concerned with how decision making occurred generally, and how specific
environmental factors effected diffusion patterns in the UK and US. The key issue concerns
manufacturers and clinicians (producers and providers) who sought to use MRI, and so lobbied
for it in various ways, and were instrumental in engineering risk bearing networks, enabling the
uncertainties of the technology to be overcome. Essentially, these groups believed in the
technology, and were able to operationalise that belief by convincing others.
MRI was an uncertain technology released into an environment which decision makers generally
perceived as being economically and politically harsher (Brehm and Muliner 1989, Teplensky et
al 1995, Steinberg et al; Partain et al 1988, Hillman and Schwartz 1986b, Banta and Luce 1993,
Teplensky et al 1993, Vaughan 1989). Cost issues were becoming central and contentious, and
both the UK and US financiers were anxious to cap expenditure and tighten regulation (Ecri
1985, Zimmerman 1991, Steinberg et al; Partain et al 1988). Theoretically, the characteristics of
MRI (unknown clinical application, high cost) should not only have impeded adoption, but should
have made the decision making process much more tortuous (e.g. involving hospital boards,
management and clinicians, to address strategic, financial and clinical aspects).
However, MRI had both therapeutic and research applications, and different configurations of
public, private and charitable financial sources were used to support purchase and utilisation. In
the UK the dominant funding sources were the public and charitable sectors, whilst in the US the
commercial sector dominated. However, such public-private definitions are vague. e.g. in the UK
machines were often bought with charitable money (Hall C 1995), but were subsequently
supported by the DoH, whilst Medicare payments supported US MRI machines. Generally,
however, research functions in both countries were concentrated in the public and charitable
sectors.
Often machines were bought and run using combinations of financing from different sources,
although occasionally machines would be entirely supported by a single source. The relative
austerity of the UK encouraged machines to be purchased for both care and research
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applications. Consequently MRIs were typically placed adjacent to research centres e.g.
universities, teaching hospitals. In the US, the greater volume of resources available meant that
machines could be supported from single sources, and therefore a greater diversity of settings is
apparent. e.g. outpatient, mobile, small hospitals, foundations etc. US expertise with various
forms of contract enabled complex networks to be established between multiple players.
Manufacturers often offered significant discounts, especially early in the diffusion of MRI, since
they largely benefited from maintenance contracts and upgrades, and wanted radiologists to
become familiar with their machines (Cowley 1994). Manufacturers rushed to place machines in
teaching hospitals, research institutes and other high profile, prestigious places where clinicians
and researchers were funneled, and many of these were heavily subsidised. e.g. manufacturers
even paid US teaching hospitals a fee to use their machines, compensating them for the alleged
inconvenience of using new technology. Manufacturers would typically offer various incentives
and packages, such as indemnifying the purchaser from premature obsolescence (e.g. free
upgrades), throwing in CT scanners etc.
Meanwhile, clinicians usually form the dominant decision making system within hospitals, since
they have immense economic, political, social and ideological power. Centrally, they direct most
'coalface' activities (Whitcomb 1988). Consequently management prefers to maintain a
consensus with clinicians, and seeks to co-opt them into management (Rosenberg; Brehm and
Muliner 1987, Whitcomb 1988, Alexander and Morrisey 1988). Trustees, managers and
clinicians in institutions, such as large teaching hospitals, considered MRI central to maintaining
their institutions' prestige and position in the clinical-academic hierarchy (Campbell 1996b).
Technology acted as a symbolic proxy for quality, in the absence of alternative indicators, and
aided claims for various sorts of resources. e.g. research (Mantill et al 1991, Wilkinson 1987a).
However, different decision making groups faced different issues, and had varying perceptions
of risks, benefits and costs. Thus radiologists were generally unashamedly enthusiastic, whilst
managers and board members were uncertain (concerned with economic, political and social
costs and benefits in the short and long term) (Steinberg et at 1988, Hillman et al 1986, Hillman
et al 1987). Groups seeking the adoption of MRI generally had to insure against the risks
associated with its clinical utility (or lack thereof) and its high costs. Consequently, adopters had
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to weave together coalitions of groups who could symbiotically manage these risks, being able
to confidently supply some valued resource. Thus the underlying faith in technology (generally)
and MRI (in particular) enabled new structures to form, which were able to bear the uncertainty,
and ultimately enable MRI to be adopted and utilised (Brehm and Muliner 1989).
A wide range of groups could be recruited to finance MRI. The common pattern was that
financial risk was pooled by the community (the population), and channelled through an
organisation (e.g. NHS, research institute, charity, commercial insurer etc.) to radiologists within
an institution. Finance could, of course, be gathered privately, theoretically causing the investor
to centre financial risk on themselves. However, for all these groups, the government (and
hence the community) eventually bears the bulk of the financial risk, since charitable donations
and commercial losses are tax deductible.
Specialist clinicians, typically radiologists, often organised disparate sources into coherent
funding packages. Various key motivations can be identified (economic, political, social,
ideological), and elements of these are more and less applicable to different groups, although
definitions are often arbitrary, vague and multi-layered. An underlying pattern can be identified,
whereby specific issues (threats and opportunities) were promoted to specific groups (e.g.
clinicians, general public, research institutes, government departments, entrepreneurs,
managers etc.), whose co-operation enabled financing packages to be constructed. The
configuration of these patterns shows significant variations in the UK and US, although there is a
large middle ground of basic similarity.
Usually hospital radiologists would desire some form of MRI machine after learning about it
through peer networks, meetings, presentations, seminars or manufacturer visits (Brehm and
Muliner 1989). They would request the technology from the groups which controlled financing,
who would either provide some form of support (perhaps delayed, or perhaps partial) or
rejection. Various forms of internal and external politicking could then be used to increase their
allocation e.g. projections of increased referral rates, research opportunities, falling relative
prestige, risk of losing market shares, going public through the mass media and whispering
campaigns etc. These methods would apply pressure to board members and managers at
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various levels, and perhaps politicians. Simultaneously radiologists would seek alternative
sources of financing. Thus grant applications could be made to research foundations, often in
combination with charities or government bodies e.g. cancer research, MRC, DoH, ACS, NCI,
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). In the UK (where healthcare is viewed as a
community based citizenship right) it was common for money to be raised through public charity
drives, whilst in the US (where healthcare is viewed as a individually based market good)
commercial investors could be approached. Various forms of providers (e.g. professional
associations, manufacturers, companies, government agencies) would be implicit in assisting
this process, supplying advice, information and expertise, and perhaps enabling apparent risks
and immediate costs to be constrained e.g. leasing packages, financial forecasts. In such a way,
networks could be formed to raise resources and minimise risk exposure to any single party
(Campbell 1996a). These patterns were common between different health care systems.
Having discussed the general patterns underlying the decision making around MRI, the
discussion now turns to the specific experience of the UK and the USA, which will illustrate how
environmental factors effected the general processes outlines above. The main element to be
retained from the previous discussion is that there was a widespread underlying faith in MRI.
Consequently its high costs and dubious efficacy were of marginal importance. The discussion
now turns to the specific environment of the UK.
In the UK, MRI's regulatory approval was perfunctory, only requiring manufacturers to prove a
basic level of quality in production, with the overall category being approved by the National
Radiological Protection Board (James et al 1985a, Bydder 1988, Steinberg and Cohen 1984a).
Prior to the introduction of the internal market, Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) would top
slice funds and allocate these to specific DHA's, who then allocated these freely to hospitals,
often as regional centres (Sorby and Baddeley 1988). Managerial hierarchies (e.g. Health
Authorities, DOH, central government etc.) had formal authority to control clinicians, but lacked
the right to control clinical care, and this dependence on clinicians meant that all parties sought
to maintain the implicit contract between them. Thus management only exerted control
indirectly, and exercised power judiciously. e.g. establishing national guidelines for MRI
requirements per population (Greenwood 1996), but devolved decision making to lower, clinical,
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levels (Banta 1992, Gross 1985, Greer 1987a). Hence the apparent administrative hierarchies
were more than matched by a complex and hidden system of medical advisory committees,
stretching from hospital departments into government. These medical committees were
constituted around clinical divisions, with members being melded together by common
backgrounds, relationships and interests. This system took many of the decisions which
effectively became NHS policy (defined as implementation) and informed and guided those
decisions which management took, behind the shroud of rational bureaucratic systems (Greer
1987a, Gelijns and Halm 1991).
Health authorities were determined to limit the diffusion of MRI when it appeared (Gelijns and
Halm 1991), having failed to control the adoption of CT (which had left health authorities (HAs)
liable for unpredictable costs as indications and utilisation expanded) (CSS 1982, Hogg 1988).
The DHSS and the MRC established the UK Committee on the Clinical Application of NMR
Imaging (Gross 1985) (mostly radiology professors) to analyse MRI and guide its diffusion.
However, research was focused on comparing MRI technically with CT, and did not analyse its
impact on patient care (Kleinfield 1985). The strategy was negated by financing delays, with
diffusion and utilisation commencing prior to the committee's reporting (Kleinfield 1985). Hence
national guidelines and committees were weak and tended to be more reactive than proactive
(Gross 1985), and diffusion occurred without any real form of technology assessment.
Consequently, RHAs had no capacity to analyse the optimal distribution of MRI, since they had
little information on costs, clinical efficacy or the burgeoning expanse of application, and limited
power to enforce their decisions on DHAs. Simultaneously, such a high profile technology
attracted considerable political attention, particularly related to issues of equity (Meyer 1992),
and administrative tiers would be grateful to shift decision making around these to other, more
apparently legitimate, areas. Consequently decision making was progressively devolved to
clinicians, who would negotiate spending priorities with each other, only constrained by macro
budgetary limits (Anonymous 1983, Gross 1985, Greer 1987a). Clinicians and university based
researchers conducted most research on MRI (Bronzino et al 1990), but practical diagnostic
protocols were difficult to define (CSS 1982), leaving clinicians with considerable discretion.
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The DHSS held evaluative meetings in 1984 and 1987 to advise DHAs on whether they should
replace CT with MRI. The essential conclusions were that MRI was useful in the central nervous
system, but had not proved its cost effectiveness outside of this. Consequently CT remained the
workhorse of a neuroscience centre, and old CTs should be replaced by modern ones, with MRI
only being considered as an additional technology, despite emerging medicolegal concerns
(Critchley et al 1987). More complex cost benefit evaluations followed much later (Berggren
1996), usually too late to have any meaningful impact.
Throughout the 1980s central government followed contradictory policies regarding the private
provision of health care. Ideologically it embraced it, but pragmatically it sought constraints,
fearing inflation and escalating public subsidies. Policy thus settled on increasing forms of
pluralistic provision, using budget capping and regulations to foster a more pluralistic market of
provision and consumption. e.g. tax deductible private health insurance, compulsory competitive
tendering for some services etc. The internal market, introduced in 1991, was structured around
these principles, essentially introducing competition between providers within a fiscally
constrained system. Consequently, technological decision making within the NHS began to
resemble that of US hospitals. e.g. decentralised financing and decision making. It is the
manner of this decision making that is now discussed.
The classic mechanism for decision making took the following pattern. Clinicians would usually
initiate requests for technology and have most influence on decision making (Friedman And
Jorgensen 1994). Sometimes such requests would be at very high levels. e.g. a consultant
radiologists campaigned directly to ministers for a cancer screening in Scotland (Christie 1993).
In the old NHS, specialists would debate their relative claims to new technologies within the
medical committees, usually at District level. Negotiations usually resulted in specialisms taking
turns getting new equipment, due to the cash limits on the overall system. Therefore clinicians
would close ranks and mutually endorse the chosen project, presenting a united front to any
administrative questioning. Groups would often club together at district health authority (DHA)
level to get expensive equipment (Thomson 1989). Managers, concerned at the legitimacy of
some claims, were dependent on information residing in the clinical domain, and so were
dependent on clinicians' assessments (Greer 1987a). Even supposedly factual, objective data,
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such as waiting lists, were easily manipulated, by clinicians expanding their thresholds of
referrals (1). RHAs became involved in MRI provision, due to its expense (Greer 1987a), but the
clinician dominated Professional Advisory Committees and Scientific Committees were powerful
in determining the disbursement of funds, and resistance to them required detailed technological
knowledge (Banta 1992). Academic clinicians, linking the research and practice communities,
were central to defining clinical possibilities, and therefore to directing resources towards
research, experimentation, demonstration projects and supraregional provision of specialist
services. Often the formal decision making around these was conducted by managerial tiers, but
they were usually reliant on clinicians' information and opinion. Simultaneously, budgetary
systems and manipulation, such as virement, could generate additional funds for specific
interests. Clinicians were effective at mobilising public pressure, through the media, to lever
additional funds from government, typically for teaching hospitals or expensive technologies
(Greer 1987a). Consequently, although decision making occurred at high administrative levels, it
was still clinician dominated, with the only real constraint being on the available level of public
funding.
However, if either other clinicians or management rejected radiologists' requests, then they
sought alternative sources. Usually this would be by public appeal, frequently in concert with a
local or national charity (Sorby and Baddeley 1988), and often supported by hospital
management. Although such efforts undermined regional planning and equity (Greenwood
1996), health authorities were rarely strong enough to reject public donations, since public
goodwill was seen as a vital resource in the policy community. Similarly, abstract bureaucratic
planning was vulnerable to high profile personalised crisis stories in the media, which clinicians
could generate and demonstrate, centred around an icon of angelic suffering (Fletcher 1996,
Bailey 1991). Community affiliations were drawn on by radiologists to apply political pressure to
get more resources. e.g. the relative underprovision of MRI (Anonymous 1983) in Scotland by
comparison to England (Holme 1995), or the UK by comparison to the world (Anonymous
1993g, Anonymous 1988g). MRI could thus be linked to key issues, and be viewed as a gift to
validate a concept. e.g. radiologists played a central role in the establishment of a national MRI
program in Scotland, marketed as being used for cancer (Christie 1993). Edinburgh's Sick
Children's NHS Trust was able to lever increased finances from the Scottish Office, after
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prolonged capital freezes, by using a 'Sick Kids' charity campaign to focus public (political)
pressure (Stokes 1995).
Consequently, most MRIs in the UK were used for both research and clinical care (2)
(Cherryman 1985). often being funded from diverse sources (e.g. charities (Hermes 1995a,
Anonymous 1995a), the Health and Safety Executive etc (Fazey 1988)), which were used to
bridge funding gaps and lever in additional public money (either directly from the NHS or from
research) (Gelijns and Halm 1991, Sorby and Baddeley 1988). Access to these was controlled
by academic radiologists, neurologists or neurosurgeons (3) (Critchley et al 1987).
Although many elements of this model changed in 1991, with the introduction of the internal
market. e.g. decision making around purchasing was decentralised, with DNA's and RHA's
having a very minor role. However, many aspects have remained constant. e.g. hospitals can
still claim increased resources from the NHS for specialisms or research, and charity fund-
raising continues. Essentially, some financial decision making was devolved, some financial
distribution systems altered, but the financial sources themselves largely remained constant.
Consequently, radiologists in Trust hospitals now prepare a clinical and economic report (4)
(usually with guidance from professional associations, manufacturers etc.) (Wagner 1991a),
which passes through various hospital committees (who manage the hospital's internal political
relationships). Usually clinical issues would be vaguely defined, whilst economic ones are largely
unpredictable. Hence intricate cost benefit analysis would be largely irrelevant, and statistics
could easily be found to justify most desired outcomes (Smith et al 1994). Decision making is
thus guided by achieving acceptability, not optimality or value (Rosenberg; Brehm and Muliner
1987). Essentially, the nature of decision making has not changed, but it has been devolved.
Superficially, the imputation of capital charges to hospitals would inhibit capital purchases, since
machinery would no longer be 'free' (Berggren 1996). However, the system is not cash limited
overall (private sources are used to fund care). Centrally, decision makers in each hospital do
not perceive the overall spending limits on the system, viewing themselves as being in some
degree of competition with other providers. Consequently equipment purchases can be justified
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if a potential market can be predicted for them. Thus the introduction of a decentralised system
of purchasing and provision, drawing on additional, non-public, sources of finance, produced an
illusion of limitless growth, whilst competitive pressures made growth essential. Consequently,
managers and trustees were more likely to side with clinicians in their enthusiasm for new toys.
Radiologists could legitimately define technical efficacy, and could thus justify MRI's role. Thus
by adjusting the thresholds at which MRI was deemed useful, they could essentially insure its
use, and a continually expanding frontier of applications and utilisation. Other clinicians (e.g.
GPs, neurologists, orthopaedics etc.) could ensure referrals, perceiving MRI as the most
definitive diagnostic device (reducing their perception of risk in clinical management), whilst its
status encouraged association to it, granting an impressive placebo effect to both clinician and
patient. Managers would seek increased throughput, particularly from patients to whom a fee
was attached (e.g. financed by GPFH's or through private insurance), and trustees would view
MRI as an essential long term investment.
More patients would be allocated for MRI scans, at an earlier stage in investigation, and
probably with smaller clinical gain. However, these increased volumes would inevitably lead to
waiting lists and delays, which increased political pressure on decision makers to invest in more
machines. Thus logic at the microeconomic and microclinical levels (a machine is installed
which can be used for many more scans without increasing total costs and which can possibly
benefit additional patients), may be illogical at the macroeconomic and macroclinical levels
(waiting lists encouraged more technology to be adopted, which may not benefit patients, and
which take resources away from more productive applications).
However, the velocity with which such processes occurred depends on the availability and
structuring of financing. Hospitals were able to support capital investment internally, or by
borrowing from financial markets (although strict limits were placed on this). Government
encouraged the intermingling of public and private activity, but such moves were slow since both
sectors were inexperienced and uncomfortable with the concept (Rapoport 1985, Pauly 1996).
However, economic pressure encouraged hospitals to economise, innovate (e.g. day surgery),
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and seek private sources of income. e.g. private wings, accelerated care for GPFH and private
patients (Tyler 1995).
Another form of risk sharing was leasing, which left capital budgets intact. However, central
government was largely opposed to leasing, which had successfully been used against it by
rebellious Local Authorities in the 1980s, regarding it as an 'unconventional form of finance', and
regulating it strictly (Anonymous 1990e, Anonymous 1993i). Hospital decision makers lacked
technical and administrative skills, and only used simple forms of leasing. e.g. hire purchase
(Anonymous 1990e, Anonymous 1989d). Most NHS decision makers were wary of leasing
contracts and joint ventures, unaware of possibilities, and unsure of regulatory permissibility
(Anonymous 1989d). There were few leasing companies, producing standard, inflexible,
packages, usually for small cheap items (Anonymous 1990e). Profit margins on NHS provision
were low, and involved long and complex tendering processes (Macdonald 1993i, Anonymous
1990e).
Similar uncertainties over the legality of financing and liability for losses effectively stymied the
Private Finance Initiative, which mandated that NHS Trusts should seek capital investment and
tenders from the private sector, and thereby transfer the risk to them (5) (Barrie 1997). There
was general uncertainty as to whether NHS Trusts were public or private organisations (HoIme
and Robertson 1995). However, several private finance initiative (PFI) arrangements did occur,
and MRI scanners were often cited as examples of successful lease arrangements (Hermes
1994a).
Hospitals would sometimes realise the capital value of land and assets whilst gaining access to
MRI, through risk sharing with the private sector (Anonymous 1995d). e.g. leasing land to private
operators to run specific facilities (Long 1995, Macdonald 1993i). For example, Ayrshire Medical
Support leased an MRI to South Ayrshire NHS Hospitals Trust (Steele 1995, Anonymous
1994b), whilst the Queen's Square Imaging Centre in London was owned by the trustees of the
NHS National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery but managed by BUPA, who received a
fee, with profits being reinvested in the hospital (Macdonald 1993i, Anonymous 1985a). Joint
ventures tended to be rare generally, but more common for MRI.
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The increased decentralisation implicit in the internal market encouraged clinical
entrepreneurialism, which was ideologically fostered by government attitudes. Clinicians
increased their flirtation with commercial income sources e.g. investing in centres to which they
referred patients (Wilkinson 1993, Katz 1994, Tyler 1995). e.g. radiologists at Edinburgh's
Western General established themselves as a company, MRI Associates, rented equipment
time and sold MRI sessions to GPFHs for 190 GBP after hours, allowing them to bypass the
neurological waiting list of 7-12 months (Anonymous 1996k, Christie 1996). Realising these
ethical issues, the General Medical Council (GMC) encouraged clinicians to disclose their
financial interests to patients (Wilkinson 1993).
The growth in private insurance was unsteady (Gibson 1988, Timmins And Hughes 1996,
Anonymous 1994L), and, despite the contract culture, it was still rare for commercial
organisations to successfully tender to run hospitals and provide NHS care (Milne 1996).
However, by 1992 there were 221 private hospitals in the UK, with some 1.1 bn GBP being
spent privately, providing approximately 20% of elective surgery, as the private sector was
embraced as a partner to the NHS (Griffiths 1995). Hospitals fiercely competed over MRI,
associating its status with an attractive halo effect (Lockhart 1992, Turner 1984). e.g. all 3 of
Glasgow's private hospitals had MRI machines (Thompson 1995b, Macdermid 1994,
Anonymous 1994b). Such attitudes were not confined to the private sector. For example,
Edinburgh's Sick Children's NHS Trust sought to get an MRI machine and use it to compete for
long range referrals and the development of expanded specialists services, whilst using public
pressure to lever out concessions from its purchasers (primarily Lothian Health Board) (Stokes
1995, Holme 1995). Thus between 1980-198824 clinical MRIs were installed in the UK (Bydder
1988), but between 1992-1994 another 17 were installed in the NHS (Hermes 1994b), with
approximately 8-10 being added annually (6).
In summary, MRI's diffusion was at first constrained in the UK by macro financing constraints.
However, the decisions about the worth of MRI, and about where particular machines should be
sited, were mainly made by an almost invisible system of clinical committees. This fits the
general model of health care policy in the UK, where central government may define broad
priority areas, but tends to allocate resources in blocks, devolving decision making to clinicians.
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Frequently, clinical groups would orchestrate charitable drives or political pressure, merging this
with research protocols, in an effort to gather money from diverse sources, and enable them to
purchase an MRI. Once installed, it demonstrated the hospital's status, and the extent of
investment necessitated subsequent investment. Such processes accelerated with the
introduction of the internal market, as hospitals struggled for status and referrals, and sought
valuable research grants and contracts, in an effort to also attract the most precious and
charismatic staff. Attention now turns to the USA, where a market system effectively existed
from MRI's introduction.
MRI was the first device in the US to require Pre-Marketing Approval by the FDA. However, the
Office of Medical Devices sought to balance the interests of sponsors. investigators and
subjects (Steinberg and Cohen 1984a, Young 1983). They did not limit the number of
experimental sites at which machines could be placed, accepted meaningful data from well
documented case histories (Gelijns 1991), and exempted manufacturers from proving the safety
of magnetic fields (Steinberg and Cohen 1984a, Blume 1992, Hillman 1984b). The approval
process was particularly gentle for MRI, the FDA being '..prepared to accept a more general
claim..that the clinically significant result of the device use is information that has general
diagnostic usefulness, rather than the identification of specific diseases' (Lee P; Anonymous
1983:1348). Consequently models began to be approved in March 1984.
The US had a weak system for regulating diffusion, being merely able to limit Federal
sponsorship through the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act 1974. This
required states to determine whether large hospital capital investments were necessary, and
adjust their access to federal funds accordingly. For Certificates of Need (CON) to be effective it
required the timely collection, co-ordination and gathering of data, upon which decisions could
be made and then implemented. However, at the time when decisions can be made, meaningful
data did not exist, and by the time the data did exist, diffusion has proceeded so far that the
decisions could not be made. The technology thus becomes established in the community,
which generates quantitative and qualitative technical changes, making control even more
difficult (Hillman et al 1986).
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CON was marginally effective, juggling state regulation with competitive flexibility, whilst being
dependent on consensual agreement in a system premised on competitive combat. Data was
unreliable, and decision making complex in a situation where a technology increases both costs
and quality (Hillman 1986, Steinberg and Cohen 1984a, Anonymous 1985c, Freeman 1988,
Hillman et al 1986, Steinberg et al; Partain et al 1988). Such problems are more explicit versions
of those which plague technology policy making in the NHS.
For example, New York State combined a professional group assessment with some statistical
analysis (mainly based on previous use of CT in the central nervous system (Anonymous
1985c) to project likely use of MRI, and hence an appropriate number of machines for the state.
This figure was inflated on the basis that applications would expand and that scanning times
would be reduced. Consequently, it was little more than a guess (Milliren 1989). MRI was
limited, by CON, to medical schools, but private clinicians, hospitals and entrepreneurs
purchased their own scanners, often on an outpatient basis (Hillman et al 1986), under the guise
of being experimental machines, and surreptitiously passed the costs to insurers (Steinberg and
Cohen 1984a).
Consequently CON's impact was, at most, to affect the shape of early diffusion patterns. e.g.
New Jersey's stringent regulation did not apply to outpatient facilities, encouraging MRIs'
placement in them. In unregulated states, such as California, MRI became an armament in an
intensely competitive market (Gelijns 1992, Mitchell And Scott 1992), driven by entrepreneurial
and interspecialty rivalry e.g. 25 units were operating in Los Angeles by the end of 1985 (Hillman
1986, Cowley 1994), with 120 units operating state-wide by 1987 (Robinson 1988). Such over-
concentration increased scanning volumes (Swedlow et al 1992). Generally, therefore, CON
merely encouraged outpatient placing (Hillman et al 1986, Hillman et al 1987a) and accelerated
the rush for experimental machines (Steinberg and Cohen 1984a).
Meanwhile the US insurance system was in flux, with Federal government introducing a
capitated system (PPS) and private insurers deciding whether to follow suit (Gelijns 1992, Kent
and Larson 1988, Larson and Kent 1989). The large insurers, who would typically lead decision
making about which technologies were to be covered, resisted the vigorous lobbying of
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clinicians, manufacturers and providers, who promoted MRI to the public to increase political
pressure (Hillman 1986). Consequently, small insurers were the first to cover MRI, usually on a
case by case basis at first (Steinberg et al; Partain et al 1988, diMonda 1985, Steinberg and
Cohen 1984a).
For the large insurers, most decisions are made locally in specific regions for both administrative
and professional (sensitivity to local clinical practice) reasons. Usually insurers cover clinical
activity deemed standard practice, and such advice stems from the (largely anecdotal) findings
of speciality medical societies, who also play a role in setting fees (Steinberg and Cohen 1984a).
These major insurers faced intense pressure from the American College of Radiologists (ACR),
AHA and manufacturers, who argued that rigorous studies would be impractical and naive. Thus
the director of the AHA Technology Management and Policy Division stated "The technology has
advanced enough that the evidence is overwhelming..There doesn't have to be controlled study
evidence. Its not possible to do controlled study because physicians will not subject their
patients to risk when they can get very satisfactory results with MR" (Hess 1985:56).
The HCFA granted coverage to MRI in November 1985 (Steinberg et al; Partain et al 1988,
Cowley 1994), after conducting a technology assessment (Steinberg E 1985, Peddecord et al
1988). Other major insurers quickly followed (Steinberg et al; Partain et al 1988, Cowley 1994),
meaning that by 1986 insurance coverage was almost universal, despite the absence of
rigorous trials or consensus concerning the technology (Peddecord et al 1988).
Crucially, the PPS system was to be introduced slowly, and Medicare continued to pay for
capital costs separately from operating costs (Steinberg et al; Partain et al 1988). The high costs
and low throughputs imputed to MRI in 1985, meant their DRGs were very profitable by 1989,
when throughput rates had tripled (Milliren 1989). Meanwhile, the PPS system continued to pay
more generous fees for outpatient services (under Medicare B) in order, partly, to encourage
outpatient provision. However, Medicare patients being treated at outpatient MRI units were
forced to bear 20% of the costs of these scans. Judging this to be inequitable, hospitals
received an additional payment if they had MRI machines, in addition to the normal DRGs, to
encourage inpatient provision (Whiteis and Muliner; Brehm and Muliner 1987). Effectively,
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therefore, investment costs could still be passed through to Federal government, whilst the
HCFA paid inflated hospital fees for services, and clinicians were claiming market based Usual,
Customary and Reasonable (UCR) rates for their fees (Steinberg and Cohen 1984a).
The crucial points to be aware of in the preceding discussion is that faith in MRI overrode the
regulatory and financing barriers it faced, and that networks of providers and financiers could be
created to manage uncertainties and difficulties as they arose. Decision making patterns that
occurred in the US were generally similar to those of the UK, at the micro level, although the
more intense competitive pressures, and the greater availability of financing, meant more
diverse forms of provision emerged. Some of these patterns will now be discussed.
Different groups and organisations had different motives for adopting technologies. e.g. clinical
care (e.g. provide high quality, state of the art care, fulfill clinicians demands, enhance
diagnostic abilities), economic (e.g. maintain or increase market share, provide cost effective
care, profitability, collaborative ventures), institutional (e.g. research, teaching, prestige), and
political (e.g. be seen to be committed to care, the patient, the clinician, and, most importantly,
the health care game). Different institutions had different motives e.g. teaching hospitals were
concerned with clinical application, prestige and research or residency programs, whilst
community hospitals and free-standing centres were much more concerned with avoiding loss of
market share (Steinberg et al 1988). Perceived pre-eminence was usually more highly valued
than either profit maximisation or clinical excellence (Teplensky et al 1995).
Similarly, they also had different capacities for realising these desires, and applied different
strategies. Large, prestigious hospitals were strongly motivated to maintain their image of
technological pre-eminence, and had the political and economic resources to quickly purchase
MRI. Chain hospitals would buy MRI on an experimental basis, phasing acquisitions. and often
worked with universities in joint partnerships to assess clinical efficacy (Steinberg and Cohen
1984a). Smaller hospitals, anxious to market services, gain referrals and maintain control of
patients, were more likely to lease ground to outpatient MRI providers (Steinberg et al 1985a).
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Strategically, both managers and radiologists saw wide ranging possibilities for MRI. It could
develop from a CT clone into a safer, more accurate and possibly less expensive replacement
for numerous invasive diagnostic procedures, or even spearhead assorted new services e.g.
cancer detection and treatment (Kimberly et al; Brehm and Muliner 1987).
Health care decision makers tended to construct MRI in terms of CT (Persson 1985,
Anonymous 1985c, Sorby and Baddeley 1988, Hillman et al 1987a, Hillman et al 1987b), and
hospital decision-makers (clinicians, managers and boards) had been generally happy with their
experiences with CT (Hillman et al 1987a), although policy makers often considered its use
inappropriately excessive. MRI was viewed as a revolutionary diagnostic advance, generating
rapidly increasing areas of application (Hillman 1986, Sorby and Baddeley 1988).
However, the range of regulatory and financial uncertainty (e.g. FDA approval, CON control,
insurance reimbursements, changing Medicare and tax laws) merged with internal uncertainty
(e.g. clinical efficacy, profitability, manufacturer, types of scanner etc.) to cause delays which
management were willing to tolerate in order to avoid legal, ethical and precedent setting
problems (Kimberly et al; Brehm and Muliner 1987).
In view of this managerial uncertainty (Blume 1992, Burck 1995, Brokaw 1992), radiologists
would often plan to provide MRI services themselves, often supported by manufacturers who
would provide technical, legal and budgetary skills (Cowley 1994). Often such threats would
encourage management to negotiate with the radiologists, since they wished to maintain control
over MRI (Kimberly 1987). Typically this would be some form of joint contract which mixed
ownership and management, and radiologists even brokered deals between hospitals to share
acquisition of MRI (Hillman et al 1987a, Hillman and Schwartz May 1986).
However, it was also common, at first, for radiologists to group together to form, staff and run an
MRI company, borrowing from commercial financiers, leasing from the manufacturer or an
intermediate (James et al 1991, Kimberly 1987), often sited on ground leased from the hospital
(Hillman 1986), or using mobile scanners allowing even further decentralisation of risk (Kimberly
1987). Shareholders were usually clinicians, although non-clinicians, companies and hospitals
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were also frequent part owners (Hillman and Schwartz May 1986). Radiologists would often sell
shares to referring clinicians (Lipper et al 1995, Mitchell And Scott 1992, Brown And Saltman
1985, Hillman et al 1986, Kimberly 1987), whose incomes were linked to their volume of
referrals (Hillman et al 1987a), and whose liability was limited to their initial investment (James
et al 1991). Effectively radiologists became managers (clinical entrepreneurs) (James 1987), in
a strange parody of the UK's attempt to produce budget constraining clinical directors.
Thus clinicians provided referrals, radiologists provided services, the hospital provided the site,
investors provided capital, and intermediaries provided units supplied by manufacturers. Each
group brought a particular skill, capacity or resource to the transaction, causing others to give up
degrees of control, but reducing their individual and collective risks in the process (Brehm and
Muliner 1989).
Frequently MRI units were housed in outpatient facilities, since these were not subject to the
PPS system (Brehm and Muliner 1989), enabling them to receive cost based reimbursement.
Additionally, hospitals could then unbundle DRGs, which included an estimate for MRI scans.
Thus scans could be done off the premises, under fee for service, whilst inpatient care was
delivered in hospitals which received DRG payments which included a sum to cover MRI scans
(Hillman and Schwartz 1985). Hence inpatient intensity was reduced whilst incomes rose
(Steinberg et al 1985a, Kimberly 1987).
Commercial, free-standing units at first made paper losses, largely due to bad debts on
uncovered scans, but since many of the staff, drawing wages and fees, were also owners, tax
deductible company losses could conceal personal profits. Centres reduced charitable, free or
subsidised care, accelerated the speed of scans, instituted prepayment, increased fees, and
received greater direct referrals from GPs (instead of specialists) (Hillman et al 1987a, Brody
1987, Hillman et al 1992a, Doughty et al 1992, Gelijns 1992, Hillman and Schwartz May 1986,
Steinberg and Cohen 1984a, Evens And Evens 1991). Centres owned by self referring clinicians
had the highest patient throughput, the highest revenues overall, and lower proportions of
patients on Medicare or Medicaid (Lipper et al 1995), since profit per scan was halved on these
patients (Robinson 1989, Evens And Evens 1988). Outpatient units scanned many different
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areas, whilst inpatient units concentrated on the head (Evens And Evens 1991). MRI was
concentrated in richer areas, causing an inappropriate matching of technical capacity with
population need, and applied technology for marginal and often inappropriate indications (Lipper
et al 1995). By 1990 they were making significant profits, and their practice of not recording data
made it difficult for HMOs to lever down prices (Kent and Larson 1988, Larson and Kent 1989).
It was widely recognised that clinicians increased the cost and volume of services if they had
financial interests in them (Wilkinson 1987b). Similar patterns were found in the NHS after the
introduction of the internal market (Wilkinson 1993, Hall 1993). However, legislation against this
was difficult to pass, and harder to enforce (Ahern and Scott 1992, Mitchell and Scott 1992).
Professional bodies, such as the American College of Physicians, the AMA and the American
College of Radiology adopted varieties of ethical guidelines to address such dubious
professional and competitive practices (Whitcomb 1988, Cowley 1994, Swedlow et al 1992,
Schachner 1992, Ecri 1985), and to pre-empt state regulation (Ecri 1985) and legal challenge
(James et al 1991). Legislation against such tied interests, combined with fee falls, encouraged
clinicians to sell outpatient units to managed care chains in the 1990s (Dougherty and Hagin
1989).
Decision-making was strongly affected by perceptions of competition, and the environment of
high uncertainty and strong competition increased the possibilities of serious errors. Thus
organisations bunched together (Brehm and Muliner 1989). Producers and consumers traded in
more powerful whole body machines (Steinberg and Cohen 1984a), to manage the uncertainty
of unknown future capabilities, and to avoid premature obsolescence (as had occurred with CT).
Bunching was a further means of risk management, since it effectively became a form of meta-
analysis in decision-making (trying to find the average of other's decisions) (Kimberly 1987,
Hillman and Schwartz May 1986).
Having studied some of the unique patterns of decision making experienced in the US, afforded
by its more fractured system of health care delivery, a summary comparison of diffusion patterns
can be illustrated.
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iffusion in the UK and US was initially slow, since MRI was ringed in uncertainty. Consequently
the earliest sitings were expensive and powerful machines in large teaching, research and
specialist centres, with the anomalous free-standing outpatient centres also playing a significant
role in the US (Blume 1992, Steinberg et al 1988, Sorby and Baddeley 1988, Kimberly 1987,
McGiveney 1988, Hess 1985, Cherryman 1985).
The uncertainties enveloping MRI gradually reduced as experience was gained with it. A
dynamic was set off, with new applications fueling increased utilisation and hence greater
adoption. The greater the volume of machines, especially in more diverse settings, the greater
number of new applications which were found (Critchley et al 1987, Cowley 1994, Wilkinson
1987c, Baldor 1993). Producers' and consumers' confidence overcame MRI's lack of objective
applications. Faith in the technological imperative made technology an imperative.
Regulatory control (FDA, CON) fell in the US in the 1980s, whilst financing (primarily Medicare)
continued to be readily available, and MRI diffusion was rapid. In the UK public regulatory and
financial control remained strict, but adopters were able to bypass this by using charitable and
research funds. These independently financed machines fueled the legitimacy of the technology,
justifying the need for public finance (Gelijns and Halm 1991, Fletcher 1996). Once installed,
equipment justified the expansion of its utilisation. Thus scanners lying unused in out of office
hours were perfect for media campaigns focused on increasing their funding, and hence
utilisation (Anonymous 1995b), increasing hospitals perceived need to have an MRI of their own
(7).
Meanwhile, the technology adjusted to the environment. Thus powerful machines (although not
spectroscopic applications) did come to dominate the market in the 1980s, but their weak
technical advantages were outweighed by their costs in the 1990s, causing a shift to low and
mid-power machines (Cowley 1994, Brady 1994). It is thus possible to see how the nature of the
technology adjusts to the dominant environment (Taggart and Griffin; Brehm and Muliner 1987).
In the 1990s stricter Federal financing controls, and the centralisation of health care provision
(in managed care companies), constrained MRI diffusion, although manufacturers responded by
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producing machines for niche markets (Baker 1997). By contrast, the introduction of the internal
market in the UK accelerated the diffusion of MRI, as a more unitary system was fragmented
into one of multiple purchasers facing a plurality of provider institutions. The institution of this
system has merely increased the inequitable distribution of MRI, with machines being
• concentrated in richer areas e.g. London and the South East (Sorby and Baddeley 1988),
increasing inequality of access (Bydder 1988, Hall 01995).
Rapid diffusion rates could not be justified by clinical data or patient care criteria (Hillman and
Schwartz May 1986, Cowley 1994), since no comprehensive assessments of MRI's safety,
efficacy, cost effectiveness and relative cost effectiveness had been made (Gross 1985), and
meta-analysis seemed to err on the technologies limited applicability.
These discussions have made clear that the greater was the perception of competition, then the
more rapidly MRI diffused, with the noted exception that purchasing slowed (somewhat) when it
was believed that health care reform was about to be enacted. Thus structural, macro-level,
changes seem to dramatically effect the diffusion of MRI. However, even in this circumstance,
demand for smaller machines grew, as clinicians sought office based technology which would
enable them to negotiate and compete more effectively with insurers.
6 Conclusion
The emerging radiology profession effectively came to form a monopsony. Manufacturers
serving these organised consumers generally prospered, and the radiology industry gradually
formed into an oligopoly, dominated by a few large companies. Consumers and producers were
thus meshed closely together in a symbiotic community, which could be termed the radiology
establishment (Blume 1992). This community was sustained by the belief that technological
medicine was the best medicine, and scientific research underlay technological medicine.
Technology was seen as a simple and prestigious solution to otherwise complex and mundane
alternatives (Blume 1992).
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This radiology establishment forms a small chunk of the medical industrial complex, where
parties shared political and social interests overcome the supposed economic conflict between
producer and consumer (Blume 1992). The establishment ensured that only sterile incremental
innovations occurred, since radical changes would threaten the stability of the community.
Threatening technologies (e.g. CT, MRI, etc.) which emerged from outside the community, were
incorporated, and came to sustain the network instead of structurally altering it (Blume 1992).
The following section analyses the emergence of MRI.
MRI arose outside of the radiological community, which relies on technology to defend its
territorial boundaries. At first there was no consensus on what MRI should be able to do, and
multiple producer and consumer groups moved to fill this vacuum. The radiology establishment
was threatened by MRI, which could undermine their profitable, stable and symbiotic community.
Consequently the radiology establishment rushed to assert definitional dominance. MRI could
have developed into forms of spectrometry, with the possibility of being able to classify various
forms of pathology according to chemical analysis. However, this would have propelled
radiologists into areas of interpretation where they were vulnerable. The emphasis on imaging
morphological forms instituted uncertainty in diagnosis, and hence discretionary space. Once
this hegemonical dominance was achieved, extraneous researchers, clinicians and
manufacturers were marginalised and ultimately excluded (Blume 1992). It seems plausible,
given the possibilities of MRI, that its most fruitful application would be by multi disciplinary
teams, including various clinicians and radiologists (National Consultative Committee 1987).
Instead the true possibilities of the technology have not been realised, possibly in part due to the
fears and possessiveness of the radiology establishment.
Radiologists fought vigorously with various other clinical groups for ownership of MRI, even
changing its name from NMR, and were largely successful due to their close relationships with
the like-minded radiology industry. Other groups remain in the field, however, and some of these
have reached a satisfactory compromise with radiology regarding a division of labour.
Occasionally groups or splinters wrestle with radiologists over MRI at the margins (e.g. surgeons
are pressing to use small MRI systems (Fishlock 1988)), although in recent years this conflict
has mainly been with policy makers, health economists and the like. MRI, however, remains an
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excellent justification for the growth of radiology, with clinical and research applications
continuing to grow, hauling the radiological community into ever more prestigious, and secure,
areas.
MRI is interesting since it is an extremely expensive piece of capital equipment, with costs
emerging from purchase, installation, running (including staff ) and maintenance. Clinical
efficacy, however, is relatively unproven outside of the central nervous system, and even here
the technology mainly simply increases clinicians' diagnostic confidence, with little impact on
patient outcomes. Paradoxically, the knowledge gulf concerning efficacy is perhaps bigger now
than it was in 1980 (since the range of applications has expanded so greatly), meaning its place
within the health care system is even more vague (Hailey And Marshall 1995).
However, MRI is also used extremely inappropriately, in situations where it may not assist
diagnosis or treatment. e.g. marginal efficacy, duplicative, diagnosing untreatable conditions. Its
effectiveness at imaging means that asymptomatic anatomical deviations become constructed
as pathologies, giving rise to a stream of often fruitless, counterproductive, interventions (Drake
et al 1983, Wolf and Berle 1980, Davidson 1995). Consequently, the cost effectiveness of MRI
(clinical benefit versus economic cost) does not justify its expansive utilisation and diffusion,
causing it to distort healthcare provision. Essentially various forms of economic, political, social
and ideological resources are focused on MRI, in its clinical and research dimensions, which
could more productively be applied elsewhere.
Regulatory and financial constraints were overcome by various decision makers (e.g. clinicians,
managers, institutions etc.) who were strongly motivated by various forms of competitive
interests (e.g. patient control, market share, turf, financial rewards, intellectual satisfaction,
market capture, financial compensation (James et al 1990), supported by public fascination and
professional attention (James et al 1991).
Ultimately, the question surrounding MRI, is why was it accepted so readily ? Frequently the
answer that is given is that it provides beautiful pictures. MRI is a product of human culture (a
technology), that enables us to confront the mysteries of nature (the void), and perhaps gain
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control over it. Consequently MRI has been linked to all sorts of human fears (e.g. dread
diseases such as cancer), often focused on the weak and vulnerable (e.g. children). Such
conditions, and such groups, provoke anxiety, since they symbolise the edges of safe human
society, where it borders the menacing realm of chaotic nature. MRI, in this analogy, acts to
expand our understanding of nature (and thus push the border with nature further back e.g.
research disease, cure patients), and clarify the status of people at the border (e.g. what their
disease is, reducing the extent of the unexplained). Thus MRI alleviates human anxiety by
asserting the power of ordered benevolent culture over chaotic menacing nature, expanding the
realms of culture, and providing clearer definitions of status. MRI was thus able to transform
natural forms into scientific images, giving us control over them. Consequently, its beautiful
pictures were central to its appeal. Secondly, MRI, as a sophisticated technology (i.e. the current
peak product of culture and rationality) was a celebration of human ingenuity and understanding,
and symbolised belief in human progress. Consequently, MRI was attached to faith in human
ability, and virtually all decision makers shared this faith in the usefulness of MRI.
Thus MRI expanded the world of culture, provided clearer definitions of the border between
culture and nature, and became a vehicle for human faith in culture. Its clinical usefulness,
therefore, was largely peripheral, since its main role was as a statement of faith.
It is interesting to note that Positron Emission Tomography (PET), an extremely expensive
imaging technology, is following almost an identical path to both CT and MRI. Its efficacy is
described in terms of impressive naturalistic images, it is being linked to cancer, specialists are
organising partnerships to gain access to it, normal regulations are being overcome to allow its
medical benefit to shine through, various financial packages are being constructed to buy it,
financiers, providers and regulators are constructing it in terms of CT and MRI (Lumason 1992,
Hinz 1991). John Cova, Director of Medical Technology Assessment at the Health Insurance
Association of America (HIAA), neatly summarises the entire argument of the chapter in
describing PET: ' "It's a fabulous machine with limited application" '(Hinz 1991:62).
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Endnotes
1 Personal Communication- Community General Practitioner Yorkshire, England.
2 Personal Communication- Manager of an MRI Site, England
3 Personal Communication- Head Radiologist of an MRI Unit, England
4 Personal Communication- Head Radiologist of an MRI Unit, England
5 Personal Communication- Manager of an MRI Site, England
6 Personal Communication Official at British Technology Group
7 Personal Communication- Imaging Department Manager, USA
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Chapter 6
La paroscop ic Cholecvstectomv: Surqeons and Space Invaders
1 Introduction
This case study is concerned with understanding how Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy developed
and why it diffused at different rates through the UK and US health care systems (figs 4 and 5),
in order to illustrate the larger processes informing such processes. In this instance, the central
argument is that the emergence of various competing therapies for gallstone disease in the
1980s pushed general surgeons to adopt a new surgical technique, in order to retain control
over the gallbladder. Technological innovation and diffusion were therefore shaped by
professional competition (Gelijns 1991)
The second section outlines the epidemeology of gallstone disease, the main characteristic of
which is its vagueness. Section three analyses the professional changes which have been
occurring in general surgery (a group which has become reliant on cholecystectomy, the surgical
removal of the gallbladder), and the development of competition from gastroenterology and
radiology.
Section four studies the creation and adoption of laparoscopic cholecystectomy (keyhole
surgery) within the context of surgeons fearing loss of the gallbladder, and describes their rush
to adopt the new surgery and block other groups from it. Section five emphasises a problematic
biproduct of this rush- a lack of training and high rates of severe complications, causing
academic surgeons to reassert control over the profession before policy makers imposed state
regulation. Despite this reassertion of control, the actual value of laparoscopic cholecystectomy
is debateable in view of large increases in patient throughput (figs 6 and 7) and costs, and
perhaps even of patient morbidity.
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Fig 4 incidence of Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy Surgery in the UK 1988 -1995
40000
35000
30000
25000
Cg 20000
•3
E
15000
10000
5000
0
1988
	
1989
	
1990
	
1991
	
1992
	
1993	 1994
	
1995
Year
Data provided by Department of Health Statistics Departments (for England, Scotland, Wales
and Northern Ireland), BUPA and the PPP.
Fig 5 incidence of Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy Surgery in the USA 1988-1995
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Fig 6 Total incidence of Cholecystectomy Surgeries In the UK 1989-1995
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Fig 7 Total Incidence of Cholecystectomy Surgeries in the USA 1989-1995
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2 The Gallbladder and Gallbladder Stones
An understanding of the gallbladder and gallbladder disease (primarily cholelithiasis) is
necessary before studying the professional competition which has surrounded the organ.
Bile, a digestive juice used to break down fats, is produced by the liver and stored in the
gallbladder. After eating the gallbladder contracts and forces bile through the cystic duct and the
common bile duct into the small intestine where it acts on fats (Anonymous 1991m). Surgeons
have suggested this organ is disposable, since many animals lack it, and people without
gallbladders seem to experience no ill effects (Gelijns 1991, Sauerbruch and Paumgartner
1991). Gallbladders, however, often produce stones, which are believed to form when
cholesterol concentrations in the gallbladder exceed those of bile acid. Most gallstones are
composed of a combination of cholesterol, pigment and calcium (Farha and Bearner 1991,
Steyer 1989)
Gallstones tend to remain asymptomatic ('silent') at the larger end of the gallbladder. However, if
they move into the funnel end of the gallbladder, or into the cystic or bile ducts, they can become
symptomatic, causing pain (Anonymous 1991m). Billiary colic (an intense, episodic pain across
the upper abdomen, that peaks and then persists for several hours (Ransohoff et al 1988)), is
the classic indicator of such gallstone disease, and is believed to occur as the gallbladder
compresses on stones, forcing them into the cystic or bile ducts, blocking the flow of bile and
increasing pressure in the gallbladder. In cases of complete obstruction, the bile can stagnate,
inflaming the gallbladder (acute cholycystitus) and nearby organs, and causing pain, fever,
nausea etc., or jaundice as bile is absorbed into the blood (Stern 1989, Gelijns 1991). Organ
inflammations can be potentially life threatening (Anonymous 1991m), although only
approximately 1% of patients experience these more serious complications (Goldman; Frazier
and Mosteller 1995) (resulting in 5000-8000 deaths in the US per year (Servaas 1989).
Gallstone disease, however, is poorly understood (Schade et al 1989). Its incidence and
prevalence rates are unknown, although estimates of 10% are often reported (Goldman; Frazier
and Mosteller 1995, Gelijns 1991). Different studies generate widely different likelihoods for
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asymptomatic stones becoming symptomatic (Schade et al 1989), whilst the relationship
between gallstones, morbidity and mortality is a mystery (Fitzpatrick et al; Bunker et at 1977,
Farha and Bearner 1991). Decision making thus occurs in a relative vacuum, although by the
mid 1980s some consensus was emerging that the probability of developing billiary pain from
asymptomatic gallstones was low, and diminished with time, with a small risk of severe
complications (Ransohoff et al 1988). Consequently, only billiary colic was considered a
definitive symptom of gallstone disease, and treatment centred around a policy of watchful
waiting (expectant management). i.e. only treating symptomatic gallstones (Weinstein et al
1990).
However, the relationship between 'pathology' and symptoms is mysterious, especially in areas
such as gastroenterology. The definition and cause of biliary pain remains vague, and this
uncertainty extends to the link between action and outcome. Thus gallstones are also
implicated, variously, in a wide range of symptoms (e.g. bloating, flatulence, belching, nausea,
vomiting, upper abdomen pain, pain in between the shoulder blades or in the right shoulder, fatty
food intolerance (Ransohoff et al 1988, Goldman; Frazier and Mosteller 1995). Frequently
surgical treatment (cholecystectomy, the removal of the gallbladder) for these symptoms
resulted in post-cholecystectomy syndrome, a euphemism for symptoms of unknown cause, for
which cholecystectomy had been ineffective (Zuccaro 1990, Ransohoff et al 1988). Indications
for gallbladder stones are wide and vague, complicating diagnosis (Stern 1989).
Surgeons had become progressively more enthusiastic about prophylactic cholecystectomy
(Goldman; Frazier and Mosteller 1995, Rosenthal 1989, Gelijns 1991), until seriously challenged
by research in the 1980s that promoted expectant management as a more efficacious and cost
effective strategy (Gelijns 1991). They continued to argue that the morbidity and mortality risks
caused by 'watchful waiting' and emergency surgery justified the elective use of surgery and
perhaps even routine screening for gallstones (Wacha 1992). Prophylactic surgery was a means
to reduce the incidence of gallbladder cancer, which is rare but nearly always fatal, but about
which little was known (Fitzpatrick et al; Bunker et al 1977). The apparent justification appears to
be the classical surgical concept- if the organ is removed it cannot become diseased. Vague
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heuristics were touted around this concept. e.g. 1 less death from gallbladder cancer for every
100 cholecystectomies (Diehl and Beral 1981).
Prophylactic surgery was only generally indicated for groups with calcified gallbladders
(porcelain gallbladder) or large gallstones, who were considered more at risk of malignancy
(Diehl 1993, Ransohoff et al 1988). However, determining risk was difficult, since gallbladder
calcification is rare, few patients have large stones, and it is difficult to determine gallstone size
(Diehl 1993). Meanwhile there were concerns that elective cholecystectomy was linked to
increased risks of colonic cancer (Anonymous 1981a).
Thus the decision tree surrounding minimally symptomatic gallstones was complex, and
frequently left to the discretion of the individual surgeon (Fitzpatrick et al; Bunker et al 1977),
whose surgical practice was guided according to their own cultures, agendas and interests.
Consequently, the easier was gallbladder removal, the more likely surgery was, partly since
decision making would shift more towards the clinician (e.g. treatment became an earlier step in
care, and perhaps even a diagnostic tool), and surgery could be directed at more frail groups
(Ransohoff and McSherry 1995), or those who could not afford prolonged recovery times.
3 Specialisms Claiming the Gallbladder
This section analyses the specialist competition which began to be focused on the gallbladder. A
process of surgical specialisation had fragmented general surgery, leaving it as almost a
vestigial profession, dependent upon gallbladder surgery. Meanwhile both gastroenterology and
radiology were applying new technologies to expand their range of activities, and were both
making claims on the gallbladder.
One of the reasons underlying surgeons' enthusiasm for prophylactic surgery may have been
their increasing reliance on cholecystectomy. Originally general surgeons performed all types of
surgery. However, since the 19th century general surgery has become fragmented into various
surgical specialisms, based on the principle that disease resided in specific places within the
body, which could be best addressed by specialised expertise, knowledge, skills and devices
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(essentially technologies) (Reiser 1979). As such groups specialised they established separate
boards (regulatory bodies), societies and certificates, undermining centralised surgical control
(Tompkins 1988).
Surgeons faced growing competition from other groups, fighting over turf and technology.
Alternative therapies appeared, such as pharmaceuticals (Rosenthal 1989, Maguire 1994)(e.g.
H2 blockers for peptic ulcer), radiology (e.g. radiotherapy), invasive therapy by non surgical
groups (e.g. cardiologists, radiologists and gastroenterologists etc.) and other surgeons fighting
for turf (e.g. head and neck surgery, hand surgery, oesophageal surgery, and intensive care)
(Anonymous 1993f), and groups fought over control of technologies e.g. cardiologists, cardiac
surgeons and radiologists compete over balloon angioplasty (Banta 1993). Surgeons were also
oppressed by economic issues (e.g. fewer hospital beds, rising malpractice rates), whilst the
number of surgeons increased (almost doubling in the US between 1970 and 1985) (Rosenthal
1989).
Surgeons were well aware of such pressures: 'In this world of change, I started as a specialist...,
I had to change my major interest and I survived. One thing I am grateful for is that I did not then
become a specialist in gastric surgery, for what with the endoscopists, the vanishing of gastric
cancer, and the success of the medical treatment of duodenal ulcer, I would again have been
out of business. I wonder what field will be the next to fall !' (Grile 1989:258).
Surgeons worked to expand their 'turf' (overtreat)- learning new techniques, moving into non
surgical areas, lowering the thresholds at which they performed surgery (Levine 1989,
Rosenthal 1989). e.g. some general surgeons moved into areas previously dominated by
specialists in internal medicine (Anonymous 1993f), whilst others engaged in primary care and
began practising out of offices (Rosenthal 1989).
Although the volume of surgeries rose, volume per surgeon fell, with general surgeons being
particularly effected since the abdomen was easily colonised by other groups and therapies. e.g.
gastroenterology, gynaecology, family physicians etc (Moody 1983), and by the predations of
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emerging specialities (Rosenthal 1989). General surgeons became dependent on
cholecystectomy, which accounted for 30% of their activity (Ross 1991).
General surgery was thus declining, lacking status, cohesion or recognition (Tompkins 1988,
Kelly 1994, Anonymous 1993f): "The main problem, in my view, is that gastrointestinal surgery is
not recognised today as a clear cut, cohesive field of surgery, unlike other disciplines of surgery
such as plastic surgery, cardiac surgery or neurosurgery. We do have our national society, the
Society for Surgery of the Alimentary Tract, but we also have the following problems: many
competing societies; a declining trend of research in the field; few, if any, advanced training
programs; virtually no speciality appointments in gastrointestinal surgery at hospitals, clinics of
surgical departments, and no American journal devoted exclusively to the field of gastrointestinal
surgery. On top of that we are usually referred to as general surgeons, not gastrointestinal
surgeons. The lack of recognition of gastrointestinal surgery has caused a lack of cohesion in
the field. A number of areas have broken away from it....The field of colorectal surgery formed
an identity separate from gastrointestinal surgery at the time of the founding of the American
Board of Colorectal Surgery in 1948...{with its}...own society,...its own fellowship, its own
journal...and its own national meeting. More recently the field of surgical endoscopy has
separated from gastrointestinal surgery with the formation, in 1980, of the Society of American
Gastrointestinal Endoscopic Surgeons (SAGES)." (Kelly 1994:3-4)
Stresses and fears were openly expressed: "Old structures are being dismantled... It is a time of
stress and concern. Many in our field, gastrointestinal surgery, and its parent discipline, general
surgery, feel threatened. Some say the future looks bleak." (Kelly 1994:2) Similarly. "General
surgery was the starting point for most of the surgical specialities, and it appears that it will be
the resting place for surgery of the alimentary tract. ' (Moody 1983:3)
This overall sense of gloom also influenced adoption, as general surgeons lost areas of surgery
to other groups: "In spite of these measures, traditional laparotomy and cholecystectomy
became known in Europe as 'old fashioned' when compared with so-called non-invasive and
modern methods of gallstone therapy. This may explain why the gastrointestinal (GI) surgeon,
discouraged and admitting defeat, yielded gastrointestinal endoscopy and even interventional
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endoscopy to the gastroenterologists and did not become interested earlier in the possibilities of
laparoscopic surgery." (Dubois et al 1991:53)
Such lessons were not lost, however: "...lt is now nearly 20 years since the introduction of
endoscopic sphincterotomy. Regrettably this surgical procedure has been taken over by the
gastroenterologists largely because of the indifference for the new technology by surgeons at
the time. There is a lesson to be learned here and we must ensure that future advanced in
endoscopic gastrointestinal surgery are embraced by surgeons and not left to those who are
surgically untrained. ' (Cuschieri 1990:347)
Academic general surgeons realised that for general surgery to regain its prestige, it would have
to become identified with special surgical skills, based around an extended training period
(Tompkins 1988). Various strategies were considered to reinvigorate the profession, such as
focusing on the whole patient (becoming the GP of surgery), broadening membership,
expanding training and research, and undertake political lobbying through a Gastrointestinal
Surgical Foundation (Kelly 1994). However, technology and specialisation seemed to offer a
potential way out of this predicament: 'Ophthalmology ...has remained organ specific and has
continues along the path of ever further specialisation to the point of possibly being extreme or
even absurd. However this refinement of practice has brought about remarkable advances in
the care of the eye. Shouldn't it be, 'what is good for the eye should be equally good for the
alimentary tract?'." (Moody 1983:2)
Diagnostic and therapeutic endoscopy was recognised, eventually, as such an opportunity
(Tompkins 1988). Essentially general surgeons would specialise, and become 'specially trained
gastrointestinal surgical specialists" (Tompkins 1988:5). Innovative zeal was thus essential: "...it
is absolutely essential that surgery as a discipline stop being excluded from change and begin to
try to envelop change so that we can be part of the solution and not a dinosaur- like position of
having been a problem long since solved " (Polk 1989:170)
However, surgeons found it difficult to react to such problems and threats. They are trained
within a highly hierarchical community, favouring major incisions which enabled the direct
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viewing and manipulation of internal organs. Such dramatic surgery was socially valued within
the surgical community, being seen as skillful and daring. Thus: "To cut is to cure', 'the greater
the surgeon, the bigger the incision', and 'wounds heal from side to side, and not top to bottom'
are just a few of the aphorisms that residents have been exposed to during training. "(Olsen
1993:441-442). Further: "Three decades back, all over the world, most resident surgeons in
training were taught by their chiefs, 'Big surgeons make big incisions. th (Udwadia 1992:287). The
culture of general surgery is generally resistant to innovations (Ross 1991), requiring
establishment leadership, and favouring incremental change (Perrissat 1993). Traditionally
academic surgeons would synthesise innovations (Gelijns and Rosenberg; Rosenberg et al
1995) which would percolate into community settings where incremental changes would occur
(Gelijns 1991).
Surgical mavericks, seeking to minimise tissue damage, were roundly criticised. For example,
an early user of selective incision instead of radical mastectomy stated: 'Needless to say, I was
soundly scolded by most of my surgeon friends...The debate was often bitter, and I did not
hesitate to mention that , from an economic perspective surgeons had no incentive to change
from performing a radical mastectomy to local excision. The Cleveland Academy of Medicine
reprimanded me because, they said, my condemnation of radical mastectomy made patients
who had had the operation critical of the surgeons who had performed them.' (Grile 1989:258)
Surgeons enjoy great prestige, enabling them to exercise discretion in their work. Consequently,
large variations occur in surgical techniques and rates for the same conditions (Leape 1989,
Anonymous 1991j, Le Fanu 1995, Morgan et al 1987, Arndt 1993), over time (Finkel; Finkel
1988, Vayda and Barnsley; Finkel 1988, Goldenacre et al 1993, Perrson et al 1993, WasteII
1991, Saunders-kirkwood et al 1992, Dubois et al 1991) and space (Finkel; Finkel 1988, Louis et
al 1996, Renwick 1991). The more optional surgery becomes, the more likely it is to be
unnecessary or contentious, showing little benefit for the patient (Stroman 1979). Prestige
strengthens the agency relationship (Leape 1989), causing specialists to drive the consumption
of surgical treatments (Black et al 1995, Scott and Black 1992). Thus surgical volumes increase
as the number of surgeons rise (Leape 1989, Holohan 1991). Richer, more knowledgeable
patients are also liable to consume more surgery (Holohan 1991, Mort et al 1994) than those
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with poor English skills (Diehl et al 1993), in part because they may be consuming through the
private sector (Renwick 1991). Consequently, the correlation between need and surgery is
dubious (Brindle 1995), and it can be argued that surgery is neither an art nor a science, but
more of a dice roll.
This generalised aura of esteem (Grove 1991, David 1991) combines with faith in technology,
and medical technology in particular, laying the groundwork for unnecessary, inappropriate and
possibly dangerous care (Stroman 1979). Examples include tonsillectomy, leucotomy,
nephropexy, gastric freezing (Anonymous 1993k), colectomy for epilepsy, laparotomy for
abdominal tuberculosis, unsafe breast implants (Miller 1993), exploitative aesthetic plastic
surgery (Carey 1990), and unnecessary mastectomies (Dyer 1989). Meanwhile extracranial /
intracranial (EC/IC) bypass, coronary-artery bypass, and surgery for glue ear have all been
found to have dubious, or non existent, efficacy (Anonymous 1991j). Surgeons, keen to rid the
body of organs which they believe to be functionless, have culled the thymus, adenoids,
appendix and tonsils (although many of these were subsequently found to have a purpose). A
specific disease (thymic hypertrophy) was invented to justify the dangerous radiation treatment
directed at the thymus (Weil 1992:58). Egoism and arrogance appears almost as a prerequisite
of surgery: "My father, although severely handicapped by loss of vision from cataracts and
glaucoma, was still operating and performing both thyroidectomies and celiac
ganglionectomies..." (Grile 1989:256). Similarly: "Their letter was read to me by my anaesthetist
while I was performing uneventfully a laparoscopic cholecystectomy..." (Eyre-Brook and Barlow
1991:847)
Large incisions, and working within the body, were valued by general surgeons. Thus, in open
Cholecystectomy (the surgical removal of the gallbladder), the surgeon would make a 15cm cut
in the patients' abdomen, enabling the gallbladder to be viewed and removed, leaving the liver to
secrete bile directly into the intestines. Open cholecystectomy was considered major surgery,
but had low mortality provided risk groups were avoided (frail, elderly etc.). However, extensive
damage to tissue, particularly muscle, meant patients required 5-7 days of hospitalisation,
followed by 6 weeks of outpatient recovery, with many experiencing pain at the incision site for
1-2 years (Moody; Gelijns 1992, Goldman; Frazier and Mosteller 1995).
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Cholecystectomy and choledochotomy (removing stones from the common bile duct) were
championed by Langenbuch (Hardy 1993) (considered a revolutionary surgical icon (Sauerbruch
1991) over cholecystostomy (the removal of stones from the gallbladder) in the late 19th century
(Gelijns 1991). Eventually cholecystectomy replaced cholecystoctomy as the treatment of
choice, although fierce controversy persisted for several decades (van Gulik 1986), and open
cholecystectomy and Langenbuch remain icons of general surgery.
The gastrointestinal tract is an area characterised by border conflicts, as different groups used
various techniques (and their supposed expertise with them) to claim legitimate control of
organs or organ systems, eventually solidifying their claims through the formation of specialist
societies (Banta 1993). Within the gastrointestinal tract, cholecystectomy was a major surgery
applied to large volumes of patients (Steyer 1989). Traditionally the gallstone diagnosis was
made by the internist (gastroenterologist), confirmed by the radiologist and cured by the surgeon
(Fenly 1988a, 1988b). Cholecystectomy's high profile made it a tempting target for various
professional groups (Jakiche and Carey 1995), who crowded into the arena, touting assorted
minimally invasive therapies (Rosenthal 1989), whilst emphasising the mortality and morbidity
attached to surgery (Moran 1990). General surgeons, by contrast, viewed themselves as
naturally having control over gallstones, and hence the gallstone patient (Tompkins and Doty
1987). Cholecystectomy was viewed as the gold standard of gallstone treatment, an equivalent
of the kings champion for general surgeons (McSherry 1989a)
Meanwhile, gastroenterologists sought to control the gallbladder using a combination of
endoscopes and chemical technologies. The endoscope is basically a rod which can be used to
look inside the body. Although desirable, its development was fraught with difficulties (Davis
1992, Chung and Broughan 1992). Basic rigid endoscopes were used by internists at the end of
the 19th century, but were relatively ineffective, and somewhat dangerous. By the 1930s
endoscopists were using them to diagnose gallbladder disease. Fibre optics (which enabled light
to travel down glass bundles) improved effectiveness, and this was applied more
comprehensively in the production of different forms of rigid endoscopes in the 1950s. Whilst
various medical groups adopted these scopes, general surgeons resisted, claiming the
choledochoscope (for use in the bile duct) would increase surgical risk. In the 1960s flexible
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endoscopes were developed, and in the late 1970s these were fitted with video cameras,
enabling a clearer view and more delicate surgery to be undertaken (Smith 1992, Rosenthal
1989, Gelijns and Rosenberg; Rosenberg et al 1995, Gelijns 1991).
Whilst endoscopes were primarily concerned with viewing, laparoscopes could carry instruments
and be used to conduct surgery. Gynaecologists, followed by orthopaedic surgeons, were the
first professions to make widespread use of laparoscopes in therapeutic, and not merely
diagnostic, applications in the 1970s (White 1991, Hines 1989), with many groups contributing to
its development (Rosati 1994). Some gynaecologists experimented with using laparoscopes
more widely (Hunter 1992). e.g. laparoscopic appendectomies in 1983 (Holohan 1991, Dubois
et al 1991). However, gynaecologists are a relatively minor and insignificant surgical group with
low professional status, and general surgeons considered them and their practices to be of low
status (Anonymous 1991L). They strenuously avoided laparoscopes, fearing being tarnished by
association (Gelijns and Rosenberg; Rosenberg 1995). Thus: "It was a gynaecologist, Jun
Semm, who over 10 years ago, did the first laparoscopic appendectomy (more or less as an
encore to his wide range of gynecologic laparoscopic surgery). Yet the general surgeon lagged
behind, content to slash away with his scalpel." (Udwadia 1992:287), (Gelijns and Rosenberg;
Rosenberg et al 1995). However, other groups adopted laparoscopes: "...surgeons have
avoided 'minimal access procedures', which they consider something less than surgery. They
have been slow to follow gastroenterologists, pulmonologists, and radiologists into the field of
minimal access procedures. " (Olsen 1993:441-442). When surgeons eventually, under
competitive pressures, adopted laparoscopes, their professional journals skated over the
primary role played by gynaecologists in the development of laparoscopy: "Because of space
limitations, we were unable to review the history of laparoscopy and purposely confined our
article to the current status of general surgical laparoscopy." (Rosati 1994:55)
Resistance to endoscopes effectively cost general surgery the control of gallbladder stones
which were trapped in the bile duct. In 1970 gastroenterologists and Olympus developed
endoscopic retrograde cholangiopancreatography (ERCP), enabling the viewing of the common
duct, leading to the development of endoscopic sphincterotomy and endoscopic papillotomy,
which used a combination of abdominal incision, a duodenoscope (inserted through the mouth)
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and a choledochscope to stretch the common duct and enable spontaneous emission of
trapped stones into a basket, avoiding the significant risks of choledochotomy surgery (Gelijns
and Rosenberg; Rosenberg et al 1995). General surgeons questioned it's efficacy and safety
(Gelijns 1991) but by 1990 it had replaced general surgeon's choledochotomy (Classen 1990).
Gastroenterologists thus came to control the removal of bile duct stones, and laboured to extend
their control into the gallbladder itself. e.g. working with chemical therapies, and also with
interventional radiologists in the development of lithotripsy (Gelijns and Rosenberg; Rosenberg
et al 1995)
In the 1970s pharmaceutical companies, gastroenterologists and internists, sought chemical
solutions to gallstones (Levitt 1990, Gelijns 1991, Moran 1990). Oral and direct instillation
therapies were developed to increase bile acid concentrations, and hence dissolve cholesterol
stones (Carter 1986, Clark 1992). Chenodeoxycholic acid (CDCA) and ursodeoxycholic acid
(UDCA) were slow, with CDCA having more severe side effects (Mullich 1989). Oral therapies
required long duration and hence motivated, capable patients (Zuccaro 1990). Therapy was less
effective against large stones, ineffective against calcium stones, and required a functioning
gallbladder (Levitt 1990, Fromm et al 1990). Recurrence was considered to be 30% in 5 years,
adding to the surveillance costs implicit in the therapy (Zuccaro 1990). However, the lack of
alternatives accelerated their regulatory approval, and they were marketed as Chenix (1983)
and Actigall (1988), in the belief that they could be effectively used in combination with lithotripsy
(Gelijns 1991, Levitt 1990, Fromm et al 1990, Steyer 1989). A third oral drug, Monoctanoin
(Moctanin) was approved by the FDA for use on stones retained in the bile duct, despite its low
efficacy and toxicity, due to the sensitivity of the bile duct to mechanical damage (Fromm et al
1990, Papazian 1992)
The prestigious Mayo Clinic developed a means of directly instilling methyl tert-butyl ether
(MTBE), a chemical which dissolved cholesterol gallstones, into the gallbladder. However, it was
considered difficult and dangerous, requiring several days of hospitalisation. Gastroenterologists
at the Mayo Clinic reported very high success rates (Levitt 1990), whilst surgeons criticised their
techniques: 'For surgeons who have seen the consequences of bile leakage... the report that
occasional leakage of bile follows the percutaneous introduction of the catheter but that no
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deleterious or harmful symptoms result seems unlikely.' (Baker 1988:271-272). MTBE's
approval by the FDA was delayed (Fromm et al 1990)
Consequently drug therapy was only considered effective for small stones (Fromm et al 1990),
to be used in patients who were fragile and could not, or would not, tolerate surgery (Papazian
1992). Thus oral therapy is only considered applicable to some 10% of the symptomatic
population. The size of this group is further reduced by GP preferences, who view gallstones as
a surgical and not a medical condition, and prefer to refer patients to surgeons, regardless of the
patient's preference, to avoid the uncertainties and inconveniences involved in long term
chemical therapy. Thus of the 500 000 people in the UK identified as gallstone patients, only
1300 receive oral therapy (Gelijns 1991). Critics also 'smeared' dissolution therapy, by linking it
to naturopathic care (Lim and Jazrawi 1995, Tait and Little 1995).
The crucial innovation introduced in chemical therapy was the addition of various mechanical
means of fragmenting the gallstone e.g. using the rotary lithotrite, percutaneous
cholecystolithotomy, lithotripsy, percutaneous transhepatic or endoscopic retrograde cannulation
of the gallbladder (Dowling 1992). These various combinations were effective in 10-30% of
patients (Lu 1989, Venbrux 1992, Fromm et al 1990, Burhenne et al 1987, Moody; Gelijns
1992).
Aside from gastroenterology, radiologists were also intruding nto the gallbladder. Radiology was
an area of conflict and flux. Interventional (curative) radiology had emerged in the 1950s and
had become a large professional field (Rickards 1986), competing with other groups over
various therapies and technologies (Rosenthal 1989, Bloom 1991). Interventional radiologists
had undertaken extensive work in the urinary and billiary systems (Rickards 1986) and, working
with urologists, had successfully replaced most surgery in the treatment of renal and uretic
calculi (largely using lithotripsy) (Rickards 1986).
ESWL (lithotripsy) uses sound waves (Anonymous 1984b p19) to break kidney stones (Gelijns
1991), and was introduced rapidly into the UK and the USA in 1984 (Roan 1990a), with little
assessment, since its strengths were judged, typically, to be self evident (Carey 1988, Podolsky
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1988, Matthews 1989, Gelijns 1991, Matthews 1989). Despite its high initial investments, ESWL
was seen as cost effective (Patel et al 1986), and rapidly diffused in the US (Gelijns 1991, Borzo
1991), whilst private sources of income enabled NHS planning to be bypassed in the UK (Patel
et al 1986, Anonymous 1993d, Gelijns 1991, Anonymous 1984b, Benady 1989). Kidney stone
surgery, a popular operation, was almost entirely replaced by ESWL combined with drug
treatment to prevent reoccurrence (Kotulak 1985). Urologists and radiologists worked together
and competed over the technology in community hospitals (Carter 1986, Borzo 1991, Hamilton
1991), whilst those urologists unable or unwilling to adopt the new technology were largely
excluded from kidney stone surgery (Rubenstein 1987, Brandon 1990). Consequently, ESWL
moved kidney stone therapy from a surgical procedure controlled by surgeons, to a non invasive
therapy available to both surgeons and radiologists, displacing many urologists in the process.
Such drama was widely appreciated. e.g. Heckler, the US Secretary of Health and Human
Services, termed the kidney lithotripter an ' "authentic modern medical miracle" ' (Kotulak
1985:C19)
The technology was widely reported on (SerVaas 1989, Anonymous 1989b, Nourse 1989, Hood
et al 1988) , with alternative applications being proposed (Bankhead 1988), often by
manufacturers (Droste 1988). Attention was turned to gallstone lithotripsy (ESBL) in Germany
(Fenly 1988a, Baker 1988), primarily around bile duct stones, which were dangerous and difficult
to treat (Ell 1992, Collier 1987). Whilst ESBL appeared ineffective (since cholesterol gallstones
were not as brittle as calcium kidney stones (Levitt 1990, Zuccaro 1990, Gelijns 1991). Munich
university researchers reported extremely promising results when ESBL was combined with
chemical therapies (Anonymous 1986, Anonymous 1988c, Fromm et al 1990, Levitt 1990,
Mulley 1986).
ESBL was enthusiastically received in the UK in 1987 (Forgacs 1987), and research began to
expand its applications and reduce its costs (Nicholl et al 1992, Forgacs 1987). Lithotripsy was
widely accepted as a self evident 'slam-bang technology' (MuIley 1986), and there was immense
faith that lithotripsy would be successful against gallstones (Lehman 1990, Fendrick et al 1992).
Public health authorities began planning the number of machines required for their localities
(Anonymous 1988e, Lilly 1988), and hospitals rushed to invest in high profile (Souhrada 1988c)
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'research' ESBL (Weingart 1995, Alder 1989, Lehman 1990), or combination renal-billiary
machines (Droste 1988, Folse 1987, Folse 1987, Carter 1986, Borzo 1991, Market Intelligence
Research Co. 1990, Carey 1988). ESBL was 'heralded as near panacea by the lay press as well
as many prospective regional billiary treatment centres' (Petersen 1990:23). The FDA began
sponsoring clinical studies of gallstone lithotripsy in autumn 1987 (Anonymous 1987c, Gerson
1988, Eisenberg 1990, Roan 1990a).
Different professional groups rushed to claim ownership of ESBL, according to some claim of
expertise based on the organ (general surgeons) or the technologies (gastroenterologists and
chemical therapy, radiologists and lithotripsy) (Koska 1988, Gelijns 1991). Thus: "An important
issue that is being debated hotly and often on the basis of local politics rather than patient
welfare is: Who should perform ESBL- gastroenterologists, surgeons or radiologists ?" (Ertan et
al 1989:996)
Gastroenterologists argued for their pre-eminent role, since neither surgeons or radiologists
could conduct follow up medical therapies (Ertan et al 1989, Fenly 1988b, Rubenstein 1987).
Surgeons feared ESBL (Malt et al 1989), which could process large patient volumes, although
they did not necessarily believe it could replace cholecystectomy. e.g. "The bottom line,
however, is that the lithotripter will do for billiary tract calculi only some of what it did for urinary
tract calculi, because prolonged drug treatment is required. More impressive are the absolute
numbers of patient involved, probably in excess of 50000 per year. Most important, however, a
lithotripter equipped to destroy billiary stones will attract large numbers of patients with billiary
tract disease. It is of no small concern that many of these patients will be referred
inappropriately..." (Baker 1988:273). Surgeons overcame their distaste for ESBL, and sought to
embrace the machine (Collier 1987, Baker 1988). Meanwhile radiologists claimed technical
rights over ESBL, and set about organising an international symposium as a vehicle for such a
claim (Koska 1988). The different professional societies drew up their own ESBL guidelines
(Ertan et al 1989, Earnest et al 1991, Jakiche and Carey 1995)
General surgeons were thus understandably fearful of losing the gallbladder to some
combination of gastroenterologists or radiologists, but seemed powerless to resist the technical
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innovations these groups were applying. Gastroenterologists had successfully adopted the
endoscope (which general surgery had rejected) and were using this in the bile duct (at the very
door of the gallbladder), whilst radiologists had already played a central role in the extinction of
kidney stone surgery, by replacing it with the lithotripter. Meanwhile, the pharmaceutical industry
seemed to have settled its gaze on the potential for lifetime prophylactic treatment of gallstones.
4 The Creation and Adoption of Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy
This section describes the emergence of laparoscopic cholecystectomy, which can be viewed as
a response by community general surgeons to the threats posed by endoscopy, chemical
therapy and shock wave treatment.
Surgeons perceived the combination of ESBL and chemical therapy as very menacing (Polk
1989), being particularly critical of radiologists (Schirmer 1991), since surgeons had been 'dutiful
midwives during the birth of modern radiology.' (Rutkow 1993:253). An entire edition of the
American Journal of Surgery was dedicated to the gallbladder predators. Radiology, and its
beloved MRI, were picked out for special attention: '...surely, the value of magnetic resonance
imaging of the brain in addition to computed tomography scanning is a case in point in which
there is clearly greater specific precision by MRI in many cases. Whether this really improves
medical care proportionate to its increase in cost will take a very long time to answer. The same
concept applied to many of the ..ideas presented in this issue of the journal, when more often
than not...patients will have undergone lithotripsy or non invasive methods and then, at least in
the present circumstance, 80% of them, if they remain symptomatic, will go on to conventional
cholecystectomy. Surely, there will be an added cost for that 80%" (Polk 1989:170)
Surgeons claimed a lead role in determining therapy for the uninformed patient, who seemed
relatively uninterested in gallbladder removal (Polk 1989). Thus the major perceived advantage
of ESWL was the layman's willingness to be exposed to 'awesome machine rather than
submitting to elective surgery, regardless of its simplicity. The layman cannot evaluate the
alternatives, however and looks to the professional for guidance. We shall have abdicated our
responsibility if we yield to the more 'attractive' choice without insisting on careful evaluation of
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this new experimental approach to the management of gallstones. Langenbuch's admonition
'they have busied themselves with the product of the disease, not the disease itself', may again
prove correct." (Javitt 1988:11). Consequently the focus of clinical trials on stone clearance and
symptom alleviation was misplaced ! Such major issues had been obscured by destructive and
distracting professional competition over ESBL (Johnson 1990a)
Such competitive pressures created a sense of urgency within the surgical community, making
them more receptive to innovations. Despite the existence of both physical (fibreoptics, video,
electrocautery, laser, endoscopes) and cultural (gastroenterologists, gynaecologists, urologists
and orthopaedics had expanded these techniques from diagnosis into therapy) elements
regarding endoscopy, general surgeons had no social or political will to embrace it, even
resisting attempts to introduce laparoscopy into acute appendicitis (Gelijns and Rosenberg;
Rosenberg et al 1995). Eventually, however, environmental pressures were so great that
surgical experimentation, in the form of laparoscopic cholecystectomy, was adopted by the
wider community (Gelijns and Rosenberg 1995)
In laparoscopic cholecystectomy four small (1cm) incisions are made, through which surgical
instruments and a laparoscope are inserted. The laparoscope is basically a miniature camera
attached to an endoscope which projects colour images to a monitor, and this is used to
visualise the operation which occurs within the body (Gelijns and Rosenberg; Rosenberg et al
1995, Perrissat 1993). The smaller incisions reduced recovery times and accelerated return to
normal activity, although the estimates of these constantly change. e.g. day surgery or 3 days
inpatient stay, overnight recovery, or 2 weeks. This reduction in incision related morbidity meant
that surgery on more fragile groups was possible, and changed the cost-benefit ratio in decision
making around surgery (Fromm et al 1990). Essentially the surgery removes the gallbladder
through 4 small punctures using laparoscopic devices instead of a single large incision using
standard surgical implements.
Various clinicians have claimed ownership of the laparoscopic cholecystectomy innovation
(Harris 1993, Ross 1991, Rosenthal 1989, Ferriman 1992, Hughes 1996, Harris 1993).
Laparoscopic cholecystectomy was described in an obscure German journal in 1985 (Russell
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1994, Berggren et al 1996), whilst experimental work occurred elsewhere (Cuschieri 1990).
Mouret, in France, is generally credited with performing the first laparoscopic cholecystectomy in
March 1987, although this was not widely publicised. Mouret's innovation was essentially to
transfer a technology from gynaecology into general surgery, eased by his being a surgeon in
both specialisms, and experienced in mini cholecystectomy (Russell 1994) and laparoscopic
appendectomy (Dubois et al 1991). The following year it was almost simultaneously repeated in
France by Dubois (Wetter and Way 1991), Perissat (Dubois et al 1991), and Reddick, Olsen and
Schultz in the US (Stoney 1991, Wetter and Way 1991, Way 1990, Dubois et al 1991). Early
publications were met with skepticism (Perrissat 1993), shock and disbelief (Perissat and Vitale
1991, Gelijns and Rosenberg; Rosenberg et al 1995, Russell 1994). Had it not been for the
extremely competitive environment into which laparoscopic cholecystectomy was received, it
would simply have been an interesting aside in experimental surgery (Boyce and Lightdale 1991,
Stoney 1991, Gelijns 1991).
Diffusion of laparoscopic cholecystectomy was faster in the US than in the UK, where there was
less competition, fewer resources and a more conservative attitude (Gelijns and Rosenberg;
Rosenberg et al 1995, Morreti 1991). Laparoscopic cholecystectomy appealed to most major
stakeholders and decision makers. Surgeons and hospitals feared competition, manufacturers
strenuously competed for market share, financiers enthused over reduced unit costs of surgery
(Meyer 1992a, Conway 1990, Fowkes and Gunn 1980, Graves et al 1991, Anonymous 1992L),
and patients sought surgery which was quicker, less invasive, more cosmetically pleasing and
allowed them to return to normal activity faster. The technology had relatively low start up costs,
and was concentrated within the surgical units, requiring little capital expenditure and few tiers of
decision making (Gelijns and Rosenberg; Rosenberg et al 1995, Scott-Conner 1994), enabling
surgeons to exercise power over managers (Lilley 1994).
At first older gynaecological instruments were adopted for laparoscopic surgery (Stenning 1995,
Straface 1995, Dubois et al 1991, Conway 1990). The surge in demand caught manufacturers
by surprise (Chow 1990, WasteII 1991, Anonymous 1991L), and investors rushed into the
market, perceiving a surge in the volume of cholecystectomies as they became cheaper and
less painful (Shenol 1990). Manufacturers and surgeons worked closely together, generating
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streams of innovations and alterations (Gelijns and Rosenberg; Rosenberg et al 1995, Gelijns
1991, Goldsmith 1990, Soper et al 1994, Anonymous 1996g, Voyles 1993, Hunter 1992, Smith
et al 1993) which still continue (Ferriman 1992). The market was characterised by rapid change
and quick obsolescence, and manufacturers encouraged the application of the laparoscope into
new areas (of the body, and locations where surgery could be done) (Lumsden, Ross 1991).
Manufacturers invested heavily in research, development and training (Poletti 1992, Lumsden,
Reese 1992), vigorously promoting themselves to surgeons through promotional trivia. e.g.
surgical drapes (Anonymous 19910, Ross 1991). Subsidised training was an essential tool for
manufacturers, organising video conferences allowing surgeons face to face trustworthy contact
with major surgical opinion leaders, and thus accelerated information dissemination: "We are
not specifically promoting products in these efforts... Our interest is in opening a dialogue with
opinion leaders and in reducing the usual lag time in getting new procedures adopted." (Ross
1991 p54). Such industry influence was apparent at the NIH consensus conference on
laparoscopic cholecystectomy, where manufacturers promoted themselves (Jacoby and Scott
1993) to the praise of clinicians: 'We must remember that without industry, laparoscopy would
be technically back in the 1980s." (Traverso 1996a:133)
The media was central in promoting laparoscopic cholecystectomy, and thus stoking public
interest and enthusiasm (Zuccaro 1990), although it was reliant on information from
manufacturers and surgeons (Anonymous 1993k). e.g. "Such key hole surgery was heralded in
the lay press, and by physicians marketing their wares and abilities." (Thomas 1995:487).
Laparoscopic surgery was portrayed as a panacea ('keyhole', 'minimally invasive', 'band aid',
'nintendo surgery), billed as being quick, painless and safe (Soper et al 1994, Foreman 1990),
being little more complex than having a tooth pulled (Wright 1990, Anonymous 1990b), and
conducted by surgeons of the video generation (Satava 1992). The technology was seen as part
of a revolution (Banta 1993, Wickham 1994, Fowler 1995), encouraging patients to seek out this
'easier' operation (Johnson 1996). Laparoscopic cholecystectomy became, for consumers as
well as producers, fashionable (Dover 1993). e.g. the CEO of US Healthcare HMO stated "You
could interpret this to say that somehow getting your gallbladder out will make you beautiful"
(Ochs 1993 p24). Both hospitals and surgeons were afraid of being marginalised if they did not
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adopt laparoscopic cholecystectomy (Marano 1991, Vierra 1995, Traverso 1996a, Moody;
Gelijns 1992, Escarce 1996,  Hayes 1990, Smith et al 1992, Johnson 1997, Fromm et al 1990).
Adoption was also related to prestige (Groves 1990), marketing (Meyer 1992b), accreditation
and litigation (Wagner 1990).
Whilst surgeons blamed patients for the rapid adoption of laparoscopic cholecystectomy
(Mowschenson 1993, Banta 1993), they encouraged them (in the UK) to have the procedure
funded privately. BUPA, the UKs primary private health insurer, originally treated laparoscopic
cholecystectomy as a Complex Major Operation, and paid a fee just below the level of major
heart surgery (twice that of the fee for open cholecystectomy). But in November 1991 they
downgraded it to the rate of open cholecystectomy, causing private waiting lists to develop, and
forcing BUPA to reupgrade. Such practices encouraged the Monopolies and Mergers
Commission to investigate the area of medical fees (Diliner 1992). There was thus a significant
financial incentive for surgeons to adopt laparoscopic cholecystectomy, and this urgency led
them to press hospitals to purchase laparoscopic sets (Stoney 1991).
The commercialised US system was quick to realise the possibilities of accelerated surgery
(Banta 1993). Hospitals feared the development of outpatient based surgical care (Carney 1991,
Ogg et al 1989), based on laparoscopic technologies, funded by risk capital (Henderson 1992),
and fostered by financiers pressure (Lumsden 1992, Poliner 1991). Such moves were slower in
the UK (Beech and Morgan 1992), but accelerated with the introduction of the internal market
(embracing day surgery (Hermes 1993)) and encouraging GPs to conduct more outpatient
surgery (Bryan 1995)). Additionally, by the 1990s some 10% of the UK population was privately
insured for certain elective procedures (Anonymous 1989a), regarded as consumer services
(Wood 1987), accounting for some 25% of elective surgery (Hughes 1996). Despite this, the UK
private market was overbedded, being capable of performing some 25000 more operations
annually than it in fact did (Anonymous 1989a), encouraging it to adopt laparoscopic
cholecystectomy more rapidly than the NHS (Hughes 1996). Thus in both the UK and the US
laparoscopic cholecystectomy rapidly, and prematurely (Roan 1990b), passed into common
practice (Russell 1994, Gelijns and Dawkins 1994, Anonymous 1991L, Wilson et al 1991), whilst
174
being considered experimental (Lumsden 1992), without controlled evaluations (Anonymous
1991L) or the involvement of surgical leaders (Stoney 1991).
The laparoscopic revolution, led by laparoscopic cholecystectomy, was perceived as reordering
the division of labour in the gastrointestinal tract: 'General surgeons have lagged behind their
colleagues in urology and gynaecology in embracing endoscopic surgery, which is one reason
why gastroenterologists have been able to climb all over the bile duct during the last decade.
We are about to witness a new shake-out of turf. '(Cotton et at 1991:96).
Laparoscopic cholecystectomy placed general surgeons at the forefront of technological
innovation, spawning viable competition with other professional groups (Nagy et al 1992). It was
quickly predicted that 80% of surgery would be done laparoscopically (Johnson 1996), and
laparoscopy was rapidly applied to other forms of surgery (Bowen 1993, Johnson 1997,
Cuschieri 1990), supported by the medical device industry. Such innovations were not guided
by evidence of clinical efficacy, causing inappropriate and unnecessary application (Nagy et al
1992, Treacy and Johnson 1995, Anonymous 1991h, Hall 1991, Kingman 1991, Anonymous
1992m, Hirsch and Hailey 1995), that was often less efficacious than the surgery it replaced
(Lawrence et al 1996, Lawrence 1996a, McKee 1995). The vigour with which they were adopted
and experimented with suggests a cultural shift within general surgery, and the establishment of
status hierarchies based on innovativeness. A flavour of this can be seen in the following quote:
'...1993 to 1994. ..The laparoscopy master continued to mesmerise, surprise, fantasize, futurize,
and keep charging into the brave new world of laparoscopes and gadgets to demonstrate by
delicate finesse and sheer guts the power of performing intricate procedures within the
abdominal cavity. Every conceivable abdominal and pelvic urological procedure was attempted
and elegantly reported in several series...' (Thomas 1995:487).
Surgeons jealousy guarded laparoscopic cholecystectomy, as the emblem of their new found
skill: 'Laparoscopic surgery has finally moved out of the pelvis, as performed by the
gynecologist, into the abdomen proper - the province of the general abdominal surgeon. '(Boyce
and Lightdale 1991:92). They adopted the term 'minimally invasive' from radiologists, urologists
and orthopaedists, but differentiated themselves by renaming it 'minimal access surgery'
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(Monson 1993, Johnson 1997), asserting that only experienced general surgeons should
perform laparoscopic cholecystectomy (Spiro 1992a, Classen 1990): 'Along these lines, it must
be emphasised that only a surgeon experienced in operating on the billiary tree should be
performing laparoscopic cholecystectomy. Gynecologic surgeons or other specialists who know
how to perform laparoscopy but lack such training have no business removing the gallbladder
through the laparoscope. ' (Miller 1990:1523).
The endoscope was a key technology, and general surgeons fought vigorously with endoscopic
gastroenterologists over it. Surgeons claimed traditional pre-eminence in any invasive
procedure, whilst endoscopists cited their training and experience (Silen 1985). The general
surgeons professional association, the Society for Surgery of the Alimentary Tract, was charged
with professionalising the laparoscopic surgeon as a trained specialist, and standard bearer, for
general surgery (Kelly 1994), whilst the American Society for Gastrointestinal Endoscopy issued
guidelines to stop surgeons using endoscopes, claiming that 'In few instances is it possible for 2
busy groups as widely divergent in personalities as surgeons and gastroenterologists to share
with any degree of equanimity a single endoscopy suite' (Achord 1984:323)
Gastroenterologist endoscopists trumpeted their success in forcing surgeons to adopt
laparoscopy, abandoning their large (prestigious) incisions: 'It is interesting that our surgical
colleagues have for years chided gastroenterologists when we recommended diagnostic
laparoscopy by saying. Why would we want to look through the keyhole when we can open the
door?' Even the most staunch surgical antilaparoscopists of the past several decades will soon
be using the 'keyhole' approach rather than the 'open door' approach for cholecystectomy.'
(Boyce and Lightdale 1991:93-94). Similarly "Our general surgery colleagues would be forced to
learn laparoscopic surgery to maintain their share of the gallbladder market." (Thomas
1995:487) and further: "The patient is more concerned with...the illness than the satisfaction
some surgeons of that generation derived in claiming, "I do not enter through windows. I enter
through doors." (Udwadia 1992:287)
Gastroenterologists and surgeons levelled criticism at the American Academy of Family
Practitioners, which sponsored courses teaching general practitioners endoscopic techniques.
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Exchanges were often spiteful and bitter (Powers 1993). e.g. '...one can only guess what will
come next: echocardiology, bronchoscopy, cystoscopy, cardiac catheterisation ? It is not
inconceivable that physicians misdirected into believing that a 'short course' can substitute for
the blend of procedural and cognitive skills needed to appropriately diagnose and treat patients
with gastrointestinal conditions or to deal with the potential complications of endoscopic
procedures, might attain high enough titers of self deception to believe that any diagnostic and
/or therapeutic procedures might fall within their purview, even laparoscopic cholecystectomy.
(Chobanian et al 1993:329).
The American College of Gastroenterologists (ACG) provided a menacing memo to managerial
and professional staff in hospitals, detailing the legal risks of liability they faced if they allowed an
inadequately trained clinician to perform endoscopic procedures, and pressed the AMA to
endorse these training and standards guidelines. 'By taking this vigorous stand, all of us in the
gastroenterological community may be accused of attempting to restrain trade. Nothing could be
further from the truth.' (Chobanian et al 1993:330). Such unconvincing statements were
buttressed: '...this position is about ensuring the adequacy in physician training that all patients
deserve, not about medical 'turf." (Chobanian et al 1993:330)
Similarly, gastroenterologists argued forcefully that surgeons training courses were merely an
introduction to endoscopic techniques (Powers 1993, Boyce and Lightdale 1991, Cotton et al
1991, Gandolfi and Orlandi 1990). e.g. a Director of Gastroenterology commented '"You don't
want to be a doctor's first laparoscopic cholecystectomy patient." ' (Ondrusek 1993:28)).
Gastroenterologists further argued that laparoscopic cholecystectomy was being applied
inappropriately, to patients without gallbladder disease, since symptoms could be confused. e.g.
irritable bowel syndrome. e.g. a professor of gastroenterology observed: ' "Here's what's
happening now that it has become so easy to remove the gallbladder through a laparoscope:
The doctor says, 'Gee you've got a little belching and you've got some indigestion, maybe it's
your gallbladder. Let's take out your gallbladder--it's so easy to do now--and see if you get
better." 'Such observations reinforced his statement that: '"...There's a kind of triumphalism in
medicine that says, 'if doctors can do something easily, then they should go ahead and do
(Anonymous 1993e:11)
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The innovation and diffusion of laparoscopic cholecystectomy was led by frightened community
surgeons working with manufacturers. Older surgeons were seen as incapable of laparoscopic
surgery: '...some surgeons find the technique too difficult or too time consuming for their
practices.' (Tompkins 1990:1245), and were discouraged from pursuing it (Meyer 1992a). The
surgical establishment, and older surgeons generally, were sceptical and hostile to laparoscopic
cholecystectomy (Perrissat 1993), and its symbolic challenge to their leadership (Banta and
Luce 1993, Johnson 1996, Conway 1990, Lumsden 1992, Stoney 1991), rejecting it as simple
fashion (Fendrick et at 1992): 'It is important to decide whether surgeons have made a major
advance or are under the socio-economic tyranny of surgical technology.' (Johnson 1997:631).
Laparoscopic cholecystectomy's applicability (Anonymous 1991e), safety and efficacy were
questioned (Olsen 1993), whilst some surgeons tried to accelerate open cholecystectomy's
surgery times, to compete with laparoscopic cholecystectomy (Moss 1996), whilst others
promoted minilaparotomy (miniature incision) cholecystectomy as an alternative (Russell 1994)
(using a small incision to conserve muscle tissue). Mini cholecystectomy was promoted in the
UK, where it was promoted as being simpler, safer and more efficacious (Chung and Broughan
1992, Baxter 1992). Proponents argued 'We believe it is unethical to allow patients to dictate
that they want laparoscopic cholecystectomy when we are unable to guarantee that this
operation is safer than minilap cholecystectomy. More effort should be put into improving the
minilap technique rather than bypassing it' (Baxter 1992:560)
Supporters claimed laparoscopic cholecystectomy was revolutionary (Cooperman 1993),
arguing: ' "Surgeons applaud large incisions and denigrate keyhole surgery. Patients, in
contrast, want the smallest wound possible, and we are convinced that patients are right." ...it
was no longer appropriate for surgeons to be "trained as butchers and carpenters". '(McKee
1995:T36). Adopters viewed themselves as having a new attitude towards surgery: "What we
have dubbed Band-Aid cholecystectomy and others have called minicholecystectomy
emphasises an attitude and approach to cholecystectomy...that has the goal of early feeding,
early ambulation, and dismissal 24-72 hours postoperatively.' (Cooperman et al 1989:1368)
Mini cholecystectomy was swept aside by 'Laparoscopic fever' (Baxter 1992), and the:
'Increasingly rigid belief of many surgeons that laparoscopic cholecystectomy is unassailable'
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(Baxter 1992:560). There was a general perception that if surgeons did not embrace
laparoscopic cholecystectomy, then others would: "General surgeons must approach the
procedure and this particular device with an open mind. Refusing to accept its efficacy or its
place in biliary tract surgery will certainly propel it into the hands of our brethren in other
disciplines in medicine, to the detriment of our patients and our practice." (Baker 1988:273).
Similarly: 'Nonetheless the benefits to our patients with this new approach are real and marked
to such an extent as to dictate that 'old dogs must learn new tricks...or perish" (Cuschieri
1990:347). Thus, whilst laparoscopic cholecystectomy diffused rapidly to frightened surgeons
(Anonymous 1993f, Johnson 1997), future surgeries would have to be considered more strictly:"
...We can hope that with the further expansion and application of laparoscopy, critical analysis of
prospective trials on the outcome of such procedures will be accomplished before reliable
techniques or procedures of the immediate past are abandoned.' (Wolfe et al 1991:1574)
However, such wishes (Pearson 1994) were not realised. Development occurred in
informational vacuums, data was not collected (and often concealed), technology assessment
was weak, and criteria for application and execution were poorly developed. General surgeons
were proud to again be the leaders in introducing new surgical techniques, although this tended
to obstruct critical analysis and honest reporting of results (Nagy et al 1992). Although
laparoscopy was not applied generally as quickly as it had been in laparoscopic
cholecystectomy (Hirsch and Hailey 1995), it was used in some areas with even less surgical
control e.g. kidney removal, lung biopsy and appendectomy (Meyer 1992b). Thus: "That almost
all abdominal surgery can be performed by technically adept surgeons on a naive and eager
public has been amply demonstrated. What remains to be seen is how far these techniques can
responsibly be extended, what benefits they yield, and whether they can be made cost effective.'
(Vierra 1995:156)
Meanwhile lithotripsy had not proved as promising as anticipated (Mori et al 1992, Weingart
1995), requiring several treatments and prolonged drug therapy, making it as expensive as
surgery (Fromm et al 1990). However, it required no inpatient stay and enabled an immediate
return to full activity (Carr 1988, Smith et al 1994, Charig et al 1986, Hogerstown 1986). In
October 1989 the FDA rejected approval for 2 lithotripters, since they were ineffective at the
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intensity allowed in the US, and could only fragment small stones (Cotton et al 1991, Bowen
1993, Chow 1990, Eisenberg 1990, Zuccaro 1990). By 1990 most research ceased in view of
the laparoscopic revolution (Gelijns 1991, Wasowicz 1988, Bankhead 1988), with ESBL being
constructed as an adjunct modality for difficult cases (Petersen 1990, Go et al 1995), along with
chemical therapy which was similarly marginalised (Jakiche and Carey 1995).
Gastroenterologists continued to argue that ESBL was superior to laparoscopic cholecystectomy
(Fromm 1992), but overall its history was seen as a "triumph of technology over reason"
(Foreman 1990:3), based on the fact that "We love technology. Myself included." (Dr. Randolph
B. Reinhold, vice-chairman of surgery at New England Medical Center)) (Lehman 1990:31).
Such passions were not denied with the emergence of laparoscopic cholecystectomy: '"One
glamorous technology strikes out,... and an even more glamorous one comes along." '(Chow
1990:107)
This section has described the innovation of laparscopic cholecystectomy, and the way that
commercial and media influences encouraged its rapid adoption, whilst instrument shortages
and academic surgical resistance constrained it. Several clinical disputes emerged, including
that between gastroenterologists and laparoscopic general surgeons, and between general
surgeons using laparoscopic techniques and their peers who continued to advocate open
cholecysectomy or mini-laparoscopic cholecystectomy. This rapid diffusion, however, occurred
largely in the absence of technology assessment or surgical training, as the following section
illustrates.
5 Uncovering the Problems of Laparoscopic Cholecysectomy
Surgeons are largely unregulated. There is little independent assessment of surgical processes
and care, and even legal threats have limited potency since surgeons are often called upon to
judge each other. Surgeons' competence is judged by experience, training and accrediting, but
mostly by the confidence they have in themselves and that other surgeons have in them
(Anonymous 1991j).
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Theoretically the relevant medical speciality would formulate standards, sponsor training
programs and control the accrediting of surgeons (Goldman; Frazier and Mosteller 1995).
However, in the US some 36 professional associations produced 1500 training guidelines
(Koska 1991, Sauerbruch 1991, Holohan 1991), partly in an attempt to claim ownership of
laparoscopic cholecystectomy. These standards were often voluntary and limited, with
competing groups refusing to be bound by each others rules (Faivelson 1992, Meyer 1992b).
The American Board of Surgery was secretive about its requirements (Achord 1984), and the
American College of Surgery insisted that the duty of accrediting surgeons was the duty of
individual hospitals (Meyer 1992a).
Similar patterns were reproduced in the UK, although professional competition was not so
apparent. The Royal College of Surgeons made a useful statement regarding training in 1990,
but did nothing to enforce it, and lacked the facilities to achieve training. In part this reflected
Fellows' resistance to being liable for each others' practice (Critchley et al 1987), supported by
the Royal College of Surgeons' (RCS's) assertions that its members were trained professionals
who decided for themselves what they were capable of (Toynbee 1995). However, education
and training standards remained vague (Banta 1993). Consequently there were large variations
in the indications, contraindications, equipment, methods, and accrediting criteria used in
laparoscopic holecystectomy (Moon et al 1993), both nationally and internationally.
Manufacturers and innovative surgeons (Cuschieri 1990, Wright 1990) quickly established
subsidised or profitable short courses (Stoney 1991, Montague 1995, Goldsmith 1990, Voyles
1993, Sylvester 1995a, Chung and Broughan 1992, Laurence 1994, Meyer 1992b). Few courses
applied for official endorsements (Poliner 1991), produced no formal accreditation (Sylvester
1995b), and were not overseen (Meyer 1992a), creating anxiety, even within the surgical
community. Thus: ' "The problem of credentialing remains unsolved. A 2 days course that
includes removing the normal gallbladder of a pig or two would not qualify a surgeon to do a
laparoscopic cholecystectomy on grandmother, but this may be happening in some hospitals."'
(Stoney 1991:683). Or: '"It's the four-pig technique...You operate on four pigs. If they live, you
graduate." (Meyer 1992a:E1). Similarly: '.... in the mad dash hundreds of others thought they
could learn by a couple of days of sitting next to Nelly. "It was see one, do one, teach one," says
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one surgeon, appalled at how some of his colleagues took up keyhole techniques with virtually
no training.' (Toynbee 1995). Surgeons' ebullient confidence enabled them to rapidly change
roles from student to teacher: 'Surgeons nervously joke about colleagues who started teaching
soon after attending a course or who started doing the new gallbladder operation after reading a
manual.' (Meyer 1992b pE1). Meanwhile, surgeons cited the complexity of laparoscopic
cholecystectomy (Poulin et al 1992). as a basis for their high fee claims (Goldman; Frazier and
Mosteller 1995)
Theoretically, surgeons would graduate from these short courses, and then assist in several
operations, before commencing operations under the supervision of an experienced surgeon
(Chung and Broughan 1992). In the UK proctors, who spent time at the trainee's hospital, acted
as the accrediting agency for the Royal College of Surgeons (1), whilst in the US such a role
was played by the hospital's chief of surgery. However, such controls were often bypassed
(Stoney 1991), due to the shortage of experienced surgeons. There were many incidences of
surgeons being essentially self taught (2), believing that the surgical tradition of 'see one, do
one, teach one' was applicable to laparoscopic surgery (Anonymous 1993e): 'Pierre Guillou,
professor of surgery at Leeds University, says: "At the beginning some surgeons assumed they
could cope because they had plenty of experience of conventional surgery. But that is like flying
a jumbo jet on a driving licence." ' (Sylvester 1995a:5)
Both the surgical establishment, and many surgical innovators, expressed concern at the rapid
diffusion of laparoscopic cholecystectomy (Boyce and Lightdale 1991, Thomas 1991). Thus:
"....it was cholecystectomy that captured the imagination of the surgical world and put the
spotlight on laparoscopic surgery. Unfortunately, in this age of media blitz and show biz, such a
bright spotlight is reason for considerable qualms amongst those who seriously pursue
laparoscopic surgery as a new method on trial. It is a frightening possibility that, driven by the
necessity of growing patient demand, the egotism of 'being there', the lure of financial return, or
the push by instrument manufacturers, a large number of surgeons not trained or qualified for
the great demands of laparoscopic surgery will flood the field, with discredit to the procedure
and danger to the patient. There is a trend for surgeons who are not conversant with
laparoscopy to team up with gynaecologists (or even worse, internists) with intent to perform
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laparoscopic cholecystectomy. Here the surgeon has no experience in laparoscopy and the
gynecologist has no experience in cholecystectomy. This certainty is not the ideal situation,
although it is being practised in the USA, and is reminiscent of the school-time story of the lame
man riding on the shoulders of the blind man in a symbiosis of infirmity." (Udwadia 1992 p287).
Surgeons rushed to learn the new technique (AMA 1987a7), with some 15000 US surgeons
undertaking training in 2 years (Gelijns and Rosenberg; Rosenberg et al 1995): "This rapid
retraining for a new technique is unparalleled in surgical history.' (Fitzgibbons 1993:331).
Traditionally surgical training was based on personal supervision, but few surgeons could
undertake laparoscopic cholecystectomy (Smith 1994), and there was an early shortage of
equipment (3) (Monson 1993). Training was unregulated and chaotic (Soper et al 1994, Gelijns
and Rosenberg; Rosenberg et al 1995, Rosenthal 1989). In the UK it was introduced without
formal control, with 30% of surgeons being self taught, and being described as the '"biggest
unaudited free-for-all in the history of surgery" ' (Johnson 1997:633). This rush was associated
with increased rates of injury to the bile duct, although such injuries may be more related to the
technique than to the surgeons' experience.
The common bile duct transfers bile from the liver to the intestine. Damage to the bile duct can
cause dangerous infections and inflammation, and repaired ducts usually narrow, leading to
chronic illness, liver failure and possibly death. The direct viewing of the duct in open
cholecystectomy means there is low incidence of injury, and enables quick repair of any such
injuries. However, during laparoscopic cholecystectomy the bile duct can be mistaken for the
cystic duct, which flows into it, and which must be cut to remove the gallbladder. Such injuries
can be easily missed, causing the duct not to be immediately repaired (Wolfe et al 1991).
Stones can also become trapped in the bile duct. In open cholecystectomy these can be
removed during the operation, either using choledochotomy or endoscopic clearance.
Laparoscopic cholecystectomy's equivalent, operative cholangiography, is technically difficult
and has lower success rates, meaning that patients must undergo subsequent endoscopic
clearance procedures (Meyer 1992a, Fletcher 1995, Scott-Coombs and Thompson 1991).
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Evidence emerged of high complication rates associated with laparoscopic cholecystectomy
(Anonymous 1993k, Moon et al 1993, Faivelson 1993, Ransohoff and McSherry 1995), related
to bile duct injuries (Johnson 1997) or punctures to the major blood vessels (Ondrusek 1993).
These were much more serious than the more common complications related to open
cholecystectomy and its large incision (Holohan 1991, Johnson 1996). Such risks were
exacerbated by surgeons undertaking more difficult cases (Klepitsch 1992) and being resistant
to converting to open cholecystectomy, which they viewed as evidence of an embarrassing
technical failure (Faivelson 1992, Faivelson 1992, Wolfe et al 1991)
The common explanation, tactfully phrased as 'the learning curve', was that surgeons were
training on patients (Anonymous 1992d, Goldman; Frazier and Mosteller 1995, Gelijns and
Rosenberg; Rosenberg et al 1995, Spiro 1992a). The extent of this was difficult to gauge, since
usually no records of mortality or morbidity rates were kept, trials were done on small series's,
there was no centralised reporting system (Chung and Broughan 1992), surgeons did not report
complications (Soper et al 1994, Soper et al 1992, Chung and Broughan 1992), and patients
were quickly discharged or transferred elsewhere. Complication and conversion rates were
higher than most published reports (Steele et al 1995), being concentrated in community
hospitals (Rosenthal 1989).
It was unknown whether these problems related to poor surgeons, a poor technique, or the
learning curve (Ransohoff and McSherry 1995). Surgeons claimed open cholecystectomy had
higher complication rates (Bramhall et al 1996), mostly related to the incision (Conway 1990,
Anonymous 1991L), with large uncontrolled surgical studies producing impressive results
(Anonymous 1991L, Anonymous 1992f), but the reliability of these was dubious.
A media storm enveloped laparoscopic surgery (Wolfe et al 1991). In the UK several
laparoscopic surgery accidents gave rise to high profile medical litigation cases, and the
organisation of a public campaign for surgical regulation (McKee 1995, Wilkins and Frost 1995,
Reilly 1995, Sylvester 1995ab, Gordon et al 1995), drawing attention to patients' lack of
knowledge concerning surgeons (Eggleston et al 1995). Surgeons rarely revealed their
qualifications or skills (Westmacott 1993), and were not legally or ethically required to do so
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(Meyer 1992b). Surgeons decried such unnecessary disclosures, with a general surgery chief
arguing ' "How would we get any beneficial new procedure out there if we had to tell patients
we're doing our first one?" ' (Meyer 1992a:E1)
Some private hospitals restricted surgeons from performing laparoscopic surgery unless they
were accredited from certain courses, and anecdotal evidence existed of NHS Trust hospitals
preventing surgeons from performing laparoscopic procedures, or even suspending surgeons
who had previously experienced problems with it (4). In the US the New York State Department
of Health uncovered a 2% rate of serious complications associated with laparoscopic
cholecystectomy (using its almost unique Injury Reporting System to correlate otherwise
disparate incidences (Meyer 1992b, Anonymous 1993e, Faivelson 1992). A State Advisory
issued in 1992 (Faivelson 1992), defined minimum standards of training for laparoscopic, being
the first surgery the state ever regulated. Ominously, for surgeons, the standards were the ones
of the Society of American Gastrointestinal Endoscopic Surgeons (Faivelson 1992). Surgeons
reacted to their loss of definitional control, viewing the incident as 'a 'wake-up call'." (Green
1992). Meanwhile, in the UK, ministers considered establishing an agency to regulate surgery,
similar to those overseeing drugs and devices (Wilkins 1995, Laurance 1995, Anonymous
1991j), whilst the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists criticised the poorly
controlled introduction of minimal access surgery (McKee 1995), and issued its own guidelines
on performing laparoscopic operations (Sylvester 1995b).
The Royal College of Surgeons, fearing a loss of control, admitted that keyhole surgery was
introduced too quickly and without proper regulation (Sylvester 1995a), and worked with
ministers to organise a comprehensive program under its control (self regulation) (Perissat and
Vitale 1991), before laparoscopic surgery and surgeons fell into public disrepute (Anonymous
1994f) whilst enabling the surgical establishment to reassert its control, and limit the splintering
of laparoscopic away from general surgeons (Satava 1992, Moody 1983, Cotton et al 1991,
Kelly 1994, Gelijns and Rosenberg; Rosenberg et al 1995). Three high profile training centres
were established (Harris 1993, Anonymous 1993d, Hermes 1995c, Traherne 1994, Hamilton
1994, Smith 1994, Houlder 1996), under the auspices of the RCS which would maintain
standards of teaching on recognised courses, supervise laparoscopic audits (Anonymous
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1994f), produce vague clinical guidelines (Anonymous 1994p, Wilkins 1995), and establish a
panel of experienced laparoscopic surgeons to formally approve surgeons who were currently
undertaking laparoscopic surgery (Schauer et al 1994, Hermes 1995c). A symbolic system was
established to control the introduction of new surgical innovations, by which the Royal Colleges
would assess a technology, and grant a code to accepted techniques, enabling them to be used
in the NHS (Hermes 1995c, McKee 1995). However, technology assessment remains a major
problem in surgery, as the experience with laparoscopic cholecystectomy demonstrates.
Surgical evaluation requires consideration of multiple physical, psychological, social and
economic aspects at different levels, each creating different ripple effects (Anonymous 1993k).
Such technology assessment is particularly hard, since surgical outcomes are dependent on the
particular surgeons' skills, the institution and the patients context (e.g. physical condition, age
etc.) (Fitzpatrick et al; Bunker et al 1977). Surgical pride, confidence, extroversion and
enthusiasm act as a strong placebo effect, and this partly accounts for the high success rates
that surgical innovators experience with new surgeries, which are not reproduced by others.
Surgery is enveloped in the placebo effect. e.g. open cholecystectomy mysteriously seemed to
cure other symptoms (Anonymous 1988b).
Trials rarely attempt to measure this placebo effect, the duration of which seems to be related to
the invasiveness of the surgery, and the presence of sophisticated or exciting machinery e.g.
lasers. An RCT comparing ESBL with cholecystectomy found the methods to be equally
effective in reducing symptoms, with ESBL having the advantage that it produced this benefit
whether it was operating or not (Nicholl et al 1992). Key hole surgery, being both less painful
and technologically new, exhibited particularly strong placebo effects, complicating assessment.
In some cases patient expectations were so high that they were disappointed to have any post
operative pain (Anonymous 1988b, Cason et al 1996). In blinded RCTs, the differences between
mini-cholecystectomy and laparoscopic cholecystectomy were debatable (McGinn et al 1995,
Barkun 1992).
Surgical RCTs are difficult to conduct, requiring large, stratified samples in many centres over
prolonged periods (Russell 1995, Anonymous 1993k). Aside from the ethics of 'dummy'
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operations, surgeons are rarely blinded effectively, and patients tend to do better under
enthusiastic surgeons (Anonymous 1991j). Surgical techniques also undergo almost continuous
change (minor variations, often in response to the patients' unique physiology) (Sisk and Ruby;
Finkel 1988)
Assessment is dependent on the co-operation of surgeons, who often deny this due to 'ethical'
concerns (Barkun et al 1992, Poliner 1991). Surgeons vigorously resisted undertaking RCTs for
laparoscopic cholecystectomy (Banta and Luce 1993), claiming they were impossible and
unethical (McMahon et al 1992, Anonymous 1993k, Cuschieri 1994). Patients were also
unwilling to be randomised, being influenced by the outbreak of "laparoscopic fever" (Baxter and
O'Dwyer 1992, Wolfe et al 1991) and vague fears of general anaesthetic, operative risks,
cosmetic appearance, hospitalisation, recovery times, and loss of wages etc (Dubois et al 1991).
RCTs could only be conducted in a narrow window, when technological change had largely
ceased, before the technology had become embedded within the medical profession, but after
surgeons had gained proficiency in open, mini and laparoscopic cholecystectomy (Cuschieri
1994). Political, economic, social, clinical and vague temporal factors meant prospective RCTs
did not occur (Cuschieri 1993, Plaiser et al 1994a, Ham 1993, Weinstein et al 1990)
Thus of the 841 articles reporting on laparoscopic cholecystectomy published between January
1987 and October 1994, 15 were randomised (3 contained 50 or more patients) (Johnson
1997), and 10 directly compared laparoscopic and open cholecystectomy (3 RCTs compared
laparoscopic and mini cholecystectomy (Johnson 1997) , with only 1 of these including over 100
patients) (Russell 1995. Such sparseness (Stoney 1991, Johnson 1996) was typical of
subsequent developments in laparoscopic surgery (Johnson 1997).
Usually, therefore, assessment was based on observational studies, often on the personal
experiences of enthusiastic surgeons concentrated at the edges of the bell curve (Anonymous
1993k, Goldman; Frazier and Mosteller 1995). It was only as experience grew with laparoscopic
cholecystectomy that it could be compared with large series' of open cholecystectomy (Tilman
and Kaiser 1992). Assessment thus fell to simple heuristics: 'Even without controlled trials, the
number of procedures performed successfully nationally have clearly established the efficacy of
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the operation. ' (Chung and Broughan 1992:190). Similarly: "Even though laparoscopic
cholecystectomy has not yet been rigorously evaluated, it already appears to have enough
advantages to tip the balance even more towards cholecystectomy and away from such
alternatives as extracorporeal shock wave lithotripsy and dissolution of the treatment of
gallstone disease." (Way 1990:1274)
A crucial factor used in promoting laparoscopic cholecystectomy was its alleged cost
effectiveness (Fromm et at 1990), since it reduced inpatient stays and outpatient recovery times
(Wenner et at 1995, Cohen et al 1996). Such estimations were sensitive to how costs and
benefits were measured, and to what degree indirect and ripple effects were considered (Cook
1994). Such issues plague cost effectiveness analysis, which seeks to objectify the subjective.
Some areas were entirely subjective (e.g. patient preferences, cosmetic appearance, patient
risk adversity), for others data did not exist (e.g. risk of bile duct injury, unknown rates of bile
duct stone retention, missed pathologies that may have been discovered by open
cholecystectomy, repeated surgery for trapped bile duct stones (Cooperman et al 1989,
Cuschieri 1990, Thompson 1991), some aspects were simply unknown or accounting issues
(e.g. cost attribution to capital or current budgets, volume of use, unit costs etc.), whilst many
were apparent clinical issues which were in fact cultural ones (e.g. cultural traditions shaped
recovery times (Lawrence 1996b, Johnson 1997, Kaag et at 1996, Doyle 1990), the rapidity of
return to work (Johnson 1997, McLauchlan and Macintyre 1995), and economic situations
structured the intensity of the work then done) (Chung and Broughan 1992, Lawrence 1994b,
Scott-Conner 1994, Cook 1994, Lawrence 1996b). Such problems are exacerbated by
environmental and technological change (Goldman; Frazier and Mosteller 1995, Kingman 1991,
Swern and Fazzalan 1995). Thus costs and benefits are limited momentary assessments, which
are highly contextually dependant.
For example, both hospitals and surgeons inflated the fees they charged for laparoscopic
cholecystectomy (Fitzgibbons 1991, Jordan 1991, Dent 1991), causing the forms of surgeries to
cost the same (Jordan 1991, Goldman; Frazier and Mosteller 1995). In addition many of the
alleged savings related to laparoscopic cholecystectomy are in fact merely the shifting of costs.
Thus as patients moved from inpatient to outpatient settings, increased care burdens were
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passed to paid or unpaid carers. The essential savings of laparoscopic cholecystectomy were
actually about shifting care from paid women workers in hospitals to unpaid women workers in
homes, and can only be considered savings if domestic labour is considered costless. Such an
assumption says more about the perspectives of analysts, clinicians and policy makers than it
does about the real costs of laparoscopic surgery. Additionally the costs of outpatient care are
further hidden in that they occur in the private domestic sphere, or in decentralised commercial
settings, where costs are relatively unknown.
Thus laparoscopic cholecystectomy was only cheaper and more effective under certain
conditions (e.g. absence of bile duct stones (Bass et al 1993, Hirsch and Hailey 1995, Barkun et
al 1992), patients selected appropriately (Zuccaro 1990), performed by a dedicated surgical
team (Hasson 1995)) (Fletcher 1995). Crucially savings could only be concretised through bed
closures (Cuschieri 1990, Stirrat J, Beech and Larkinson 1990), but such a policy was politically
difficult to implement, whether by private or public systems (Rafferty 1996, Roger 1994, Hall
1994a). Counter intuitively, hospital competition increased length of inpatient stays, since
patients and clinicians judge quality of care to be demonstrated by volume of care (Robinson et
al 1988). Such uncertainties and unpredictabilities are central to research and decision making
(Sylvester 1995a, Freemantle 1995b)
However, the introduction of laparoscopic cholecystectomy resulted in higher volumes of
patients undergoing gallbladder surgery (as mildy symptomatic patients were operated on), the
duplication of procedures for diagnosing and managing bile duct stones, increased rates of
serious complications (Cohen et al 1996), reduced the economic gains from reduced inpatient
stays and quicker return to normal life (Fletcher 1995, Steiner et al 1994, Johnson 1997).
Although 20% of abdominal operation are performed using laparoscopic techniques, there is no
evidence that these are 'better' than conventional surgery (Laurance 1995).
Numerous groups conducted technology assessments (Anonymous 1987c), but these were
generally weak, political, informal and ad hoc affairs (Weingart 1995), drawing on information
supplied from biased interests (e.g. manufacturer sponsored trials, surgeons-manufacturer
collaboration) (Scott-Conner 1994), and hence produced unsurprisingly supportive findings
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(Wagner 1991, Lumsden 1992, Faivelson 1993, Soper et al 1994, Anonymous 1992h). Findings
are often largely irrelevant to decision making (Sisk and Ruby; Finkel 1988). For example,
hospital approval committees are usually composed of clinician peers and managers reliant on
good relations with each other, and so decisions are guided by politics and economics, and not
by technical assessment (Meyer 1992b). Similarly, 'medical audit', which clinicians are often
required to undertake, (Politt 1993) is usually a voluntary internal affair, collecting little usable
data (Toynbee 1995). Thus systems at every level, from hospital department to national policy
makers fell victim to combinations of manufacturer and clinicians, who could bring political
pressure to bear on both private and public payers (Matthews 1989).
However, whatever technology assessments did or did not find, the introduction of laparoscopic
cholecystectomy dramatically increased rates of gallbladder surgery (and costs (Polk 1989,
Anonymous 1995k)) wherever it was introduced (Scwesinger and Diehl 1996, Davidson 1995,
Anonymous 19910, Johnson 1997, Anonymous 1993e, Nenner 1994 Ochs 1993 p24, Marshall
et al 1994, Ackland 1996), even whilst rates for other abdominal surgeries remained constant,
since it did not require a large incision, and so had faster recovery times. Consequently it could
be used on more groups of people (e.g. fragile, elderly (Milheiro et al 1996)), busy, complicated
cases (Dubois et al 1991), anxious (Nenner et al 1994, Anonymous 1993k), with different
indications (e.g. diagnostic, prophylactic, elective surgery). Laparoscopic cholecystectomy also
became a peripheral surgery, undertaken as part of a larger surgical procedure, or for risk
management. e.g. cancer, organ transplant, diabetes, pre-emptive operations prior to surgery,
for women of childbearing age, young children etc (Scwesinger and Diehl 1996). Thus as
surgery became simpler, organs from asymptomatic patients were increasingly removed en
passant (Banta 1993).
Patients, GPs, internists and surgeons viewed the procedure as painless, cosmetic and
convenient (Vierra 1995), altering its costs and benefits, and making referral and self referral
more likely (Sauerbruch 1991, Eggleston et al 1995). Inappropriate or equivocal
cholecystectomy was supported by a supply of new entrants, under-utilised surgeons and
generous fees , with growth being more rapid in the commercial sector (Shaper et al 1996)
(despite surgeons frowning on economic issues as 'pedestrian' (Voyles 1993:472) than capped
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systems where surgeons are salaried (Pilpel et al 1992-93, Chernew et al 1997, Chernew 1997).
Essentially laparoscopic cholecystectomy could be applied to more people, for less cause,
earlier in treatment cycles (Monson 1993, Gelijns 1991).
Open cholecystectomy was undertaken mostly on sicker, older, poorer patients with worse
outcomes, whilst laparoscopic cholecystectomy patients were younger, fitter, richer and whiter,
exhibiting good outcomes, and mostly being women (Vierra 1995, Escarce et al 1995b). Whilst
open cholecystectomy was undertaken generally as a necessary surgery, laparoscopic
cholecystectomy became elective, optional or even peripheral, moving from a definitive therapy
into a stage of the diagnostic process, or being a prophylactic procedure. Essentially became a
consumer service, with some prestige attached to it through the association with cutting edge,
high tech, revolutionary surgical techniques and machines. Consequently the introduction of an
attractive new technology distorted medical practice, making care more expensive overall
(Davidson 1995).
General surgeons debated the value of such lowered thresholds. Supporters called for the
standardisation of the new, informal, indications: 'In the face of this major paradigm shift in the
management of gallstones, it seems appropriate to re-examine long standing
guidelines...Perhaps, in this new era of lower risk laparoscopic procedures, the indications for
cholecystectomy should be extended to carefully selected gallstone patients who have no
symptoms but are at risk for severe complications or even to others who have no stones but
suffer incapacitating billiary symptoms.' (Scwesinger and Diehl 1996:493)
Meanwhile others criticised such symptomless surgery (Nenner 1994): "...I want to call attention
to the occasional light-hearted decision to remove a gallbladder because lap choly is so easy. I
have seen more than a few patients in whom a combination of gallstones incidentally uncovered
at ultrasound and the ease of lap choly has led to removal of a gallbladder that might formerly
have been left alone. When I talked with them about the original symptoms, the patients did not
describe anything remotely resembling billiary colic 	 Presumably, the internist and surgeon
said to the patient something like, 'Well, you've got gallstones, and we cant seem to do very
much about your indigestion. Lets take out your gallbladder, since this is now so easy to do, and
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see if you get better. Those stones aren't doing you any good , and they could be the cause of
your trouble.'...To such physicians the notion that lap-choly may help and will do no harm
sounds vaguely Hippocratic.' (Spiro 1992a:167)
Similarly:'Most gallstones that turn up on routine "imaging" need admiration only, I think, and can
be carried about with as much harm as a rabbit's foot. But the alacrity with which "Band-Aid
cholecystectomy" is being carried out has led to the "diagnostic" lap-choly: if your belly pain goes
away after your gallbladder has been removed, your doctor was right. If your pain persists --
well, there is always the "post-cholecystectomy syndrome" to investigate (Spiro 1992b:168)
Such surgery, however, defined a patient as a cholecystectomy patient, meaning their
symptoms were framed by the disease. Thus a whole cascade of often inappropriate and
perhaps dangerous procedures would be launched, to investigate this post-cholecystectomy
syndrome (Spiro 1992b):'After a successful operation, the patient experienced a short period of
symptom relief, through a combination of postoperative analgesics and the placebo effect, but
then the symptoms returned and the gastroenterologist was called to investigate post-
cholecystectomy syndrome- requiring investigation of the common bile duct through ERCP after
a radionuclide guided ultrasound. A clear common bile duct will then be subjected to its
manometry, and perhaps a papillotomy. Hence a whole range of surgical procedures are
launched on the basis that the patient was a gallstone patient, when they displayed none of the
classic symptoms. Thus therapy would define cause. Once you are a cholecystectomy patient,
you are that for life.' (Spiro 1992a:168)
Surgeons sought to share blame for increased cholecystectomy rates with the patient (Russell
1994), whose intolerance of fatty food (a symptom associated with cholelithiasis) was seen more
as a cultural (fashion) artefact than a clinical one (Spiro 1992b). Patients became more sensitive
(Scwesinger and Diehl 1996) and more demanding of specific types of therapy: Who among us
hasn't been impressed by the fact that patients young and old stomp into our offices and insist
that the 'new scope' method be used to remove their gallbladders ?' (Perissat and Vitale
1991:408)
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In summary, laparoscopic cholecystectomy was introduced largely without either surgical or
administrative control, and it was common for surgeons to train on their early patients, with a
concomitant high rate of iatrogenisis. Academic surgery largely reasserted its control over
community surgeons when governments threatened to begin directly regulating surgical activity.
However, laparoscopic cholecystectomy was introduced with little attention to its efficacy and
cost effectiveness, and early failures to undertake technology assessments have been
compounded by expanded rates of surgery (who's value, in terms of patient outcome, is
debatable).
6 Conclusion
The example of laparoscopic cholecystectomy demonstrates several themes. General surgeons
were unwilling to adopt the tools or the techniques of inferior specialisms (gynaecology,
gastroenterology), viewing gaping wounds as a symbol of surgical prowess. Their resistance to
change had cost them many areas of surgery, as new specialisms emerged, and other groups
seized control of different organs. As general surgery declined, gallbladder surgery was one of
its last remaining areas.
Competition emerged from assorted groups of gastroenterologists and interventional
radiologists, being primarily identified with chemical therapy and lithotripsy, respectively. Such
combinations had already largely swept kidney stone surgery away in the early 1980s, and with it
the monopoly held by urology surgeons. Lithotripsy was viewed as particularly pernicious, since
radiologists were considered to have very low status, beginning, as they did, as simple
diagnostic adjuncts to surgeons.
General surgeons were acutely aware of their vulnerability to these minimally invasive therapies,
and that their hold over the gallbladder was slipping. In this environment, several surgeons
adopted laparoscopic and endoscopic tools from gynaecologists and gastroenterologists, and
applied them to cholecystectomy, producing a laparoscopic version of it.
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This surgical technique rapidly diffused throughout the surgical community, and effectively
blocked the further development of billiary lithotripsy and chemical therapies, since it was seen
as a definitive minimal access surgery. However, diffusion was entirely uncontrolled, leading to
numerous problems and conflicts regarding safety, costs, training and accrediting etc (Menon
and Marshall 1994, Toynbee 1995).
General surgeons successfully fought off attempts by gastroenterologists, endoscopists,
gynaecologists and interventional radiologists to claim laparoscopic cholecystectomy as their
own, by rushing to claim it for themselves. Surgeons also dismissed other, low technology,
alternatives from their peers, such as mini-cholecystectomy. Adoption was so rushed, however,
that many surgeons underwent minimal, if any, training, leading to an increased rate of severe
complications. The surgical community usually concealed these, but attention was drawn to this
by high profile public cases in the UK, and by the introduction of state regulation in New York
State. Academic surgeons, dismayed by their lack of role and control in the diffusion, used these
threats to the surgical community's independence to seize back control of the process, and
instigated vague guidelines and training controls.
Diffusion had been aided by a popular perception that laparoscopic cholecystectomy was
entirely beneficial. Surgeons claimed it was clinically efficacious, patients sought quicker, less
painful surgery with smaller scars, hospitals sought greater throughputs, payers sought
economies from shorter inpatient stays, and society generally was thought to benefit from
patients more rapid return to productive activity.
However, such beliefs were undermined by subsequent experience (Johnson 1997). The
complications from laparoscopic cholecystectomy, although arguably less frequent, were much
more severe, and secondary procedures had to be undertaken to remove bile duct stones.
Hospitals and surgeons increased fees and costs, reducing the savings from laparoscopic
cholecystectomy. Crucially, the perception of reduced clinical costs to the patient caused the
threshold for surgery to fall- so that it shifted from a required major operation to an almost
optional diagnostic one. The reduced inpatient time was particularly attractive to women,
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perhaps experiencing the dual responsibilities of work and domestic life. Thus micro level
benefits (quicker, cheaper surgery) (Kesteloot and Penninck 1993) produce macro level
inefficiencies (Anonymous 1994j), implying that the easier a surgery is, the stricter should be the
criteria governing its use (Davidson 1995).
Ultimately, therefore, the introduction of laparoscopic cholecystectomy has increased the
volume of surgery and costs, may have increased the volumes of morbidity and mortality, whilst
almost driving to extinction alternative therapies that may be more appropriate (Jakiche and
Carey 1995, Way 1989, Gelijns 1991, Levitt 1990, Steyer 1989, Bowen 1993).
Endnotes
1 Personal Communication- Academic General Surgeon England
2 Personal Communication General Surgeon England
3 Personal Communication- Academic General Surgeon England
4 Personal Communication- Academic General Surgeon England
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Chapter 7
Prozac: The Ma gic Bullet
1 Introduction
This final case study is concerned with Prozac, which was an antidepressant released into the
UK and the USA in the late 1980s, and which underwent very different diffusion patterns (figs 8
and 9) in the two countries. Prozac was surrounded by economic, political and ideological
issues, which strongly influenced its adoption in the USA. The key thing to note, however, is that
it was no more efficacious than previous antidepressants, but simply had a different side effect
profile and an easier dosing schedule. It was successfully promoted as being a painless
antidepressant, and it's low' clinical costs enabled it to be applied to an expanding range of
psychological variations (e.g. obsessive compulsive disorder, bulimia) and populations (e.g.
children, lifelong use etc.). The economic costs of this are, however, substantial, since Prozac is
much more expensive than its predecessors.
The argument of this chapter is that Prozac was conceptualised in a different way in the US from
the UK. US culture is generally more accepting of drug therapy, and welcomed the opportunity
to experiment with Prozac in a wide range of settings. In the process, however, Prozac was
viewed as demonstrating the importance of biological-chemistry in shaping character, and hence
individuality. Such a perspective was controversial, and generated widespread media attention
and debate (culminating in the conflict between Lilly, the FDA and the Scientologists). Prozac,
being associated with controversy, became a cultural icon, and these important social
dimensions fed into the clinical decision making process. However, in the UK, Prozac was
simply seen as a new class of antidepressant (although there was some disdain over US
reactions to it). Consequently, the nexus of decision making concerning its use remained
centred on clinicians.
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The diffusion curves reflect these differences. Thus in the US, Prozac prescription volumes
quickly responded to popular perceptions, whilst in the UK diffusion follows a much steadier path
(consonant with the classical diffusion, communication, model). The chapter argues that
Prozac's diffusion curves were influenced by 2 factors. Firstly, the definition of the drug (was it
simply a clinical antidepressant, or was it something more revolutionary, experimental and
contentious), and secondly, who were legitimate players in the decision making process
regarding its use (clinicians, patients, the general public, the media etc). The more varied the
definitions of the drug, the more varied were the groups involved, and the more sporadic would
be the diffusion curve.
Section two examines depression, which is a vague concept, and the principle drug therapies
which existed to treat it. Depression, nerves. 'nervios', anxiety, neurosis etc. are malaises which
have been addressed by different therapies which are extensively described in the medical,
sociological, anthropological and historical literature. The key point to understand from this
section is the gradual emergence of chemical therapies, produced by the pharmaceutical
industry, the conflict between behavioural and biological therapies, and the basic simplicity of the
model underlying the search for selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRI's).
Section three describes how Lilly, a drug company, developed and marketed Prozac. Lilly was
facing financial problems at the time of Prozac's release, and used rumours concerning its
usefulness to support the company's value. The drug was marketed vigorously to clinicians,
particularly GPs, and this merged with a more generalised promotion of mental disease as a de-
stigmatised biological category. The pharmaceutical industry supported both public education (to
de-stigmatise depression) and clinician training (e.g. providing GPs with simple clinical
checklists which enabled them to quickly categorise emotional variations as depression, and
prescribe standard drugs for these). Essentially, the pharmaceutical industry sponsored the
normalisation of mental illness, which could be treated by drugs, and the pathologisation of
behaviour.
Consequently, Prozac was widely applied. Section four finds that Prozac's' cost effectiveness is
at best dubious. In a similar manner to Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy, the low perceived side
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effects (clinical costs) of the drug (both for the patient and the prescriber, in terms of requiring
less monitoring) eased its utilisation, resulting in expanded application.
A central argument of this case study, is that the diffusion curve in the US was strongly
influenced by the debates sourrounding Prozac, and that these debates played some role in
creating a resistance to the drug in the UK. Section five addresses these ideological and ethical
debates, which are indirectly expressed by fractions of the psychiatry industry. Prozac slotted
into two key disputes, regarding the nature of the self, and the definition of disease and therapy.
The most basic, and highly charged, concerned the nature of individuality- whether it is
biological and chemical, or something qualitatively different, and perhaps even spiritual. Linked
to this public debate, was a more private (professional) debate between biological and
behavioural psychiatrists (favouring chemical or talk therapies, respectively). These professional
groups were themselves linked to organisational interests, such as the pharmaceutical and
counselling industries.
Section six analyses the different cultural contexts within which Prozac was received in the UK
and the USA (primarily using data derived from the mass media). The US seems to be more
change oriented, whilst the UK's cultural conservatism supports an attitude of scepticism
towards innovation, and this can be clearly seen in the countries' different rates of adoption until
1990. Prozac, as a symbol of change and individualism, became a cultural icon in the US. This
symbolism generated resistance to the drug in the UK, where it was seen as 'faddish'.
Up to this point, the study of Prozac is a fairly conventional one. Macro philosophical differences
concerning beliefs about the nature of the brain and the mind, expressed through different
professional groups (behavioural and biological psychologists), and having different emphasis
within different cultures, are challenged by the emergence of a new drug and a concerted
campaign by its producers to shift the frontier towards the chemical basis of personality.
However, the history of Prozac dramatically changes in 1990, as it faces intense criticism and
organised attacks by the Scientologists. Essentially, a multi-national counselling business fought
openly with a multi-national pharmaceutical company, aiming its criticisms at the safety of
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Prozac, whilst airing the basic ideological and professional issues which Prozac came to
symbolise. Although vindicated relatively quickly, Prozac's US sales did not recover for three
years, at a much reduced rate of growth. The Prozac story, in the US, is thus a classic story
following the paradigmatic cycle of faith, trust, betrayal and redemption, Prozac's history of
widespread endorsement as a miracle drug, followed by its condemnation as a source of
suicidal violence, largely accounts for Prozac's constrained diffusion in the US (before it is
redeemed and applied to a growing range of conditions and groups). In the UK, by contrast,
Prozac was not constructed as a miracle drug, it was not seen to push boundaries or frontiers,
and decision making regarding its use remained largely under clinician control.
The final section attempts to summarise the arguments presented in the study. The key point is
that the definition of what Prozac 'was' determined who was entitled to make decisions about its
use. In the UK it remained simply an antidepressant, which had a broader range of applications.
Consequently, the decision making around it remained centred within clinicians. In the US,
however, Prozac represented a new era, where drugs could be used to change personality, and
not simply to occasionally cope with behavioural difficulties. As such, biological psychiatry and
the pharmaceutical industry were laying claim to an expanded area of the psyche, and this
generated widespread social, professional and industrial conflict. The central argument
concerned the nature of individuality- was consciousness an expression of the spirit of the mind,
or simply the product of brain chemistry ? This highly public debate encouraged many different
groups to take part in decision making regarding Prozac's use. The debate was played out in the
media, and the decision making regarding Prozac came to parallel these debates. Essentially, it
became a consumer product in the US.
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2 Depression and its Treatment
Since Prozac was promoted as an antidepressant, this section studies depression. After briefly
attempting to categorise and define depression, the discussion analyses the chemical therapies
which existed for it, and the development of the biogenic-amine theory (which underlay the
emergence of Prozac).
Depression is considered the most common emotional (affective) disorder (Turkington 1994,
Shorter 1997, Powers 1990, Schuchman and Wilkes 1990, Bennett 1995, Shem 1997).
Numerous forms of depression have been categorised, under different rubrics and systems, and
diagnosed by varying indicators (Appleton 1997, Turkington 1994) Common categories include
major depression, atypical, chronic, seasonal and manic, although diagnosis is notoriously
difficult (Schuchman and Wilkes 1990), with subjectivity being inherent to diagnostic and
therapeutic systems (Appleton 1997) and definitions. e.g. significant appetite change, fatigue
(Inman 1994b).
Depression is thus an extremely dubious and vague concept, with categories appearing and
disappearing, and diagnostic thresholds shifting over time. Experiences and behaviours become
redefined as forms of depression or anxiety, and particular groups become identified with
particular 'diseases' and 'therapies'. e.g. women, anxiety and insomnia (Ettorre et al 1994,
Ettorre and Riska 1993, Bower 1991). In the tradition of madness being associated with art,
depression can even become a status symbol. e.g. the cultural glorification of depressed women
as love goddesses, and the fashionable status of suicide e.g. Judy Garland, Sylvia Plath, Marilyn
Munroe etc (Wheelwright 1995). Depression, therefore, is a concept amenable to social
redefinition.
The main classes of chemical antidepressants are the tricyclics, selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitors (SSR1s), monoamine oxidase inhibitors (MA01s), and a heterogeneous group termed
the heterocyclics (trazodone, bupropion) (Shem 1997). Their effectiveness is generally similar,
and clinicians' main concerns are side effects and safety profiles (Shem 1997, Revicki 1997)
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Monoamine oxidase inhibitors (MA01s) can be severely toxic in combination with other
chemicals, many of which are found in common foods, and patients are thus required to adhere
to a specific diet (Shem 1997, Turkington 1994, Brooke 1994). Consequently, they are rarely
considered as a first line antidepressant (Appleton 1997). Newer European MAOls are much
safer and easier to use, but liability risks and consumerism limited their application in the US
(Norden 1995).
The tricyclics usually have some form of sedating effect, cardiac toxicity, and degrees of
anticholinergic (e.g. dry mouth, constipation, difficulty urinating, confusion) side effects
(Turkington 1994, Norden 1995), and are associated with weight gain (Appleton 1997,
Freemantle 1995, Shem 1997), causing patients to abandon treatment (Angier 1990). However
such risks are often manageable (Edwards J 1995b), especially as side effects have been
reduced in newer tricyclics (Sachs 1997, Montgomery 1985, Brooke 1994). However clinicians
tend to give patients sub-therapeutic dosages, due to the small risk of suicide (Appleton 1997,
Jick et al 1995, Gram 1994, Wessely 1995). Tricyclics and heterocyclics were applied to many
conditions and were the most commonly used antidepressants for 30 years, with no others
(including the SSRIs (Bezchlibnyk-butler 1994) achieving higher efficacy (Appleton 1997)
MAOls, tricyclics and lithium were found to be effective against depression in the 1940s and
1950s (Appleton 1997, Elmer-Dewitt 1992, Anonymous 1994q, Anonymous 1990d), largely
replacing electroconvulsive therapy, amphetamine or barbituates (Anonymous 1991f), although
their mechanism was unknown. Psychologists claimed that psychotropic drugs would banish
mental illness (Anonymous 1996a), although there is no unequivocal evidence that
antidepressants prevented suicide, the major risk associated with depression (Edwards 1995).
The pharmaceutical industry anxiously sought to generate a widely effective and well tolerated
antidepressant.
In the 1950s the biogenic-amine theory of depression was developed (Kramer 1993a). It is
believed that nerve cells (neurons) communicate by sending chemical messages
(neurotransmitters or amines) across the gaps (synapses) between them. These
neurotransmitters are released by the transmitting cell into the synapse, where they carry the
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message to the receiving cell's receptor. The transmitting cell then reabsorbs the
neurotransmitter, and uses enzymes to break it down (Bronson 1987, Kramer 1993a, Trudeau
1992). A simple biomechanical model developed, that viewed excess amines as causing mania,
whilst deficiencies equated with depression (Kramer 1993a, Anonymous 1990d).
This theory is flawed, since some antidepressants work without effecting amines, there is a
significant time lag between effecting amines and effecting mood (Bezchlibnyk-Butler 1994), and
most people who are depleted of such chemicals do not develop depression (Anonymous
1994q). However, the amine theory dominates research, and has become an archetype for
other theories (Kramer 1993a, Elmer-Dewitt 1992).
Researchers on antidepressants worked on ways to increase the volume of neurotransmitters in
the brain, by inhibiting its reabsorption (e.g. tricyclics) or reducing the enzymes which break
down these amines (e.g. MA01s). It was unknown what amines effected what processes, if any,
and new amines were being continuously discovered (Bronson 1987). Consequently, drugs
affected numerous amines throughout the body, producing unpleasant and dangerous side
effects (Anonymous 1990d). Researchers worked to improve these 'dirty' drugs, reducing their
side effects or accelerating their onset of action. However, these marginal advantages were
rarely realised in practice, whilst, embarrassingly, no reliable cause-effect relationship could be
discovered. Consequently, antidepressants were prescribed on the basis of side effects. e.g.
restless patients being given sedative antidepressants (Kramer 1993a).
The two most active forms of amines were believed to be noradrenaline and serotonin
(collectively called 5-hydroxy-tryptamine or 5HT) (Anonymous 1990d). Pharmacologists believed
that MAOls effected serotonin more than tricyclics, and their greater range of efficacy implied
that serotonin was implicated in numerous conditions. Similarly, there appeared to be lower
levels of serotonin in the brains of depressed and violent individuals (Asberg et al 1986,
Bluestone and Pedersen 1988, Deveny 1988, Kramer 1993a). Serotonin's key role was first
proposed in the 1950s, and in 1963 Coppen, a biochemist-psychiatrist working for the MRC and
NHS demonstrated that serotonin could relieve depression. However, his perception was largely
ignored: ' "...I claim this was the first observation that suggested that 5-HT was important in
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depression- an idea that is now the centre of a multi-billion pound drug market. But for many
years, people said yah-boo sucks- there's nothing in this. Fashions are everything in medicine
and 5-HT was not in fashion.' "(Shorter 1997:321)
By the late 1960s the serotonin deficiency theory had become more accepted (Asberg et al
1986, Kramer 1993a). Several companies, including Lilly, (Bronson 1987, Cookson 1992) began
conducting research for a drug which could selectively effect serotonin. By reducing side effects
new conditions could be treated, and the functioning of the brain be better udnerstood (Asberg
et al 1986, Kramer 1993a).
This section has shown how the pharmaceutical industry has concentrated effort on producing
drugs which can address a progressively expanding definition of 'depression'. Depression itself
is not defined by any absolute criteria, and therefore its diagnostic shape is more a matter of
political debate than clinical objectivity. However, the definition of depression was limited by the
willingness of clinicians and patients to undergo the costs related to undertaking the treatment,
and the pharmaceutical industry sought a drug which could be more easily tolerated by these
participants in the clinical transaction. The biogenic-amine theory posited the key role of
serotonin in the etiology of depression, and the industry invested in producing a drug which
affected only serotonin (these drugs became the Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors, or
SSR1s). The following section studies Eli Lilly, whose research program produced Prozac, and
whose economic insecurity caused them to vigorously market it.
3 Eli Lilly and Prozac
Having focused on the drive to find a palatable antidepressant, the discussion now turns to Eli
Lilly, the makers of Prozac. Lilly faced extensive problems in the 1970s and 1980s, as the
company sought to restructure itself and shed the stigma surrounding Oraflex (an antiarthritic
drug which was withdrawn from the market due to its toxicity). The company's economic
problems grew in the mid 1980s, as key brands' patents expired, and this encouraged Lilly to
enthusiastically market Prozac, and seek expanded applications for the drug. The study now
turns to the development of Prozac within the context of Lilly's difficulties.
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During the 1970s Eli Lilly began to shift from being a chemical company dealing in antibiotics,
agrochemicals and cosmetics into a research based company focusing on the central nervous
system (CNS) area (Anonymous 1989c, Chu 1989). They formed a serotonin depression team
which modeled and screened compounds, eventually finding that fluoxetine oxalate effectively
blocked serotonin and little else. It was easier to work with a related compound, fluoxetine
hydrochloride, given the generic name fluoxetine (Kramer 1993a, Shorter 1997, Anonymous
1993m). Initial promising results on volunteers encouraged Lilly to seek prominent biological
psychiatrists to help test it. Private psychiatric clinics reported, in the early 1980s, that fluoxetine
was as effective in combating depression as the tricyclics, without their side effects, whilst
causing incidental weight loss. A diet drug, with antidepressant qualities, no side effects and
requiring no dietary restrictions would have a huge market (Shorter 1997)
Lilly faced many problems in the 1980s. Oraflex, an antiarthritic drug, was withdrawn amongst
considerable criticism following deaths, and Lilly pleaded guilty to withholding information from
the FDA showing that Oraflex caused liver and kidney failure (Chu 1989). Such public
humiliation is dangerous for pharmaceutical companies, whose reputation is central to their
marketing efforts (1). Lilly failed to produce any major new drugs, and came under strong
generic competition as top selling drugs came off patent (Flynn 1992). Lilly launched an
aggressive policy of buying small research companies and products (Flynn 1992, Deveny 1988),
widely and inappropriately marketing their products. e.g. the human growth hormone,
Humatrope. Lilly's growth rate fell, making it vulnerable to takeover. Lilly even promised to buy
its own shares to maintain their value (Teitelman 1988).
More generally, in the 1980s pharmaceutical companies felt their profits being pressured by
purchasers, patent expirations, and more vigorous generic competition (O'Reilly 1991, GAO
1994). Companies sought new chronic markets (O'Reilly 1991, Anonymous 1987a) and rushed
into diseases of the central nervous system and psychiatric medicine (Norden 1995). e.g.
depression, schizophrenia (Bennett 1995, Anonymous 1987a, Anonymous 1985b, Massa
1986a). Depression emerged as a major new industry. It compromised people's social and
physical functioning in much the same way as a chronic physical disease, with significant direct
and indirect economic costs (Thomas 1990, Brooke 1994, Anonymous 1990d, Appleton 1997,
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Anonymous 1991q). The psychiatry industry argued that depression was underdiagnosed (since
patients and clinicians did not recognise it) and undertreated (since side effects caused dosages
to be sub-therapeutic and therapy to be discontinued prematurely by either patients or doctors)
(Stokes 1993a, Anonymous 1994q, Anonymous 1991f, Berridge 1996, Schuchman and Wilkes
1990, Grady 1990, Talan 1990, Thomas 1990, Bryan 1992, Appleton 1997, Agnew 1996,
Haughton 1997). Depression could be conveniently and cost effectively diagnosed and treated
(Debrovner 1994, Stapert 1994, Thomas 1990), and a concerted effort was made by
pharmaceutical companies, professional bodies and even governments to encourage its
diagnosis and treatment (Shorter 1997, Manolis 1995).
A key potential market for the pharmaceutical industry was for diet drugs. Rates of obesity are
high and growing in the UK and the US (Spalding 1987, Green 1997, Bluestone and Pedersen
1988). It was linked to many diseases, seriously impaired life quality, but was difficult to treat
(Green 1995). 60% of US women dieted at some point each year, with diet pills being very
popular (Kleinfield 1986, Rosendahl 1986), and the huge market (Spalding 1987) had not been
successfully penetrated by the pharmaceutical industry (Kleinfield 1986), since existing drugs
were ineffective in the long term with unpleasant or unknown side effects (Carrell 1997). It was
anticipated that the first company to release a side effect free anti-obesity drug would be very
successful (Kleinfield 1986), and many companies had invested strongly in this area (Green
1997). Investors were far more excited (Massa 1986b, Massa 1986a) by Lilly's claims that
Prozac could be used to treat obesity (Glaser 1989, Spalding 1987, Weiss 1986) with minimal
risks (Zerbe 1987), than by its antidepressant qualities (Walsh 1987, Weiss 1986). Lilly's trials of
fluoxetine reassuringly confirmed that it was an effective antidepressant, which did not make
patients feel leaden and constipated, as tricyclics often did, but seemed to make them feel
euphoric and wired (Shorter 1997). Lilly would occasionally comment on Prozacs use as a diet
drug, causing stock prices to soar (Shorter 1997, Seligman 1987).
The stage onto which Prozac arrived was not promising. In 1981 Astra Pharmaceuticals
marketed Zelmed (zimeldine) in Europe as a drug to inhibit the reuptake of serotonin, and hence
combat depression. It was the first SSRI, but was toxic and was withdrawn 2 years later (Shorter
1997). Other drugs which effected serotonin were either unsuccessful e.g. Desyrel (trazodone),
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fluvoxamine (which was unsuccessful in the UK (Anonymous 1991f, Alexander 1995)), whilst
Anafranil (clomipramine, a new tricyclic) was about to be released in the US, after a successful
debut in Canada and Europe (Kramer 1993a). Several other pharmaceutical companies were
also submitting drugs to the FDA, for use in depression and weight loss (Freeman 1994, Shorter
1997), but only Prozac was approved, in December 1987.
After 15 years of development and testing, Prozac's US patent would expire in 2001 (Young
1993a, Freeman 1994, Shorter 1997). Lilly was therefore aware that its potential lead time for
Prozac was small, whilst it was largely dependant on the drug to assure its corporate identity.
Consequently, it launched an intense marketing campaign, and the following discussion focuses
on the vulnerability of family practitioners to such efforts.
Primary care clinicians find the depression diagnosis and treatment process difficult and vague
(Bennett 1995), being riddled with uncertainty and risk. The side effects, inconvenience and
dangers associated with MAOls and TCAs discouraged clinicians from easily diagnosing
depression (Cowley et al 1990), since their toxicity reduced compliance and increased the
chances of accidental or deliberate problems, causing clinicians to minimise dosages to
minimise this risk (Bower 1991). GPs' practices seem to be centred on risk minimisation.
Although they usually had the option of referring patients to psychiatrists, this carried costs in
terms of finance and professional status (2)- Clinicians sought simple and rapid prescribing
solutions Oilman 1994b), and reduced their uncertainty by using drugs endorsed by psychiatrists
(3) (Levin and DeVane 1993, Cooper 1997, Thomas 1989).
GPs are often largely ignorant of pharmaceutical and psychiatric issues, having little training and
being poorly guided by the literature (Norden 1995, Grady 1990, Harm 1996, Stuttaford 1996,
Thomas 1989, Brandon 1986, Broadhead et al 1991, Cohen 1995, Akiskal 1997, Schwartz
1991). Prescribing practices are largely guided by local conventions, administrative
convenience, pharmaceutical promotional activity, regulations and personal experience etc
(Bunce 1996a, Cockburn 1997, Le Fanu 1990, NAO 1993, Taylor and Bond 1991, Slee 1994,
Boath 1997, Jones 1995, Diliner 1995). Drugs were frequently prescribed on the basis of side
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effects (Thomas 1990) (related to adverse effects, safety in overdose and likelihood of patient
compliance), particularly around whether they were sedatives or stimulants (Anonymous 1992j).
Consequently clinicians can become dependant on industry, which essentially seeks to reduce
their risk perceptions in trying new drugs. e.g. building up their company's reputation
(sponsoring education, advice leaflets, research, chairs in universities etc), establishing
endorsements from prestigious specialists or locally acknowledged experts, offering financial
incentives (trials, free samples etc) (O'Malley 1996a, Gray 1996, Charles 1994, Orbach 1994,
Beltramini and Sirsi 1992, Norden 1995). The psychiatry industry targeted GPs for 'education'
about the diagnosis and treatment of depression, encouraging them to view it as a chronic
disease requiring continuous prophylactic care (Macdermid 1996, Teitelman 1988, Schuchman
and Wilkes 1990, Thakore 1996, Marcus 1990, Kernick 1997, Nichols and Chisholm 1994,
Debrovner 1994). e.g. the American Psychiatric Association produced a diagnostic standard
manual (DSM) for GPs, vaguely listing characteristics associated with different forms of
depression, and a catch all 'not otherwise specified' category to mop up the undepressed
(Thomas 1990).
Lilly strongly marketed Prozac (Angier 1990, Anonymous 1993g, Cooper 1997, Kramer 1993a)
as an alternative to talk therapy and low level counseling, (Cookson 1992) for primary care
clinicians (Trudeau 1992). Such a flexible strategy has proved successful, with Prozac
maintaining its profitability despite the emergence of competition from other SSR1s, (Anonymous
1994d, Anonymous 1993h, Anonymous 1992k, Anonymous 1992c), all of which are generally
very similar (deJonghe and Swinkels 1997, Debrovner 1994, Turkington 1994, Cooper 1994,
Kaspar and Heiden 1995, Inman et al 1993b, Anonymous 1990d, Appleton 1997, Lane R et al,
Brooke 1994, Guy 1992, Corrigan 1996).
The previous discussion has highlighted Lilly's efforts to market Prozac to primary care
clinicians. Simultaneously, however, the pharmaceutical industry was lobbying governments and
health care providers to recognise the costs attached to mental illness. Such a strategy focused
on recognising mental illness as a treatable, physical condition, which was thus stigma free
(since it was not related to the individual morality or spirituality).
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Within the context of generalised public campaigns to increase depression awareness (Shorter
1997, Thomas 1990, Thomas 1989, Bennett 1995, Stuttaford 1996, Doyle 1993, Thomas 1989,
Doyle 1996, Gilbert and Chetley 1996, Griffith 1994), companies emphasised the need to
continue full dose maintenance therapy for several monthes after complete remission to prevent
relapse, or even life time prophylactic treatment (Stokes 1993b). In the UK Lilly and the Royal
College of Psychiatrists published consumer leaflets emphasising the normality of mental
illness, and the non-addictive nature of antidepressants (4), (Agnew 1996), and Lilly urged
pharmacists to 'educate' patients in this (Berridge 1996, Shorter 1997, Berridge 1996,
Anonymous 1994q).
Lilly was vigorous in promoting Prozac directly to the public, in their claimed attempt to uncover
the iceberg of depression (Cole 1997). e.g. sponsoring depression screening in shopping malls
and schools (Brooke 1994), magazine advertisements (Anonymous 1997), information lines,
links with patient groups, articles in the lay media and the Internet (Gilbert and Chetley 1996.
The FDA seemed willing to relax constraints on such 'direct to consumer' marketing (Vecchione
1997), which used mythical themes (Chapman 1979, Riska and Lovdahl 1996) to redefine the
illness, broaden its indications (Hemminki 1973) and sell the disease (Gilbert and Chetley 1996).
Although direct marketing was illegal in the UK, Prozac and depression were talked abut
extensively in the mass media (Poulsen 1992).
Consequently Prozac seems to have enabled a shift in the frontier, towards chemical therapies
instead of behavioural based ones. It is extremely popular (Naude 1989, Shenot 1991,
Bracewell 1993), having expanded the market for antidepressants and generated significant
profits for Lilly (Glaser 1989, Anonymous 1990a, Anonymous 1991g, Marcus 1990, Talan 1990,
Cooper 1994, McDonald 1996, Orbach 1994, Naude 1989, Anonymous 1992k). In the UK
prescriptions for newly diagnosed depression doubled between 1990-1995. SSRIs accounted for
most of this increase (Cooper 1997), with Prozac claiming a large portion (Rogaly 1997)
(although 2 TCAs still dominated prescriptions) (Wessely 1995, Doyle 1993).
Cleaner and more precise SSRIs were released which competed with Prozac (Kramer 1993a,
Nichols and Chisholm 1994, Brooke 1994, Anonymous 1991f, Abrahams and Waters 1994,
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Nichols and Chisholm 1994, Loshak 1987). Lilly responded by seeking new approved
applications for Prozac, reinvigorating marketing and enabling Prozac to claim new firsts
(Dinnen 1996). In addition, the ubiquitous nature of serotonin in the body (even being implicated
in schizophrenia (Freundlich 1992)), combined with Prozac's powerful placebo effect (supported
by its strong brand image (Wells 1996, Anonymous 1996f, Taylor 1997)) caused it to have an
effect on an expanding range of indications. Off label uses could be encouraged by company
sponsorship of articles in peer reviewed journals (Gorman 1995). Prozac's efficacy in these
indications was unknown, as were its long term side effects (Nichols and Chisholm 1994).
Thus Prozac was applied to an expanding range of conditions, at a steadily falling threshhold
(Kramer 1993a). Some of Prozac's range of applications included, in all their respective
varieties, depression (Marcus 1990, Lantin 1996), obsessive compulsive disorder, panic (e.g.
stage fright (Cole 1997)), the almost ubiquitous 'social phobia' (Jefferson 1996), eating disorders
(Price 1991), phobias, self esteem, behavioural addictions, (Mauro and Breggin 1994) pre-
menstrual syndrome (Macdermid 1992, Mortola 1994, Rubinow and Schmidt 1995), arthritis
(Rock 1993), diabetics and migraine, substance abuse (Anonymous 1985a) (Anonymous
1988a), personality disorders (e.g. jealousy) (Messiha 1993) etc (Dinnen 1996). Prozacs
perceived advantages (Brooke 1994) allowed it to be applied to 'subsyndromal' disorders
(psychological complaints that fail to meet the criteria for a specific illness), dragging ordinary life
stresses into disease categories (Mauro and Breggin 1994, Appleton 1997, Rouillon et al 1996,
Bass 1990). Dysthymia, the extremely vague, and all embracing, category of depression was
basically made for Prozac (Cornwell and Tyler 1996), the antidepressant without side effects
(Mauro and Breggin 1994, Cookson 1992). Other similar conditions included 'generalised
anxiety disorder' or a 'primary morbid anxiety state'- essentially a pervasive sense of worry
(Derrington 1996), whilst 'borderline personality disorder' is characterised by uncertainty about
self-image, sexual orientation, long-term goals or career choice, doubts over which friends or
lovers to have, and which values to adopt (Anonymous 1995h). Thus: "There's nobody
nonsyndromal. You can give Prozac to anyone you want." (Mauro and Breggin 1994:47). In fact:
"I have even added it to my watering can and found geraniums grow better on it." (Mauro and
Breggin 1994:47)
210
Prozac's apparent effectiveness against obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) was partly
responsible (Jenike 1990, Cowley et al 1990) for the reinvention of the disease. Before it had
been a rare, difficult to treat and social problem, but became a common chemically based
variation that could be moderated with combinations of drug treatment and behaviour
modification therapy. Prozac was given FDA approval for its treatment in 1994 (Dinnen 1996).
Lilly linked OCD and depression to bulimia (Munson 1994, Griffith 1995, Le Fanu and
Macdonald 1989). Bulimia is a common condition (it being estimated that 1-2 m Americans,
mostly women (Munson 1994), suffered from it, and up to 15% of women in the UK suffered
some form of it (O'Grady 1991)) which was difficult to diagnose (O'Grady 1991, whose
prevalance was believed to be growing (Dinnen 1996). The nature of bulimia is not understood,
and a strong case can be made that it is largely a product of cultural, social pressures, since
approximately 75% of women of normal weight consider themselves overweight, associating
emaciated bodies with self control and moral purity (Yager 1992). Traditionally treatment was
based on psychotherapy (Corrigan 1996, Dinnen 1996), with amphetamine based appetite
suppressants being seen to generate anxiety and be potentially addictive (O'Grady 1991). After
5 years of trials based at the Lilly Center for Women's Health (Alexander 1997), Prozac was the
first drug to be approved for Bulimia, with Prozac's alleged ability to induce weight loss helping
to alleviate depression (Talan 1990). Although not approved by the FDA, (Green 1997, Marson
1990, Anonymous 1992k) clinicians continued to prescribe Prozac for obese patients (Taylor et
al 1994). Most patients, however, regain back their weight (Gram 1994).
Prozac also began to be applied to new groups e.g. children (Brophy 1995), the elderly,
recovering cocaine addicts etch (Powers 1990). Childhood depression was a particularly
tempting area (Strauch 1997, Dinnen 1996). In the UK childhood depression was 'recognised' in
an estimated 2% of children, with a further 4-5 under 12s being on the edge of major depression
(Unsworth 1997). By 1996 Prozac was prescribed to 600 000 US children and adolescents, and
some pharmaceutical companies began preparing antidepressants in mint and orange-flavoured
capsules (Unsworth 1997).
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Diagnostic applications expanded and thresholds fell, which was symbiotically linked to falling
tolerance for behaviour variations at the level of society, articulated through clinicians' attitudes,
the mass media, and a greater acceptance of drug use as a way of modifying behaviour. In this
sense Prozac mimicked other drugs e.g. Ritalin, which was used to treat attention deficit
disorder (Diller 1996). Essentially, personality was becoming medicalised (Kramer 1993a,
Nichols and Chisholm 1994).
This section has shown how Lilly was dependant on Prozac for its economic survival, and so
vigorously marketed the drug for a wide range of applications, to clinicians, pharmacists, the
public and even governments and health care providers. Before assessing the impact of this
strident marketing campaign, it is useful to analyse the efficacy and cost effectiveness of
Prozac.
4 Prozac and Technology Assessments
Having previously studied the promotion of Prozac, and the media activity around it, the
research now turns towards its clinical and economic value. The central point is that clinical
reviews of Prozac are mixed, but its high unit costs, and expanding application, add significantly
to health care expenditure. Whether these expenditures are justifiable, in terms of life quality,
cannot be answered. However, to assume they were would mean that this expenditure could not
be used to any better effect elsewhere, which would seem an unreasonable assumption. The
section begins by analysing Prozac's clinical efficacy, and then studies its cost implications.
TCAs and SSRIs have approximately equal efficacy (Kramer 1993a, Greenberg et al 1994,
Appleton 1997) with different side effect profiles (Brenner 1984, Boyer and Feighner 1989,
South Wales..1988, Levine et al 1987, Judd et al 1993, Starr 1987, Brooke 1994, Turkington
1994). It is unknown which give better value for money, since their relative efficacy is difficult to
define (Kernick 1997, Simon et al 1996). However, GPs were happy to prescribe Prozac and the
other SSRIs (Levin and DeVane 1993, Armstrong et al 1996) whose alleged low side effects
(Wessely 1995), toxicity (Wernicke 1985, Pary et al 1989, Henry 1992, Turkington 1994), fast
onset (Anonymous 1992j, Zagor 1990, Grady 1990) and easy dosage were believed to increase
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patient compliance (Anonymous 1996h, Le Pen et al 1994, Simon et al 1996, Wessely 1995,
Nichols and Chisholm 1994, Cooper 1997, Anonymous 1990d, Grady 1990). Prozac's safety
and simplicity enabled depression to shift from being identified with psychiatrists' inpatients to
GPs' outpatients (Appleton 1997, RivasVazquesz and Blais 1997, Simon et al 1993). Prozac
minimised many of the risks of GP prescribing, since Lilly essentially assumed the liability for
whole areas of decision making regarding diagnosis and therapy, alleviating GPs from this
onerous responsibility (Brandon 1986, Armstrong et al 1996). Meanwhile it promoted weight loss
(depression rates in women were twice those of men) and appeared to sometimes effect
miraculous change (Favazza 1990, Schuchman and Wilkes 1990, Cowley et al 1990, Marcus
1990, Schuchman and Wilkes 1990, Shem 1997)
However, serotonin is ubiquitous in the body, and a range of new different side effects have
been linked to Prozac (Cowley et al 1990). e.g. aorgasmia (Cowley et al 1990). (which tended to
be underreported) (Baton et al 1995), nausea (Boyer and Feighner 1989, Starr 1987), anxiety
(Starr 1987), headaches (Cowley et al 1990), nervousness (Shem 1997), anorexia, insomnia
(Wood 1994a), tremor (Anonymous 1992j), abdominal pain and a strange, altered sense of the
self (8) (Cowley et al 1990). The speed of Prozac's onset of action was contentious. It has a long
half life, increasing the risks of contraindicated drug interactions and lengthening the delay
before other therapies could be used (Anonymous 1991f). Prozac, in common with other
antidepressants, had a response rate of approximately 70% (Lader 1996, Fawcett and Barkin
1997), but a cure rate of only some 28% (Appleton 1997). Overall it seems to be more effective
than placebo for groups of mildly depressed outpatients (Wood 1994a), sometimes removing
symptoms, without affecting the cause (Griffith 1995, Turkington 1994).
Sifting truth from fiction in the relative advantages and disadvantages of TCAs (tricyclics) and
SSRIs is very difficult, since issues of which particular drugs from a class to use and compare,
in what dosage, for what group of patients (e.g. moderate depressed, inpatients etc.) and over
what period, complicate trials and their implications (Le Pen et al 1994).
RCTs, if conducted rigorously, can control for bias, within unrealistic clinical situations, whilst
observational studies are biased (Gram 1994) but accurately reflect specific real world clinical
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environments and problems (Simon 1995). RCTs often have methodological problems which
limit their usefulness (Hotopf 1997, Gram and Stage 1997, Dyck 1994). e.g. selection bias,
unsatisfactory matching, chance (Fisher and Greenberg 1995, Partonen et al 1996, Small et al
1996), shorter duration than actual clinical therapy (Appleton 1997), unrecorded changes in
dosages during trials, drop out (Gram 1994), unreported trials (Gram 1994), and failure to
effectively blind trials (since placebos produce no side effects, allowing both patients and
clinicians to recognise who is taking what drug) (Fisher and Greenberg 1995, Bower 1992).
Finally, there is an inherent bias in the literature on reporting positive results, encouraging the
misrepresentation of outcomes (Dyck 1994).
Such problems characterised many of the RCTs conducted using Prozac (Hotopf et al 1996).
Few placebo controlled studies were conducted on key groups, such as the elderly and patients
with 'resistant depression' (Anonymous 1992j). American trials tended to use outpatients
recruited by advert (Wood 1994a, Anonymous 1992j), and used higher dosages of tricyclics,
whilst European trials used chronically depressed inpatients on lower dosages, thus
exacerbating tolerance differences (Gram 1994). Thus drop out rates for Prozac were lower
than tricyclics in the US, but not in Europe (Gram 1995). Similarly, one of the advantages
claimed for SSRIs was that there lower side effects enabled greater patient compliance. Such
differences were very apparent when they were compared to the older TCAs, which had the
worse side effect profiles. However, when compared to newer tricyclics or heterocyclics, the
SSRIs did not display significantly lower discontinuation rates (Hotopf et al 1997).
Many of Prozac's alleged applications were not supported by RCTs (Anonymous 1992j), and its
advantages became more dubious in more tightly controlled studies over longer periods (Simon
et al 1996). No dose related effect has been established, and tricyclics appear to be more
effective for the seriously depressed (Gram 1994, Souetre et al 1996, Roose et al 1994),
although insufficient studies have been conducted to make comparison meaningful (Wood
1994a, Gram 1994). Issues of clinical outcome, quality of life and treatment costs suggested no
clear guidance on initial treatment selection (Simon et al 1996, Simon et al 1996, Wessely
1995).
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Generally, patients who did not experience nausea with SSRIs tended to tolerate them better
than TCAs (Burrows and Horman 1994, Anonymous 1992j), and TCAs were associated with
sedation (being more effective at relieving sleep disorders in depressed patients) whilst Prozac
was associated with insomnia (Benfield et al 1986). Consequently, despite 122 RCTs there was
no consensus around whether SSRIs or TCAs should be the first line treatment in depression
(Hotopf 1997)
In summary, Prozac had a different side effect profile to the TCAs, but showed clear
transactional advantages for the clinician and patient (it was not fatal in overdose or in
combination with everyday chemicals, it had a simple dosing regime that did not require
monitoring, and it was slightly associated with minor weight loss rather than weight gain).
Therefore, although it was no more effective than its predecessors, there were apparently less
costs to clinician and patient. On a strictly clinical level, therefore, Prozac may have had some
advantages, if it was assumed that giving attention to a depressed patient was something to be
avoided. However, the discussion now turns to the economic costs and benefits associated with
Prozac.
Most clinical studies did not address economic concerns (Hotopf et al 1996). SSRIs were much
more expensive, generally, than TCAs (Anonymous 1992j, II[man 1994c), but were promoted
(by the pharmaceutical industry (Sclar et al 1995, Debrovner 1994) as being more cost effective
since patient drop out (attrition) was lower due to smaller side effects, meaning they were less
likely to require other medical and hospital services (Greenberg et al 1997, Norden 1995, Eckett
1995).
US managed care companies embraced such drug treatments over talk therapies (Scheller
1997, Cushman 1993, Unsworth 1997, Turkington 1994, Davis 1996, Davis 1996), even
screening their databases for patients who's undiagnosed depression might be responsible for
their high use of medical services (Smith 1997). Prozac was seen as particularly appropriate,
since its easy dosing reduced the volume of medical transactions (Henahan 1995, Fairman
1997)
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However, managed care companies soon became concerned about the costs of SSR1s, which
accounted for 30% of prescriptions but 60% of costs (Debrovner 1994). HMOs found that
Prozac was prescribed freely, with clinicians seeming to use it as a cure all e.g. marginal
diagnosis, little monitoring or follow up, and lack of adjunctive talk therapies (Atherly and Crane
1991). Prozac enabled GPs to treat a wide range of mental distress, shifting it away from
psychiatrists or psychologists (Cookson 1992, Cooper 1994, Mauro and Breggin 1994).
Consequently, patients often receive no talk therapy (which may be more cost effective
(Antonuccio 1997), and are poorly monitored (Cooper 1994, Nichols and Chisholm 1994).
Prozac was reported to be counterproductive in patients who's conditions were not believed to
be related to serotonin disturbances, (Mortimore and Blacker 1996). Some HMOs sought to
constrain clinicians use of the drug (Greene J 1997).
In the UK government policy was oriented towards controlling the drug bill (Bligh and Walley
1992, Ryan and Yule 1993) using financial incentives to successfully encourage GPs to reduce
prescription volume and shift to generics (Bateman 1996, Bradlow and Coulter 1993, Bradlow
and Coulter 1993, Whynes 1995, Rafferty 1997). The debate between the SSRIs and TCAs was
fought out vigorously in medical journals, with SSRI enthusiasts labelling non-users as
irresponsible and negligent, and defenders claiming their opponents were owned by the
pharmaceutical industry (Wessely 1995). The Centre for Health Economics found, using meta-
analysis of RCTs, that the SSRIs showed no advantages in efficacy or acceptability over tricyclic
or related antidepressants, whilst they could not be judged safer since their long term effects
were unknown, and should not be seen as a first line treatment (Anonymous 1993g). Effective
Health Care considered that the aggressive marketing of SSRIs could increase the drugs bill
with no gain in efficacy (Laurance 1994). The SSRIs were also much more expensive since they
would be used more frequently, to treat lower level depressions (Brindle 1994b). Such critical
studies were circulated within the NHS twice, and published in the British Medical Journal
(Brindle 1994b) whilst the Chief Medical Officer wrote to GPs, assuring them that TCAs were
just as good as SSR1s, and should continue to be prescribed (Ashford 1995). The UK Psychiatry
Pharmacy Group, and the Royal Colleges of Psychiatrists and General Practitioners criticised
the government for violating clinical autonomy by clandestinely supporting the use of tricyclics
(which they claimed were inferior and more expensive) (Slee 1994, Goodman and Baratz 1990).
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The pharmaceutical industry has claimed that Prozac saved resources by avoiding more
expensive forms of care. However, the industry has striven to define areas of behaviour as
medical problems, requiring pharmaceutical management. According to the industries logic,
therefore, the more they spent on treating problems that were not problems before, the more
they saved. Essentially, the industry has successfully shifted the frontier between behavioural
and biological explanations for behaviour, and has lowered the threshold at which a chemical
diagnosis can be made. Effectively this is the imposition of a definition, and societies resources
are being diverted into supporting the industry, who sponsor the definition. This definition
(frontier), however, is the site of ideological, professional and industrial disagreement, which is
described in the following section.
5 Ideological, Professional and Industrial Conflict over the Psyche
Prozac was received very differently in the US and the UK, as can be seen in the diffusion
curves, and this may have been because of the different ways it was defined in the two
countries. In the UK Prozac was seen as simply another antidepressant, and was slotted into the
pre-existing discourses that sourrounded such psychoactive drugs. In the US, Prozac was
heralded as the first of a whole new generation of drugs, which could be used to improve the
personalitys' of people who were not considered ill. As such, it became an icon of scientific
progress, and was the focus of intense emotional uncertainty about the ethics of such action
(climaxing in the very public dispute between Lilly, the FDA and the Scientologists).
Consequently, clinicians and the public were much more aware of Prozac, and patients would
play a much more active role in making decisions about its use. Thus in the UK, Prozac was
simply a clinical resource upon which clinicians could use in their decision making regarding a
patient, whilst in the US Prozac became more of a consumer good, and reflected the viciisitudes
of changing perspectives in wider society (explaining the dramatic shifts and discontinuities in
the colume of its US prescriptions). This section outlines the nature of these ideological
uncertainties, which so affected the diffusion of Prozac in the US.
Within health care, definitions are often vague and emotionally charged, and this is particularly
true of some areas more than others. eg . biotechnology, abortion, euthenasia etc. Ethical issues
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such as these exist in situations where groups hold different sets of strong beliefs (concerning
how things are, and how they should be) between which reconciliation is hard. Generally
psychology is enveloped in such ethical problems areas of moral uncertainty, since the psyche
does not have the 'objectivity' of the body, and is more intrinsically related to identity, character,
worth and spirituality. Whilst human distress appears ubiquitous and constant, the definitional
meanings attached to these are highly contentious and culturally contextual (Anonymous 1994e,
Griffith 1995). Psychology, by defining what is good and bad about individuals, and the means
by which this improved individual can be achieved (e.g. drugs to control behaviour, good
parenting techniques etc), strikes at the core of individual identity- what it is, what it should be,
who should decide, and how should it be achieved ? Such issues centre on the dialogue
between the social and the ego. e.g. personal freedom and collective obligation etc.
Understandably these questions are highly contentious.
The biomedical model, based around concepts of mind-body dualism, scientific 'objectivity' and
the quantification of the physical world, has enabled biomedical science to claim definitional
domain over the language used to describe the body, and hence the concepts guiding how it
was understood. Various groups and interests continue to compete, however, over definitional
control of the mind, which is not as physically objective as the body.
The key dispute is essentially whether human action is objectively (chemically) driven (e.g.
biology, chemistry etc., associated with science and biological psychiatry), or an outcome of the
subjective and ethereal (e.g. society, spirituality etc., associated more with religion and
behavioural psychiatry). Such different conceptions of the brain, or mind, lead to radically
different definitions of what is pathology, and how it should be treated. e.g. mental disease is an
absolute aberration of physical processing, which can be fixed by biological means (such as
surgery, electric shock treatment, chemical therapies etc), or mental disease is a culturally
relative definition, which can be addressed through social means (such as talk therapy,
confession, workshops etc). Such arguments are highly charged moral and political questions
(e.g. where does identity reside, what is the relationship between the mind and the brain etc.)
essentially concerned with what makes us 'human' (e.g. chemistry, spirituality etc.).
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These disputes occur within the context of the ongoing debate between the various cosmologies
(Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, science etc.) which vie for definitional domain. Within this
background, groups produce different models of the psyche, which compete with each other
according to their functional effectiveness. Thus if the 'therapy' (e.g. ritual cleansing,
consumerism, social engineering, pharmaceuticals, cognitive counselling, Freudianism, religious
confession etc.) works, then the theory is vindicated. However, these models are shaped by
social context (Anonymous 1994e). e.g. Freud's brooding psychodynamic theory was rooted in
the first world war, and was recruited to explain the holocaust, whilst the optimism of the civil
rights era nurtured humanistic psychiatry, and biological materialism re-emerged in the context
of 1980's laissez faire individualism (Anonymous 1994e).
Culturally, both the UK and the US are strongly rooted in the Judeao-Christian tradition. Within
this belief system, individuals seek to gain divine purity by cleansing themselves of human
failings. Purging the soul (an element of the individual which is in dialogue with the divine) of
imperfections is neccesarily painful and difficult, but this process of suffering is to be celebrated,
since it demonstrates a commitment to personal growth (Lears 1993). This process, however, is
guided and informed by discourse with the divine. Such interaction may be either direct (eg.
prayer), or indirect (eg. through a representative of the divine, such as a priest, rabbi, reverend
etc). This process of learning and suffering is valued highly.
Various forms of 'talk therapy' are an extension of this ideal, whereby individuals strive for an
inner peace, and grow spiritually in the process. e.g. confessional, counselling, psychotherapy
etc. From the perspective of talk therapy, chemical 'solutions' (e.g. antidepressants) carry an
inherent stigma (Barshinger et al 1995) since they do not solve the problem, but simply obscure
it further. Simultaneously they deny the individual the ability to understand and overcome
problems, whilst learning in the process. This attitude of 'pharmacological Calvinism' believes
that nothing is worthwhile unless it is striven for (Mauro and Breggin 1994, Anonymous 1996e),
and that pain is necessary for progress (Kramer 1993a).
By contrast, principles of Cartesian rationality have been used to progressively push back the
frontiers of the objective body into the realm of the subjective mind, so that the brain becomes
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simply the organ of the mind (consciousness) (Mauro and Breggin 1994). Cognition and emotion
can be categorised and understood as biological-chemical forms, enabling them to be
manipulated. From this perspective, individuals ceased to be morally responsible for most of
their psychological functioning (destigmatisation). Characteristics which respond, however
dubiously, to physical manipulation become 'medicalised' (Eisenberg 1992) and these different
reactions form the basis of new classifications of types of mental disease (Kramer 1993a).
Chemicals can become simply a way of enabling individuals to realise their full potential,
cleaning the brain of malfunctions and enabling the mind to excercise itself fully. Thus cosmetic
surgery (often conducted for social, and not strictly clinical or biological reasons on the body e.g.
tummy tucks) would be paralleled in cosmetic pharmacology used on the brain (e.g. drugs to
boost social confidence) (Debrovner 1994).
The discussion so far has outlined the key ideological differences between objective
explanations of activity (e.g. the brains physiology and chemistry) and more subjective ones
(e.g. the mind and the spirit). These different explanations of the nature of human identity are
key to how we understand ourselves, and the border between these competing views shifts over
time.
The 20th century has been characterised by competition between biological psychiatry
(chemical therapy) and behavioural psychiatry (talk therapies) (Young 1993a, O'Grady 1991,
Schuchman and Wilkes 1990, Loshak 1987, Bower 1991). Each perspective has sought
definitional domain over the psyche (Schuchman and Wilkes 1990, Griffith 1995, Cornwell and
Tyler 1996, Appleton 1997), and, by extension, the lucrative market of the middle class 'worried
well' (Shorter 1997).
A central strategy of biological psychiatry (which renamed itself 'the neurosciences') has been to
emphasise the role of the (biological) 'brain' over the (social) 'mind'(Siegfried 1993), with the
support of the pharmaceutical industry (Bower 1991, Shorter 1997, Siever 1994, Shorter 1997,
Elmer-Dewitt 1992, Anonymous 1992g, Montgomery 1985, Fuller 1992, Griffith 1995). These
debates between biological and behavioural psychiatry (Bower 1991, Young 1993a) are visible
in the different languages and terms used to describe mental conditions, and the various
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therapies which are promoted for them. The ebb and flow of debate is reflected occasionally in
high profile cases (such as the 1987 Osheroff V. Chestnut Lodge case, in which a patient sued
an institution for not using drug therapy (Bower 1991)), but more usually can be viewed over
time in changes to classificatory systems.
For example, traditionally the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Diseases (DSM) was dominated by psychoanalysts (behavioural
psychologists). However, as these have been replaced by neuroscientists, diagnosis is
increasingly made according to specific criteria (although their underlying validity remains
doubtful) (Anonymous 1988f, Shorter 1997). The DSM is under constant revision as models
change (Bezchlibnyk-Butler 1994, Shorter 1997, Holden 1991) and diseases vanish (e.g.
homosexuality) or appear (e.g. stress (Tedre 1996), attention deficit disorder (Johnson 1994), or
panic disorder)).
Simultaneously, biological psychiatry remains experimental, with drugs often being used in
research, therapy, diagnosis and theory building simultaneously (Lears 1993, Mauro and
Breggin 1994, Montgomery et al 1994a, Vercoulen et al 1996, Anonymous 1990c, Anonymous
1992g). It is argued that the field is often shaped by industrial interests. For example, 'panic' did
not exist as a diagnostic category until the emergence of Xanax (an anti-anxiety drug) (Shorter
1997). Success in treating this new 'disease' enabled 'panic' to eventually become its own
classificatory order. This order now includes 'rejection sensitivity' (Shorter 1997) and 'social
phobia' (Appleton 1997) (which is suffered by 20% of the population) (Sadgrove 1996).
Similarly, apathy was identified as an 'anxiety disorder' in the 1950s and 1960s (due to the
effectiveness of anti-anxiety drugs), and became associated with 'depression' in the 1970s
(following the success of antidepressants in dealing with these symptoms) (Bennett 1995,
Shorter 1997). 'Depression' itself was downgraded from a major psychiatric disease to variants
of unhappiness (dysphoria) (Shorter 1997), with the 'blues' eventually being entered into the
International Classification of Diseases in 1993 as dysthymia (O'Kelly 1994, Appleton 1997). As
the definition of 'depression' gradually falls, depression rates reputedly rise (Anonymous 1990c,
Thomas 1990).
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In a similar way, Prozac's effectiveness in 'treating' a wide range of conditions suggested that
the conditions could be grouped together in a new Affective Spectrum Disorder, meaning that
variants on depression would effect 10-30% of the worlds population (Shorter 1997, Anonymous
1992g, Gram 1995). e.g. high energy successful people were defined as anxious, whilst their
more passive counterparts were categorised as depressive (Thomas 1989). The belief that
mood could shape the brains physiology (Orbach 1997), combined with a broadened definition
of relapse, and gave a 'biological' justification to the prophylactic, even lifetime, use of Prozac
(Orbach 1997, Montgomery 1996b, Brooke 1994, Kind and Sorensen 1995, Debrovner 1994).
However, critics emphasise the weakness of the theory, classificatory system and findings
underlying biological psychiatry (Anonymous 1994q, Mauro and Breggin 1994, Sanua 1996,
Anonymous 1995e, Anonymous 1992j). e.g. the absence of a reliable relationship between drug
concentrations in blood and drug efficacy (Fisher and Greenberg 1995), the relative
ineffectiveness of antidepressants and their equivalency to placebo in many respects
(Turkington 1994, Anonymous 1992j, Edwards 1995a), the alienating effect of drug therapy
(Holden 1991, Jacobs 1995, Anonymous 1995e), and the dubious validity of using therapy as a
diagnostic tool, illustrated by the fact that pneumonia is not caused by a lack of penicillin
(Shorter 1997). It is strongly argued that talk therapy is more effective than chemical therapy,
since it empowers the patient, enabling a faster and more comprehensive recovery, which is
more durable, requires less drug maintenance therapy, and perhaps allows the patient to
become more personally and socially productive (Reynaert et al 1995). By contrast, drugs are
linked to emotional desensitization (Cookson 1992).
Despite such criticism, the influence of the pharmaceutical industry continues to grow. The
psychiatry industry (Gorman 1994) (especially pharmaceutical companies and neuroscientist
psychologists) has vigorously promoted the recognition, destigmatisation, normalisation and
diagnosis of mental illness, arguing that its biological basis separates the sufferer from
responsibility (e.g. shifting depression, alcoholism and obesity from personality flaw to clinical
disease (Schuchman and Wilkes 1990, Griffith 1995)) whilst enabling the quantification and
objectification of its costs (e.g. suicide, lost work days etc.). They emphasise the scientific
objectivity of their therapies, the sophistication of their research and production techniques
222
(Griffith 1995), and the convenience of their therapies (e.g. drug treatments require clinicians to
spend less time with patients, and are seen as cheaper than behavioural psychiatry e.g.
psychotherapy (Griffith 1995)). Centrally, as issues of capitation and finance grow in importance,
the apparent objectivity of drug therapies lends them a predictability welcomed by financiers
(Schuchman and Wilkes 1990). Thus policy makers are offered a definition of an expensive
biological illness, which can be readily treated by drug therapies. However, such endorsements
have not alleviated the basic social and ethical ambiguities which sourround issues of
psychiatry.
This section has shown how the border between objective and subjective conceptions of the
psyche differs between cultures and changes over time. Such debates (focussed on the conflict
between biological and behavioural psychiatry) are complex and emotionally charged. These
different groups seek conceptual ownership of areas of the psyche, through their effectiveness
in managing mental conditions. However, in the absence of widespread agreement about what
is normal and abnormal, behaviours can become pathologised if a technology appears to effect
them. This inverts the classic model of technology development, which assumes that technology
is developed to address a behaviour. e.g. a behaviour responds to a certain drug, the behaviour
is pathologised and named, and the drug becomes the means to address the behaviour.
However, in effecting how users behave, these technologies effect 'identity'. Ethical issues
centre around the degree to which identity is biological or spiritual, whether it should be changed
(e.g. the balance between the ego or the social, collective responsibility or individual rights), who
should make such decisions (the centralisation, decentralisation and regulation of power), and
how should these decisions be implemented (voluntary or coercive mechanisms) etc.
Consequently, technologies that effect the psyche (identity) can generate widespread
uncertainty if they are seen to challenge the conventional consensus.
This chapter argues that Prozac was perceived to challenge this consensus in the US, but was
not seen as doing this in the UK. Thus, in the US Prozac shifted several borders which dealt with
culturally sensitive issues, which were explicitly posed in 'Listening to Prozac' (Anonymous
1994q). e.g. normality and illness, the social or biological basis of the psyche, blame,
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responsibility and causation, the role and value of pleasure and pain, the rate and direction of
change and the time it should occur in (Debrovner 1994, Sachs 1997, Cornwell and Tyler 1996).
The following section illustrates these cultural differences between the UK and the US.
6 The Cultural Construction of Prozac
The previous section has outlined central social debates regarding the nature of the 'self'. This
section argues that the strong marketing of Prozac enabled it to achieve an identity as a cultural
icon, being a fetish symbol that slotted into evolving discourses, debates and uncertainty about
nature, sprituality, self and society. Cultures constructed it slightly differently according to their
perspectives, with individuals and groups being attracted and repelled by it according to their
identification with its image. Essentially it became a symbol charged with emotion and meaning,
which could then be recruited by the mass media to promote and communicate concepts,
issues, topics and products. e.g. phrases, books, T-shirts, etc (Newnham 1995a, Mills 1996,
Bracewell 1993, Sadgrove 1997). The following discussion examines how Prozac was received
in the US and the UK, whose reactions demonstrate their different social (cultural) perspectives.
Diseases and drugs have often been emblems of social status and self perception. e.g.
tuberculosis was seen as a disease of the artistic in the 19th century, "mothers' little helpers"
(Kramer 1993a, Eisenberg 1992, Thomas 1990) were psychotropics used on women and the
elderly (von Ferber and von Ferber 1993, Hansen 1989, Appleton 1997, Lewishall et al 1997,
Bibeau 1994, Cooper 1993, Spore et al 1995). Depression drew on old cultural discourses which
ascribed a certain madness to those whose moral, artistic or cognitive purity made normal life
intolerable. In the US depression became fashionable, and Prozac became a fashion accessory
'designer drug' (Frame 1994. Anonymous 1996b). Prozac was associated with trendy high fliers,
seeking to ease the anxieties of modern living (Frame 1994), and users achieved an instant
associated specialness (McFarlane 1997). Prozac became a "hot yuppie upper" (Rock 1993:34),
and an emblem for competitive white collar adroitness (Eisenberg 1992, Rothman 1994), by
orienting users towards the needs of business culture. e.g. a can-do pragmatism based on
perpetual bonhomie, endless energy and a deadened sensitivity to moral issues. Such traits are
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valued in industrial societies. e.g. Mosko pills were marketed in 1900 under the same rubric of
mental focus, vitality and self esteem (Lears 1993, Kramer 1993a).
Thus: 'Clearly, depression is the new rock 'n' roll, and the words "Get down" have taken on a
whole new meaning. Kurt Cobain has found wider fame as a suicide victim than he ever did as a
musician. The pill that fashionable Manhattan boasts of popping is not a narcotic or a
hallucinogen but the antidepressant Prozac. And now Elizabeth Wurtzel, former rock critic of the
New Yorker, has produced a best-selling memoir of her own wanderings on the wilder shores of
hopelessness. A troubled and depressed adolescent, she eventually became one of the first
people to be prescribed those little buff-and-green Prozac capsules whose image, like a showbiz
star's, was soon appearing on magazine covers and T-shirts.' (Barnacle 1995:26)
The media played on the paradigmatic link between women and madness: 'Elizabeth Wurtzel,
the author of Prozac Nation, a book about depression, is also being marketed as the Sylvia
Plath of the MTV generation. Instability is in. Madness is kind of sexy. Depression drips
authenticity and depth when nothing else does these days. To be depressed is at least to feel
something and something is better than nothing.' (Moore 1995a:6). Wurtzel was reported to be
"adamant..that the drug has been misused by people with low-level sorrow' turning it into a
media joke when for depressives 'of a much higher order' this drug has literally saved lives."
(Bunce 1996b:15). Prozac Nation, however, had almost nothing to do with Prozac (Anonymous
1995h).
As 'depression' became more widely discussed, and its stages defined in the mass media (Rock
1993), people were effectively socialised into the disease, and could undergo an almost
bureaucratic career of depression and recovery. Consequently, cure through psychotropic
medicines (particularly Prozac) and even personal transformation, could become simply part of
the expected process (Karp 1993).
Prozac was embraced in the US: 'It is a marketing dream..warding off depression is like
preventing pregnancy- pop the pill and be happy.' (Anonymous 1990d:345). Not only did patients
ask for it (Marcus 1990, Cowley et al 1990), but GPs could substitute it for talk therapy (Thomas
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1990) and use it for virtually any malady related to the psyche (Talan 1990). e.g. panic, anxiety,
weight loss, OCD, sensitivity to criticism, fear of rejection, lack of self-esteem, inability to
experience pleasure etc (Barondes 1994). Essentially Prozac became a 'picker upper' (Cooper
1994), and the ease of its use enabled the engulfing of behaviours into categories of
'depression' (Glaser 1990, Naude 1989, Rosholm et al 1997).
Depression thus grew into a new catchall malady, whilst psychologists, steeped in the corporate
culture of the pharmaceutical industry, fostered a popular culture of pharmacological hedonism
(Shorter 1997). e.g. Dowling's best seller, "You mean I don't have to feel this way?", advocated
the broad prophylactic use of antidepressants (Anonymous 1992g). Prozac became a
fashionable panacea, consumed by the worried well who wanted to tinker with their personalities
and lose some weight (Shorter 1997).
Individuals were anxious to experiment with Prozac: ' "Our phone rings of the hook every time
someone does a story about Prozac," said one physician at Manhattens' Beth Israel Medical
Center. 'People want to try it. If you tell them they're not depressed they say, 'Sure I am!"
(Shorter 1997:320)
Whilst Prozac was embraced in the US as an emblem of vigour and emotional individualism, in
the UK it was constructed as a mind deadening American fashion (James and Camden 1993,
Robertson 1996, Mabry 1995). Thus: "Such claims encourage the impression that Prozac is a
self-indulgent American fad." (Anonymous 1996a:8). Or: '"Surely we don't know enough about
the brain. I'm highly sceptical - I bet this idea comes from America." ' (James and Camden
1993:14)
The furore over Prozac had been extensively reported in the British media (O'Donnell 1991),
and a 1990 Channel 4 'Dispatches' documentary had claimed that Prozac induced unnatural
irritability, and that such side effects were often unreported to regulatory bodies during clinical
trials (Oswald 11991). Like the FDA, the UK's Committee on the Safety of Medicines dismissed
such claimed links to aggression (O'Donnell 1991)
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In April 1994 'Listening to Prozac' was published in the UK, to critical disclaim: '400 or so pages
of anecdote and folksy psychobanter..' (Anonymous 1994e:865). In August 1994 the BBC
documentary series 'Everyman' reported on Wenatchee WA, in an episode titled Welcome to
Happy Valley' which was reviewed under the heading 'Prozac: Panacea or Poison' (Lader
1994:487), causing alarm amongst British psychiatrists (Hebert 1994). Goodwin, a psychologist,
had placed most of his patients on Prozac, claiming "There is a huge amount of unrecognized
depression out there..I was just a little bit early in making the diagnosis." (Roberts 1995:16)
(Hebert 1994). The Washington State Board of Psychiatry emphasised that comprehensive
therapy should be used instead of instant diagnosis, whilst Goodwin argued: ' "Freud really is
dead..But it's very hard for the people who run this business to understand that. If you're got a
treatment for the common cold of mental illness, use it." ' (Roberts 1995:16). Interestingly,
Goodwin was subjected to a psychiatric evaluation, to analyse whether his professional
competence was compromised by prolonged Prozac use (Roberts 1995, Cooper 1994, Lader
1994, Hebert 1994, Wood 1994b).
The UK can be characterised as a 'retreat culture', where an entrenched physical environment
of cultural structures and attitudes discourages proactive change (5). Prozac was identified as
an American drug, carrying American values and characteristics e.g. superficiality and optimism
overlaying a deadened sense of reality: There is a long American tradition...that anything is
possible with human effort. Unlike members of older societies, Americans have never felt
constrained by genetic endowment, established social structures, or an unfriendly natural
environment, from expressing support for this notion. But although in some ways liberating, this
culture is also a fertile ground for false messiahs.' (Freeman 1994;13).
Prozac was seen as a drug which robbed peoples sense of reality (Anonymous 1993a), and it
became a byword for mediocre, vague and transient superficiality. e.g. 'New Labour's moderate
philosophy translated as 'a Prozac political philosophy in the language of Middle England, using
words like 'decency', 'progressive', 'prosperous,' 'enthusiasm' and 'enterprise'.' (McCrum
1997:23). An article describing the token help given to those who had slipped through the
Welfare States safety net was titled 'Welfare by Prozac' (Davies 1995:1). And; 'we are 'looking
on the bright side', refusing to criticise anything - it's just so unconstructive - and generally
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behaving like Americans.. .This process of Americanisation is quietly sowing the seeds of what
amounts to a cultural death.' (Raven 1997:8)
Emotional highs and lows were seen as inherently human characteristics and experiences, and
suffering in particular was identified as being both enlightening and creative. e.g. "...without
suffering, without the character quirks that made Poe poetic, for example, we would be deprived
of his brooding masterworks." (Mauro and Breggin 1994:47). Similarly: 'A psychiatric study into
the mental state of leading literary figures...suggested that most great writers have had a fairly
loose grip on their marbles.' (Bunce 1996c:9)
Prozac was repeatedly compared to Huxley's 'soma', the happy pill of the Brave New World,
which robbed the human spirit of awareness (Bracewell 1993, Thompson 1993, Anonymous
1994e): "They muse about putting it in the drinking water, like fluoride. It might make the citizens
happy. Misdiagnosed, it could become the soma of the millennium, as in Brave New World."
(Rogaly 1997:3).
The effect of Prozac on creativity and hence culture was explored widely. e.g. the arts TV
programme The Late Show' examined artists' experiences of Prozac (Newnham 1995a). A
Guardian writer described his experiences using Prozac:"A month, two, three, four ... instead of
expansion, I felt the "equilibrium" effect slowly, inexorably zoning out into a kind of "neuter"
effect. Pleasant enough, this feeling of being at the centre of a custardy whirlpool (kind of like
white noise but without the noise), but was this why I had started taking it in the first place? To
end up on a kind of heroin-without-the-kick(s)?..Yes, I was free now, just to be me . . . and, well,
just sit, sit here in this chair, MY PROZAC CHAIR, just, well, just being this nice new neutered,
frozen, prone, Prozac me. Whole days went by where I literally sat in my Prozac Chair staring
out the window...as my bright Prozac Indian summer turned into a dry effectless autumn, it got
to the stage where I realised I was coldly considering - really, truly considering - suicide as an
option." (Glaister 1996:15)
Prozac became a buzz word for greyness. Thus Bracewell's novel, 'Saint Rachel' was promoted
as 'the first Prozac novel of the 90s' (Smith 1995 p11). Prozac served as 'a metaphor for the
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mood of the 1990s', with the books characters leading 'precarious, fractured lives, forming
defensive relationships to stave off isolation and decay. There is a numbness about them, a
sense of people merely getting by...', whilst the book was praised for its "...slow-moving,
anaesthetic prose..? (Smith 1995:11)
The UK public generally preferred counselling over drug therapies Oilman 1994b, Anonymous
1996d, Appleton 1997), fearing becoming addicted to drugs, particularly Prozac (the 'happy pill'
(6), which failed to solve real problems (Bennett 1995). Clinicians were similarly conservative,
seeking evidence of clinical depression before prescribing, and used Prozac for a more limited
range of applications (Mauro and Breggin 1994). The relative costs of different drugs was likely
to be considered in treatment, whilst in the US this was less likely due to the risks of medical
malpractice litigation (defensive prescribing (Poulsen 1992). There was widespread reaction
against, and anxiety about (Kent 1991, the 'fashionable American hypothesis of Prozac as
recreational' (Newnham 1995a:T12). Prozac, specifically, carried a stigma (Mauro and Breggin
1994), and patients feared the risks associated with it (7). Over time, however, depression
began to be normalised, partly through the media attention paid to Princess Diana's depression
(Berridge 1996).
The SSRIs began to replace TCAs as first line antidepressants (Anonymous 1991f) (although
this was quicker in the US than the UK), especially for GPs (Martensson and Abergwistedt 1996,
Bass 1990, Olf son and Klerman 1992), and the pharmaceutical industry worked to destigmatise,
and even bureaucratise depression. e.g. Wheadon, vice-president and director of CNS clinical
research, development, and medical affairs at SmithKline Beecham, was quoted as saying:
"More doctors are coming into the fold and recognizing that depression is an illness that
deserves to be treated...It's not a negative thing that SSRIs are being used more, it's a positive
thing." (Debrovner 1994:20). By contrast, in the UK the unreasonable growth in prescribing for
depression (Brandon 1986) 'is yet another expression of the emotional illiteracy that pervades
our society. It is telling us that pain can't be borne, can't be lived through and can't be tolerated
either by depressed people or those around them.' (Orbach 1994:49).
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Prozac was also linked to MDMA (Ecstacy), which was banned in both the US and the UK
because of its alleged neurotoxic effects (Anonymous 1996e). MDMA was often used in
conjunction with Prozac and, interestingly, Prozac was considered a good alternative to MDMA
since Prozac had an easier 'come down' and no hangover effects (Singh 1995). An illegal
market existed for Prozac, which was often used recreationally (Anonymous 1996e). Lilly
struggled to rehabilitate Prozac in the UK and separate this association. e.g. the Medical
Director of Lilly explained, using a classic biomedical analogy, how MDMA exhausted serotonin
reserves, sowing the seeds of depression (Coveney 1997): 'Mood can be thought of as a light
bulb and serotonin as the voltage which keeps it glowing. Too little voltage and it goes dim
(depression). Prozac restores the voltage and brightness to normal. Ecstasy produces a blinding
flash as the bulb burns out. - Dr. A Simpson (Medical Director, Eli Lilly), Basingstoke, Hants.
(Harker 1997:17).
In summary, different cultures defined Prozac in different ways. Images became attached to
Prozac, which effected who used the drug and how they used it. As such it was a consumer
good, communicating an image that the consumer desired. e.g. detached corporate careerist,
tortured artist. In the US people experimented with Prozac, to see whether it really could
metamorphose their personalities, as the media had said it could. By contrast, in the UK, the
furore over Prozac, and the traditional image of mind drugs as deadening the soul, meant
Prozac was constructed as a sedative, and took its place alongside the other antidepressants.
However, in the USA, within a cultural context of general uncertainty, a specific ideological,
industrial and professional conflict precipitated between Eli Lilly and the Scientologists
(representing, respectively, forms of biological and behavioural psychiatry). The following
section describes this conflict and uncertainty, which dramatically impacted Prozac's diffusion in
the USA.
7 Lilly, the FDA and the Scientologists
This section studies the conflict between Lilly and the Scientologists, which strongly influenced
the diffusion of Prozac in the USA. References to Prozac began to percolate into the mass
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media in the mid-1980s, based around its possible use as a diet drug. From 1988 until 1989
Prozac was prominently featured in the mass media as a miraculous antidepressant (Grady
1990, Powers 1990, Trudeau 1992), although Lilly remained wary of publicly endorsing such
claims (Debrovner 1994). By 1990 Prozac was the most popular antidepressant in the US and
one of the best selling drugs of all time (Grady 1990).
In 1990 Kramer published the influential and well marketed 'Listening to Prozac' (Anonymous
1994q, Rothman 1994) which was a best seller for many monthes (Newnham 1995a), and was
eventually published in the UK. Kramer emphasised how Prozac allegedly transformed patients'
behaviour (Bezchlibnyk-butler 1994, Debrovner 1994). Prozac's discovery was compared to
Freud's discovery of the unconscious (Brophy 1994) since its alleged uncovery of 'rejection
anxiety' as a new treatable area signalled that progressively smaller personality variations were
biologically based and susceptible to treatment. In fact, prophylactic treatment was necessary,
since damage could grow (Brophy 1994), and such a proactive stance towards 'cosmetic
pharmacology' struck a chord in the American psyche (Anonymous 1994e), being associated
with a '..sleek high technology designer drug.' (Robson-Scott 1993:16) Such ideas and language
were picked up in the UK. e.g. Vogue talked of 'designer brains' (Jaret 1994:394).
A crucial assumption Kramer made was that Prozac was not a 'drug', and did not induce false
synthetic experiences, but merely removed obstacles to feeling more content and relaxed
(Kramer 1993a). It was thus argued that if an individual's condition could be treated by an
antidepressant, such as Prozac, then it must be depression, and they must have required
treatment to return them to their normal state. This circular argument relied on the assumption
that Prozac had no independent, stimulus, effect of its own (Anonymous 1996e). Disagreement
erupted over whether Prozac simply cured the effects of low level depression and enabled
people to become less risk-averse (Debrovner 1994, Bower 1994a, Turkington 1994), whether it
altered people's personalities (Bower 1994a), or was simply a mood lifting agent (stimulant)
(Gram 1994) (similar to cocaine and amphetamine) (Mauro and Breggin 1994). Prozac
appeared to act as an anti-empathy agent, narrowing patients emotional spectrums, and was
thus similar to other stimulants which desensitise and disconnect the individual from themselves
and their environment (Mauro and Breggin 1994, Bracewell 1993). A final perspective viewed
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Prozac as simply a new antidepressant (Bezchlibnyk-butler 1994, Anonymous 1996d) with a
strong placebo effect. The placebo effect (based in trust and belief) has frequently been
observed to be very powerful (especially in antidepressant treatments (Appleton 1997), and it
seems reasonable to assume that, given the overwhelmingly positive media attention that it
received, that the placebo effect on mildy depressed patients could be very potent (Cooper
1994, Mauro and Breggin 1994, Barondes 1994), especially if Prozac carried stimulant like
properties (Breggin 1994, Mauro and Breggin 1994.
The media became transfixed by Prozac's alleged (Freeman 1994, Breggin 1994) powers to
transform personality for 10% of its users (Kramer 1993a, Barshinger et al 1995, Nichols and
Chisholm 1994, Anonymous 1994e, Nichols and Chisholm 1994, Turkington 1994) (making
them feel, in Kramer's terms, 'better than well'), challenging the frontier of whether the self was
social, spiritual or biological (Freeman 1994), and enabling healthy people to use drugs to
change aspects of their personality (represented in Kramer's phrase 'cosmetic pharmacology')
(Debrovner 1994, James and Camden 1993, Shorter 1997).
Prozac became the 'go for it' drug for the independent and individualistic 1990s, promoting
valued personality traits such as self-confidence, social poise, energy, accessibility,
assertiveness, seemingly without side effects or addiction (Lears 1993), and was particularly
useful for women in achieving their independence (Robson-Scott 1993). Such a drug seemed
particularly appropriate for the US: ' Nobody likes a gloomy Gus. Especially not Americans. Our
dominant cultural institutions -- from high schools to advertising agencies -- celebrate a notion of
"personality" that is relentlessly upbeat, sociable and energetic. For Europeans, the American
cocktail party, a ritual of the holiday season, can be an ordeal of forced hilarity and endless
recitations of professional success. This willed optimism shapes notions of mental health. On
National Public Radio, a psychiatrist recently announced that six weeks is plenty of time to
mourn the loss of a loved one; after that the survivor is showing dangerous signs of obsessional
behavior and had better seek professional help. Six weeks! No time to mope in can-do America;
best to be up and at 'em.' (Lears 1993:01). Kramer commented "There's an eerie confluence
between what Prozac does and what society demands. Precisely, society demands a kind of
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muscular assertiveness' (Anonymous 1994q:25). The public began experimenting with Prozac
(Cookson 1992)
Lilly, however, was publicly wary of such sweeping and controversial endorsements. Cosmetic
pharmacology (use of drugs with few side effects to lift common anxiety and depression) has a
long history. 'Providence' was sold in 1700 as a form of miraculous and costless relief from
misery (Anonymous 1996a), and concentrated opium (on which it was based) became widely
prescribed (as morphia) alongside cocaine. In the 1950s and 1960s barbituates and
amphetamines were prescribed to cure depression and fatigue (Mauro and Breggin 1994, Lader
1994), followed by the equally addictive benzodiazepines in the 1960s (Newnham 1995b),
Miltown (1955) was the first specific psychiatric drug to be the focus of a popular frenzy, followed
by Librium and the very successful Valium (1963), who's addictiveness was not recognised for
10 years (Nichols and Chisholm 1994, Anonymous 1996d). By 1970 20% of American women
were using minor tranquilisers, and psychiatry had become a prescribing profession (Shorter
1997).
The Prozac debate thus crossed into issues around gender and power; "Women are the
majority users of Prozac and other mood-altering drugs; Kramer believes these have become
"feminist drugs in that they free women from inhibiting consequences of trauma". But in "curing"
women of traditionally passive, feminine traits, the drugs may be reinforcing other cultural
expectations. And like Betty Friedan's groundbreaking concept of the 1950s housewife with a
trouble that "had no name", many women on Prozac are "patients without diagnosis". Rather
than address the problems that drive twice as many women as men to seek psychotherapy,
Prozac may simply be dulling the pain and equipping them for battle in a post-feminist society. It
might be the latest in a long line of mother's insidious little helpers. "(Wheelwright 1994:54)
Lilly criticised Kramer for trivialising depression and creating unrealistic expectations (Newnham
1995a, Anonymous 1994e), describing him as "a part-time psychiatrist and writer" and his book
as "anecdotal", being based on "personal observations of a few patients . . . not on controlled
research" Oilman 1994b:21)
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Prozac thus slotted neatly into a classic elixir paradigm, being viewed as a drug which enabled
people to realise their aspirations painlessly. The attention focused on Prozac almost inevitably
meant it had to collapse, as part of the drama (Grady 1990). Its wide application (e.g. weight
loss, binge eating, PMT, postpartum blues) and identification with women (Nichols and Chisholm
1994) meant it began to be compared with Miltown, Valium, Librium and other 'mothers little
helpers', linking it to forms of social control and unknown dangers (e.g. addiction) (Kramer
1993a, Anonymous 1993j, Bass 1990, Angier 1990)
The fall came in September 1989 (Hegarty 1995), when Wesbecker, a depressed man taking
Prozac, massacred his work colleagues in Kentucky. Survivors and relatives of the victims sued
Lilly, claiming that Prozac triggered the rampage (Mondi 1994). The 'Prozac defense' began to
be introduced by lawyers into criminal trials (Span 1991, Hegarty 1995, Bracewell 1993, Nichols
and Chisholm 1994), and the high profile Wesbecker case was the first of some 160 civil suits,
related to suicide and aggression, to be tried (Mondi 1994, O'Malley 1996).
In early 1990, before the case came to trial, a report by Teicher in the American Journal of
Psychiatry surmised that Prozac increased suicidal and violent tendencies amongst seriously
depressed patients, estimating that up to 3.5% of patients might be effected (Kramer 1993a,
Schuchman and Wilkes 1990, Favazza 1990). This report was picked up by the mass media,
tapping as it did into popular fears and uncertainties around the use of psychiatric drugs
(Turkington 1994, Hegarty 1995), causing Prozacs sales to plummet (Turkington 1994,
Anonymous 1991k).
This was followed by a high profile lawsuit against Lilly (Kramer 1993a), launched by a woman
claiming that Prozac had induced her to attempt suicide (Grady 1990), which rapidly escalated
into a class action lawsuit (Marson 1990) (Grady 1990). Eventually, over 100 suicide related
lawsuits were fought, including prominent ones involving minor media celebrities (Anonymous
1991n).
The Church of Scientology (a powerful and abusive religious-business cult, promoting its own
expensive brand of mental therapy) encouraged and organised much of this activity. Scientology
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was effectively a competing business in the psychiatry, psychiatry and religious arena (Petit
1991), and was a long standing and vocal opponent of the psychiatry industry (e.g.
Psychebusters) (Hegarty 1995, Trudeau 1992). The church had created the Citizens
Commission on Human Rights (Grady 1990). in 1969 to expose psychiatric abuses of human
rights. The Scientologists orchestrated a high profile campaign against Prozac, Eli Lilly and the
FDA, organising the collection and dissemination of evidence linking Prozac to suicidal and
violent behaviour, sponsoring law suits and petitioning the FDA to withdraw the drug, which they
claimed Lilly had not tested properly (Kramer 1993a, Trudeau 1992, Burrows and Norman 1994,
Span 1991, Mondi 1994, Cooper 1994). The Scientologists unconventional subjective beliefs
could thus be woven into a more objective conventional perception, enabling them to promote a
sense of community with themselves and their ideas through the example of Prozac. Prozac,
again, carried metaphors and associations far beyond its substance.
The pharmaceutical industry and regulatory bodies work closely together (Manders 1995), and
this situation can encourage bribery and fraud (Chu 1989, Olson 1991). Despite claims by both
the FDA and Lilly (Nichols and Chisholm 1994, Alexander 1997), Prozac was not tested
extensively in the US (Mauro and Breggin 1994), for prolonged periods (Grady 1990), or on a
realistic population of potential patients (Cowley et al 1990, Abraham 1994). Statistical
maneuverings were necessary to accentuate its positive effects (Mauro and Breggin 1994). The
activities of the FDA are under far more potential public scrutiny than that of the Committee on
the Safety of Medicines (or its successor, the MCA), and neither country is concerned with cost
or cost effectiveness (Walley and Barton 1995). Government policy in the UK seems particularly
inconsistent, since the DoH encourages cost awareness whilst supporting the pharmaceutical
industry (Gilbert and Chetley 1996).
Lilly, allying itself with the FDA, launched a media attack against the Scientologists, relying on a
different discourse based in a scientific and statistical lexicon, articulated through more
'objective' bureaucratic processes (Trudeau 1992, Schwartz 1991). Lilly directly contacted
clinicians, offering to indemnify them against law suits linked to Prozac, whilst offering to help
any prosecutor facing the 'Prozac defense' (Trudeau 1992, Span 1991, Zerbe 1992, McMahon
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1992, Petit 1991). Stories related to Prozac were featured extensively in the mass media
(Kramer 1993a, Debrovner 1994).
Meanwhile, Lilly attacked the credibility of Teicher's original report (Wood 1994a, Burrows and
Horman 1994, Grady 1990, Marcus 1990). The FDA concurred with Lilly (Debrovner 1994),
believing that Teicher suffered from ascertainment bias (was proactively searching for
symptoms) (Grady 1990, Talan 1990). However, more mainstream organisations were also
pressing Lilly. Nader's Public Citizen Health Research Group campaigned for Lilly to notify
Prozac users of the suicide risk (Anonymous 1991n). Under intense pressure, and losing the
media war, Lilly voluntarily added 'suicidal ideation' to the list of risks on the package insert in
May 1990 (Marcus 1990), and introduced a smaller 10mg tablet to soothe clinicians' fears
(Brenza 1995, Trudeau 1992)
In May 1991 Time magazine launched a furious attack on Scientology (Rock 1993), which the
Scientologists vigorously responded to. Amusingly, this incident forced the company providing
public relations for the Scientologists to reject its account, since another company in its group
worked for Lilly (Levin 1991, Debrovner 1994).
Debate raged about the possible links between Prozac, suicide and violence. Suicidal ideation is
a common occurrence in depressed patients, especially in the early stages of treatment
(Hegarty 1995, Petit 1991, Anonymous 1994e), but it was thought that specific classes of
antidepressants could differentially influences the actual occurrence of suicide (Hegarty 1995).
Suicidal ideation was linked to akathisia (Kawcett 1997), agitation (Talan 1990), also termed
'caffeine syndrome' (Cowley et al 1990) (Anonymous 1994e), which up to 15% of Prozac
patients experienced (Talan 1990, Cowley et al 1990, Anonymous 1994e). Such paradoxical
outcomes had been observed in other drugs e.g. the benzodiazepines, used as sedatives,
sometimes caused disinhibited behaviour and excitement (Patrick and Howells 1991, Healy
1994). Prozac could thus cause an akathisia-like extrapyramidal reaction, inducing a small
subset of patients to consider or attempt suicide (Tueth 1994)
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Suicide data is notoriously unreliable (Jick et al 1995), its volume is so small that it is difficult to
measure meaningfully in small groups, and placebo RCTs rarely enable study of specific sub-
groups on whom risks may be different (Kramer 1993a, Guy 1992). The rapid increase in the
rate of Prozac's use could mean that a relatively rare side effect could appear in volume (Grady
1990). Most psychologists rejected this alleged link (Beasley et al 1991, Beasley 1991), and
selection biases riddled trials demonstrating higher rates of suicide for Prozac (Jick et al 1995).
In the UK the evidence has similarly fluctuated, as different trials, reports and data sets have
reported different things. e.g. Prescription Event Monitoring reported that Fluoxetine was
associated with higher suicide rates than Fluvoxamine, another SSRI, but it is hard to know
whether patients were comparable, and whether a placebo (expectation) effect was occuring
(Edwards 1995, Hegarty 1995).
Meanwhile, Lilly won the Wesbecker case, after publicly refusing to settle out of court (Petit
1991). However, a secret settlement did occur, in which the plaintiffs were given large
undisclosed sums so that potentially damaging evidence (related to Lilly's established guilt in
withholding evidence on the dangerous side effects of their drug Oraflex / Opren (Wolpert
1996)) would not be presented, Lilly commented that the agreement included '"some financial
considerations designed to protect both sides" ' (Cornwell and Tyler 1996). The judge and Lilly
were at odds as to his knowledge of this agreement (Cornwell and Tyler 1996:backpage). The
jury, however, after listening to 6 weeks of technical evidence, required only a few hours to
acquit Lilly, causing Lilly to comment: '"The science was with us, there's just no evidence [that
fluoxetine causes] suicidal and aggressive behavior." '(Hegarty 1995).
Similarly, Lilly won every suit linking Prozac to suicide, since there was no 'objective scientific'
link, suicide was associated with depression, and it was easy to establish that perpetrators had
shown, at some point, prior orientations (Kramer 1993a, Petit 1991, Mondi 1994).
After conducting an inquiry and review, the FDA concluded, in September 1991 (Anonymous
1991n), that there was no realistic evidence linking Prozac or other antidepressants to suicidal
or violent ideation (Anonymous 1994e). The FDA did not require Lilly to change its warnings or
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prescribing practices (Petit 1991, Shenot 1991), and took the unusual step of publishing its
decision in the national press, to counter the publicity of the Scientologists (Dickinson 1991).
Prozac's high priority thus caused it to almost become the king's champion for biological
psychiatry, triggering attacks by the Scientologists, who sponsored a wide ranging legal,
legislative and media war on Lilly, Prozac and the FDA. Such criticisms interfaced with the
emergence of evidence linking the drug to suicide and violence, and although Lilly, and the
FDA's, claims of legitimacy eventually prevailed, Lilly was forced to amend the list of contra-
indications for Prozac, whilst sales were stalled. The media frenzy around this conflict was
interpreted differently in the UK and USA, but had a dramatic impact on Prozac's US sales.
8 Comment
The study of Prozac began by outlining the extremely subjective nature of depression, which
appears to be the latest incarnation of anxiety, neurosis, panic etc. The emergence of a simple
theory (the underlying principles of which are somewhat problematic) in the 1950s underlay a
general rush by the pharmaceutical industry to discover a compound which would only effect the
serotonin neurotransmitter. A drug with less side effects would have much greater application,
and enable progressively lower levels of behavioural variation to be addressed. In addition, the
market for psychiatric drugs was a chronic one, requiring profitable maintenance regimes for
life.
Eli Lilly discovered such a compound in the 1970s, and undertook trials with it. During this time,
however, Lilly was undergoing structural, political and economic problems, culminating in their
humiliating admission that Lilly had withheld critical data from the FDA concerning the drug
Opren, which caused fatalities and was subsequently withdrawn. During the 1980s, Lilly's growth
rate stagnated, especially as its remaining profitable drugs came off patent. The pharmaceutical
industry is characterised by take-over, and Lilly helped maintain its share price by rumouring that
Prozac would be marketed as a diet drug (with a huge potential market). However, Prozac was
marketed as an antidepressant, although it remained associated with temporary weight loss.
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Prozac, as the first SSRI in the US, was strongly promoted. Within a few monthes extravagant
claims were made about its effectiveness, and its ability to transform, stimulate and reshape
people in the form of vigorous independence so valued by American society, acting as a
stimulant. Crucially, it seemed that its reduced clinical costs (a different side effect profile, non-
toxic in overdose, and taken by a simple single daily dose) meant many more people could be
treated with it, for much lower levels of malady. Consequently, the placebo effect was much
more powerful for these individuals. Prozac's range of use increased in the US, and clinicians
and patients began to experiment with it widely. However, whilst being regarded as an almost
'wonder drug' in the US, it was received with scepticism in the UK, where it was regarded as
simply another antidepressant.
Prozac's alleged low side effects encouraged clinicians to apply it for a wide and expanding
range of applications, many of which were unfounded, or based on dubious technology
assessments. However, such widespread use created a backlash against Prozac, which was
argued most forcibly by the Scientologists (representing the view that identity emerges not from
biology and chemistry, but from a more mystical and subjective spiritual self). Such issues are
highly contentious and emotionally charged, and different groups have struggled and negotiated
over where the boundary lays between these two perspective. In the 20th century the debate
has been centred around the biological and behavioural psychologists, who promoted biological
/ chemical or talk based therapies, respectively. In the USA, where Prozac was viewed as a
major technological breakthrough, debate about it overflowed into the public sphere through the
mass media. The public and patients therefore became active players in the clinical decision
making process, whilst in the UK prescribing practice seems to have been much more
centralised under clinical control. Consequently, in the USA Prozac's sales began to parallel
media debates.
Meanwhile, clinicians in the US were encouraged (by managed care companies) to prescribe
Prozac, as a way of avoiding complicated and prolonged medical transactions, and the expense
of talk therapy. By contrast, the UK government struggled to dissuade clinicians from prescribing
Prozac, on costs grounds (although largely without success).
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Crucially, Prozac was linked to suicide and violence, and such reports were nurtured by the
Scientologists, who launched a ferocious media and litigation campaign against Lilly and the
FDA. For a time the doubts around Prozac halted its sales growth, despite Lilly's efforts to
indemnify prescribers and users against legal costs, and Lilly's grudging acceptance of the
suicide risk related to Prozac. Ultimately, however, the FDA endorsed the safety of Prozac,
despite having little knowledge about its long term effects.
However, once Prozac was cleared of the associations with suicide and violence, and as society
became more comfortable with an expanded biological basis to personality, Prozac sales were
able to resume their upward course. Eli Lilly, resisting emerging competition from other
pharmaceutical companies and their SSRls, succeeded in having Prozac approved for various
other indications e.g. bulimia, obsessive compulsive disorder etc. Subsequently, Prozac's costs
have mounted, and US managed care companies have begun to introduce bureaucratic means
to contain its use.
Endnotes
1 Personal Communication - Academic General Practitioner England
2 Personal Communication- Academic Psychologist UK, Academic General Practitioner UK
3 Personal Communication Academic General Practitioner England
4 Personal Communication General Practitioner England
5 Personal Communication- Community Psychiatrist UK
6 Personal Communication Community General Practitioner England
7 Personal Communication Community General Practitioner England
8 Personal Communication Academic General Practitioner England
240
Chapter 8 
Conclusion
1 Introduction
This study has been concerned with understanding the forces which motivate and shape the
innovation and diffusion of medical technologies, since this is of major concern to most
governments in the industrialised world, and an area of much wider theoretical interest. This
final chapter summarises what has been theorised, discussed and found.
Section two describes why medical technology is an important issue (Chapter 1) and sets the
context within which the issue will be studied (Chapter 4). The main point is that medical
technologies are a key factor generating medical costs, which are a problem for all industrialised
countries, even those with such diverse health care systems as the UK and the US (which are
the settings for the studies).
Little is known about the forces motivating and shaping the innovation and diffusion of medical
technologies, and so section three considers how the issue can be addressed Chapter 2).
Innovation and diffusion curves are produced by combinations of formative factors (the agency
can be considered as combinations of the decision maker, the technology, and the environment)
driven by motivating forces (economics, politics, social factors, ideologies, technologies). The
purpose is to discover the identity of the primary agency (the decision maker, the technology
itself, or the environment) in shaping innovation and diffusion, and which factors effect these
agencies (economics, political, social factors, ideologies and technologies).
The methodology (Chapter 3) chosen was the international, comparative, multiple case study
approach. By studying three different types of technology (device, drug and surgical procedure)
in two different contexts (the UK and the US) it is possible to control for both technological type
and environmental setting, and thus derive the effect of either, whilst using qualitative analysis to
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understand what groups were influencing decision making, and the forces that were operating
upon them.
Section four draws out the similarities and differences of the case studies, identifying the key
decision makers, the forces that motivated them and the factors that shaped their actions. It
analyses why technology assessment is generally ineffective, within a critique of the linear
model of medical innovation and development. Finally, it suggests some options for improving
policy making in this area. Section five concludes the study, emphasising the theoretical
propositions contained, and suggesting ways that the work can constructively be taken forward.
2 Context-The Nature of the Problem
This section summarises the context within which the case studies occurred, and largely
summarises chapters 1 and 4. The cost of providing health care in industrialised countries has
increased dramatically in the postwar period. Whether publicly or privately supported or
provided, these costs are considered damaging to international competitiveness, especially
since the production and consumption of healthcare tends to be a strictly domestic transaction
(and so cannot be easily exported). The bulk of this spending is supported by the public sector,
either directly (e.g. the NHS both sponsors and provides care) or indirectly (e.g. Medicare pays
private providers to deliver care, and privately financed health insurance is often tax deductible),
giving it a high political profile (Breheny et al 1992, Appleby 1992, Ham 1993).
The debate about the size, shape and nature of health care provision continues to develop
(Donaldson 1995), but in a general context where there is little agreement about what form the
issues take, and how they should be addressed. The health care sector is thus a political, as
well as an economic, 'live wire'. In the UK a political decision was imposed upon the NHS in
1991 (the internal market), which has not only failed to deliver the anticipated benefits (cost
efficiency and consumer choice), but may have even increased demands for resources (by
politicising health care). Similarly, in the US, attempts to engineer a political solution (the Clinton
Health Care Bill 1992) failed, forcing the withdrawal of the Federal government, and the
imposition of managed competition by large businesses in the private sector. However, such
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systems have, like their peers in the UK, failed to contain costs, and have been branded for
reducing quality. Consequently, the debate about health care becomes more pressing, more
open, and more emotionally charged by ethical and political issues concerning the rights and
responsibilities of individuals and communities (Calman 1994). In the UK, such issues strike an
ideological chord, and local hospital disputes mushroom into heated national debates (Timmins
1994, Rogers and Driscoll 1994, Ross 1994, Wall 1994, Freemantle et al 1993, Salter 1993,
Ranade 1995).
Crucially, there is growing doubt about the efficacy of much of this spending (Bayley 1995,
Rublee 1994, Pendrous 1991). Such concerns have undermined the traditional legitimacy that
financiers (the public and private sectors) granted to clinicians (Griffith et al 1987). Meanwhile,
however the pervasive ignorance surrounding medical practice, particularly its efficacy, (Smith
1994) has crippled attempts to quantify and bureaucratise health care delivery. Consequently,
clinicians still determine most medical practice, and such a position is largely supported by a
public wary of managers and bureaucrats. Clinicians continue to enjoy widespread popular
moral authority in defining and hence determining medical practice, and it has proved difficult for
financiers to exert effective and consistent control over their activities. Thus the UK's more
administrative system, and the US's more market based one, have not operated to guide
clinicians decision making effectively (Donaldson 1995), and neither system has succeeded in
achieving either an efficient or effective allocation of health care resources, even with growing
costs.
Attention has become focused on costs, which are essentially composed of the technologies
that are available to clinicians (expanding the definitions of what they can effect, when and
where) (Rublee 1994, Gelijns 1992, Hutton et al 1991, Orton and Fry 1995, Griffith et al 1987)
and the populations they can use these on (expanding the range of who can be effected, how
and why) (Parker 1995). At present neither issue seems controllable, since technologies are
widely endorsed, and are surrounded by a community (the medical industrial complex) which is
considered to be legitimate (socially and ideologically), and also has vast technical, political and
economic power. Demographic change (principally the ageing of the population) is very difficult
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to control, particularly in liberal western democracies. Governments, and financiers, are
therefore faced with an almost intractable problem.
Consequently, they have essentially tinkered with systems of financing and provision. Both the
UK and the US have either directly introduced (the NHS internal market) or facilitated the
introduction of (managed care in the US) systems of managed competition, which seek to cap
health care budgets, and centralise the financial risks (costs) of health care provision on those
making the decisions regarding clinical care (benefits), namely clinicians. However, such efforts
have proved largely fruitless, since clinicians are able to draw on their popular legitimacy and
marshall political opposition to such policies at the local and national levels. Similarly, attempts
to control expenditure on long term, chronic, care for the elderly have also been largely issues of
virement. Public responsibilities have been privatised in some instances (e.g. restrictions on
public spending on nursing home care), but often expenditure continues to rise anyway, as
personal private assets are liquidated (e.g. houses sold to finance residential care). Policies to
ration care, either explicitly or implicitly (Timmins 1995), are politically dangerous.
In view of these political constraints, financiers have focused resources on analysing the costs
and benefits of particular forms of medical care, enabling them to use this separate source of
information to influence medical practice. (Rublee 1994 These mainly centre around technology
assessment (indeed, this forms the central nexus in the recently instituted NHS Research and
Development program (Smith 1993,1994, Laurance 1995), and resources are being
concentrated on this area, and on the ways to carry such assessments into practice through
clinicians (e.g. dissemination, regulation etc.) (Tunis and Gelband 1994, Banta D et al 1995,
Frazier and Mosteller 1995, Drummond 1980, Blank and Mills 1989). The assumption is that if
independent, reliable information can be gathered and disseminated, then managerial and
clinical decisions makers will act according to its propositions (preventing the premature and
inappropriate diffusion of new medical technologies (Smith 1993, Laurance 1995). The difficulty
is thus premised around gathering reliable and meaningful information, and then disseminating
(communicating) this in an effective way. The subsequent adoption and utilisation patterns
would then inform innovation, guiding it towards cost effective technologies that delivered the
'most bang for their buck'.
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However, as has been amply demonstrated, technology assessment is very difficult even in
optimal circumstances. In a more realistic situation, where there is general disequilibrium in the
environment (e.g. changing applications, changing technologies around the specific technology,
changing perceptions of costs and benefits, changing cascades of interventions etc.), and in the
technology itself (e.g. a changing technology, changing utilisation and application patterns etc.),
technology assessments are frequently obsolete by the time of their completion, and can only
legitimately inform the very vaguest of guidelines or principles. In addition, the mechanisms
underlying such assessments are open to criticism. Most importantly, however, technology
assessments do not lead clinical activity, but are led by it. Consequently, by the time a
technology has been assessed, it has usually already become standard medical practice. In
order to be useful, therefore, technology assessment must be timely, but the window of
opportunity for this is short (if it even exists, since often utilisation and experimentation occur
simultaneously).
Crucially, technology assessment findings seem to have only a limited effect on adoption and
utilisation (the consumption of medical technology), and thus, through feedback mechanisms,
on research and development (the production of medical technology). It therefore appears that
there are other factors, in addition to technical issues, that drive the adoption of new
technologies e.g. economic, political, social, ideological (Gelijns and Halm 1991). A primary aim
of this study is to understand what forces do motivate and shape these processes.
However, such forces and factors are liable to manifest themselves differently according to
contexts. The UK and the USA provide good examples of countries which are sufficiently
similar, and yet different, to enable useful comparisons. Chapter 4 studies many of these
aspects, in terms of culture, government, and systems of production and consumption of health
care.
The UK and the USA are based on fundamentally different models. The US is a more
competitive, pluralistic, and mobile society, emphasising individual rights within an explicit
contract with a fragmented and diverse government. The US is based around a more fluid and
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competitive market system than the UK, which is more tightly structured. The UK is more
homogenous and static, with a greater emphasis on collective duties, and ruled over by a unitary
government. The countries health care systems have developed in different ways, but have
been based on similar principles e.g. the clinicians right to make clinical decisions without
restraint. However, both systems have experienced a lack of faith in this arrangement, and have
sought ways to contain health care costs, primarily through giving direction to clinical decision
making. Common organisational technologies have been applied to these problems (e.g.
decentralised clinical budgets, cost constraint etc.), epitomised in the model of managed care
which is set within the context of managed competition, causing the 2 countries health care
systems to converge.
Postwar public and private spending nourished a burgeoning medical industrial complex,
especially in the US. Governments are concerned with regard to the costs and safety of
technology (regulation and payment), whilst seeking to encourage beneficial technologies which
can also be widely exported. Consequently, government policies towards the regulation of drugs
and devices are vague and contradictory, especially in the UK, where the pharmaceutical
industry is one of the few indigenous high technology industries. Surgical innovation remains
almost entirely unregulated, enabling procedures to rapidly appear and diffuse.
This section has summarised the major problem of healthcare. Health care costs rise almost
uncontrollably, the efficacy of medical activity is largely unproven, causing its cost effectiveness
to be dubious. However, simultaneously, health care is a realm of intense political, moral and
ethical debate, almost devoid of reliable theoretical relationship upon which workable policies
can be based. Different governments have instituted various policies to manage the health care
system, but these have mainly centred around devolving decision making authority to clinicians,
and supporting the growth of the medical industrial complex (which is viewed as economically
and politically desirable). The expanse of the health care sector means that government policies
are riddled with contradictions.
Central to the problem, therefore, is an uncertainty about the value of medical care. Traditionally
financiers have left medical decision making to clinicians, assuming that they were the most
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legitimate group to make these choices, and that they would act according to the patients best
interests in view of the technology. Essentially it was a model of technological determinism.
Financiers concerns about the cost of technology have encouraged them to intervene, in some
cases, more actively in the decision making process- to encourage the inclusion of costs, as
well as benefits, in clinical decision making. Technology assessment is a key tool in this
process, and clinicians are encouraged to implement the findings through clinical protocols.
These tools, however, are theoretically and practically difficult, and rely on the continued
assumption that medical practice is guided by a desire for clinical efficacy (technological
determinism). If this is not the case, then such policies are placebos at best.
In a nutshell, technology assessment has been seized on as a solution to the health care
problem, but it will only work if clinicians are indeed motivated by clinical efficacy (which is the
traditional model of technological determinism). The aim of the study is to assess to what
degree this is the case (i.e. clinicians are the key decision makers, and they are motivated by
clinical efficacy). The following section discusses the theoretical and methodological approach of
the study.
3 Approaching the Problem: Theory and Methodology
Having identified the key problem to be addressed, Chapter two merges a model of motivation,
with a model of context, to enable the analysis of innovation and diffusion patterns. Policy is
currently based on the assumption that rational factors motivate clinicians in their technological
decision making. Chapter 3 then proposes a methodology by which these theoretical models
can be tested.
Several factors can be considered to effect innovation and adoption decisions, and hence
diffusion curves. Classical diffusion theory provides a model of the formative structures which
channel action. Principally these are formative factors around the agency (e.g. clinicians are
liable to bring different concerns and perspectives to issues than are managers, community
representatives, policy makers or the general public), and the communication channels through
which information flows (e.g. the more links to others that a particular decision maker has, the
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more likely they are to gather knowledge quickly). the technology itself (the type of technology
itself (e.g. intuitively it is more difficult to adopt an MRI than it is to prescribe a months supply of
Prozac), and the environment (e.g. degree of centralisation in decision making, the volume of
financing available, a populations acceptance of a technique etc.),
Sociological theory provides the second set of forces, which primarily affect the agency, and
provide the motives for action. These substantive forces can be based around technical,
economic, political, social and ideological factors, and these are tied to several broad theoretical
schools. Thus technological determinists have conceived of technologies dominance, Marxists
have classically focused on the pre-eminence of economic factors, and Weberian sociologists
have variously placed emphasis on the social, political and ideological components. Leading
from Weber, Alford has emphasised the role of political forces in medical decision making,
whilst Feminists have highlighted the ideological imperatives underlying patriarchy, and Fidler
noted that British businessmen felt disempowered by their low social status, despite their wealth
and political influence. These motivating forces propel diffusion, but also interact with formative
forces, which shape the innovation process and the diffusion curve.
Traditionally, it has been assumed that clinicians are central in determining the diffusion of
medical technologies, and in informing the research underlying innovation, both of which are
informed by their clinical concerns (technological determinism). Effectively this forms a simple
model, in which the clinician is the main agency, informed by the technologies clinical efficacy
(technological determinism). It is this model which lies at the heart of the technology
assessment component of the NHS Research and Development Strategy. It is thus the
components of this model which are being studied, to test its overall representativeness and
coherence. If the model is not found to be realistic, then the strategy is liable to fail.
In order to analyse where agency lay, and what influenced agency, and hence shaped the
innovation and diffusion process, an international comparative case study methodology was
chosen. Three high profile technologies were chosen, and their innovation and diffusion patterns
were traced in the UK and the US, whilst a qualitative background study set the context for their
patterns. Such a structure enabled a single technology to be compared between different
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countries (and thereby trace the effect of environment) and the influence of a single environment
to be seen on 3 technologies (and thus assess the influence of the technology types).
Meanwhile, the qualitative data collected would enable not only these issues to be fleshed out,
but also enable the influence of clinicians, managers and the general public to be derived. The
following section summarises the findings from each of the case studies.
4 Case Study Findings
Radiologists specialise in diagnostic imaging, but do not have a legal monopoly over it. Other
clinical groups actively seek to regain control of patient diagnosis. Consequently, radiologists are
dependant on claims to technological expertise, and work closely with large manufacturers,
together forming the radiological establishment. This establishment sought to dominate
technological innovation, and insure that it matched the interests of the radiological community
(which effectively formed a risk bearing network).
However, in the 1970s the community was threatened by the emergence of CT, and then MRI.
MRI was based on an old technology, which was applied to in-vivo imaging, and which was
originally targeted for applications in cancer screening (as part of the 'war on cancer). Both CT
and MRI emerged from outside of the radiological establishment, and threatened to undermine
radiological control over diagnostic imaging (upon which the profession and the industry
depended). Whilst CT was easily incorporated since it was based on x rays, MRI was much
more difficult, since it used magnetic fields, and required a different set of skills to use.
Originally there was no consensus regarding the applications of MRI, and numerous producer
and consumer groups rushed to fill this void with their own interpretations (e.g. neurologists,
nuclear medicine, small companies etc). The radiological community was the most threatened
by MRI, since if it became the dominant imaging technology, and radiologists did not control it,
then radiological control over diagnostic imaging would cease, and with it their professional
status.
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Radiologists fought vigorously to control MRI, emphasising morphological imaging (instead of
chemical analysis, which was more the area of nuclear medicine), rushing to buy machines and
establish expertise and research skills, and changing the device's name from Nuclear Magnetic
Resonance to Magnetic Resonance Imaging. Radiologists were assisted in these endeavours
by the large industrial components of the radiological establishment, and by 1985 radiologists
had largely come to dominate the use of MRI. Subsequently, radiologists have expanded the
applications of MRI, invested in extensive research agendas with it, and lobbied for its use as
the standard first line diagnostic imaging tool. Effectively, it has acted as a tool of
professionalisation.
Despite such industriousness, however, clinical efficacy is relatively unproven outside of the
central nervous system, and even here the technology shows little impact on patient outcomes.
Consequently, the cost effectiveness of MRI (clinical benefit versus economic cost) does not
justify its expansive utilisation and diffusion, causing it to distort healthcare provision. In both the
UK and the US, radiologists and hospital managers have worked together to gain access to
MRI, which is viewed as a symbol of quality care and technological prowess. The forces
propelling the adoption and utilisation of MRI appear to be more related to professional politics
than clinical value.
The Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy case study found a similar pattern. General surgery was the
original form of surgery, and hence carried high prestige. However, over time general surgery
had fragmented into specialisms, emaciating the parent discipline. General surgeons only
maintained control of the gallbladder, and they were facing an uncertain future. This uncertainty
was reinforced by their cultural reluctance to adopt the minimally invasive tools or techniques of
inferior specialisms (gynaecology, gastroenterology), which cost them areas of surgery (e.g.
gastroenterologists had begun using endoscopes to extract gallstones from the bile duct).
In the 1980s gastroenterologists and interventional radiologists began to experiment with
chemical therapies and lithotripsy (respectively) on the gallstone. Such a combination had
already largely swept kidney stone surgery away in the early 1980s, and with it the monopoly
held by urology surgeons. General surgeons were acutely aware of their vulnerability to these
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minimally invasive therapies, and that their hold over the gallbladder was slipping. In this
environment, several surgeons adopted laparoscopic and endoscopic tools from gynaecologists
and gastroenterologists, and applied them to cholecystectomy, producing a laparoscopic version
of it.
This surgical technique rapidly diffused throughout the surgical community, and effectively
blocked the further development of billiary lithotripsy and chemical therapies. However, diffusion
was entirely uncontrolled, leading to numerous problems and conflicts regarding safety, costs,
training and credentialing etc. This rapid diffusion was fueled by general surgeons fears
regarding these alternative technologies, but also by the possibility that gastroenterologists,
endoscopists, gynaecologists and interventional radiologists would lay claim to laparoscopic
cholecystectomy. Training was largely unregulated, and surgical injury rates rose as surgeons
trained on patients. High profile instances of injury forced the academic surgical community to
introduce internal regulation within the profession.
Surgeons promoted laparoscopic cholecystectomy on the basis of reduced costs (short inpatient
stay, rapid return to work). However, surgeons increased their fees for the new technique,
serious complication rates increased, and secondary procedures had to be undertaken to
remove bile duct stones. Crucially, the perception of reduced clinical costs to the patient caused
the threshold for surgery to fall- so that it shifted from a required major operation to an almost
optional diagnostic one. Consequently, gallbladder surgery rates have doubled in both the UK
and the USA. Although the technology to undertake this surgery existed previously, general
surgeons only developed the surgery in response to political and economic threats from other
clinical groups.
The Prozac case study, however, produces results which are a little less certain than either MRI
or Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy. Prozac was a drug that was deliberately designed, based on
a (unreliable) theory of depression, by a company motivated by profit. The drugs applications
were widely touted before its release, in order to maintain the drug companies share price, and
the drug was heavily marketed upon its release, with clinicians being encouraged to experiment
with it. The drugs main advantage was its safety profile, enabling it to be easily dispensed by
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family practitioners (instead of psychologists). In the US, clinicians experimented with the drug
widely, often with sub-syndromal patients, enabling the placebo effect to be much more
exaggerated. Consequently, Prozac was associated with miraculous changes in patients.
Prozac was widely discussed in the media, in part because its ability to effect peoples character
suggested a more chemical and biological basis to personality. Such a proposal was intrinsically
contentious, and extensively debated. Consequently, patients and the general public played an
active role in prescription decision making, as Prozac became a medical 'consumer good'.
By contrast, in the UK, Prozac was simply seen as another anti-depressant, and media
coverage of US reactions to Prozac produced a backlash in the UK, which actually impeded the
drugs use. Decision making regarding the drug largely remained clinicians dominated, with
patients and the public being much more passive than their US counterparts.
However, Prozac's extensive use, and the attention given to it, generated a backlash in the US,
where it became associated with violence and suicidal ideation. Professional groups with
psychiatry (principally the behavioural and biological wings of the industry) had debated with
each other the relative merits of the drug, and the wisdom of distributing it so freely through
family practice. The Scientologists, however, orchestrated a large scale media campaign
against Prozac (and the psychiatry industry), based around Prozac's safety. The uncertainty this
generated dampened Prozac's use, despite Eli Lilly's promises to indemnify clinicians against
law suits, and the FDA's endorsement of the drugs safety.
Subsequently, however, Prozac use has grown in both countries. Primarily this appears to be
due to its safety profile and ease of use, and the pharmaceutical industry has successfully
promoted the use of drugs as a cost effective way of treating psychological conditions. However,
Prozac is no more effective than its predecessors, but is much more expensive, whilst its low
clinical costs have enabled it to be used for much smaller reasons on many more groups.
Consequently, the costs of drug treatment have risen, causing attempts by both UK and US
financiers to constrain its use. The key finding of the Prozac case study does not centre upon
intra-professional competition, but the ability of a drug company to promote a definition of both
pathology and treatment, within a wider cultural context. This context is important, since how the
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drug is culturally defined determines who is legitimately entitled to make decisions concerning its
use. Thus in the US, Prozac was constructed as a radical innovation that challenged existing
beliefs about the nature of the self, and consequently clinical decision making was shared by
clinicians and patients (causing the diffusion curve to parallel media reporting). By contrast, in
the UK Prozac was seen as simply another anti-depressant, and patients played a very limited
role in the decision making regarding its use.
Having summarised the findings from the case studies, the following section returns to the key
questions which formed the basis of this study- where agency lay, what forces influenced
agency, and the influence of environmental factors.
5 Evidence from the Case Studies
This study has been concerned with understanding what factors motivate action (substantive
issues around economic, political, social ideological motivation, or technological determinism),
and what forces shape it (formative issues around technology types, the identity of the decision
maker, the nature of communication channels and environmental forces).
During the course of the study it has become clear that the key issue is the identity of the
decision maker. In all instances regarding adoption the primary decision makers have been
specific groups of clinicians, who either directly make decisions (e.g. Prozac prescriptions) or
provide the information on which others decisions are based. Various groups of decision makers
(e.g. scientists, researchers, clinicians, etc.) in innovation.
The second group of decision makers effecting adoption were managers working directly within
provider institutions (e.g. hospitals), funding organisations (e.g. insurers, government
departments) or for state regulators (e.g. MDA, FDA etc.). Generally, clinicians and managers
seemed to unite within institutions, and both endorsed the need for technological adoption and
utilisation. Such powerful alliances at the grass roots tended to be able to either strongly
influence directives from financing organisations, or simply ignore them and find alternative
sources of funding. Finally, the regulatory agencies often worked closely with industrial interests.
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Bureaucrats and managers often had close informal, or even formal, relationships with each
other, and prominent clinicians often held multiple appointments in different professional and
bureaucratic organisations. Consequently, although the frontier of control between clinicians and
management may be shifting, this may simply create the possibility for new (stronger) alliances.
Having identified these key groups, it is then easier to understand the main motives underlying
processes of innovation and adoption.
The innovation of MRI was motivated largely by political and social competition between various
scientific and medical researchers. Political and economic competition between different groups
of clinicians and manufacturers drove early development. Laparoscopic cholecystectomy was
driven by similar forces, although its innovation appears to be more planned and was centred in
the medical profession, who feared the loss of the gallbladder (an economic and political
disaster for general surgery). Prozac, however, is somewhat more complex. Innovation was
driven by industrial economic interests, whilst diffusion was driven by combinations of economic,
political, social and even technical factors. The key thing to note, however, is that the decision
making surrounding Prozac differed between the UK and the USA. In the UK, decision making
was largely centred on GPs (giving rise to an almost classic smooth adoption curve), whilst in
the US patients had a stronger role to play. Consequently, the media attention to Prozac seems
to have impeded peoples willingness to use the drug during the early 1990s. By contrast
clinicians were eager to adopt the drug, not because of its proven clinical efficacy, but because
of its alleged safety (although this remains unproven in the long term). Consequently, in the only
case study where technology assessment may have played a role in driving diffusion, clinicians
selectively ignored the unknown risks associated with Prozac.
With regards to the shape of the diffusion curve, generally the smaller the technology (e.g. cost,
difficulties of installing, regulatory constraints etc.) the closer decision making is liable to lie to
clinicians, and the faster such decision making occurs. MRI machines were expensive, and the
processes around acquiring them were difficult and slow, requiring co-operation from different
groups and communities (largely to generate risk bearing community networks). In the case of
laparoscopic cholecystectomy, surgeons were able to bypass forms of financial and regulatory
control (e.g. personally buying the technology, training on patients) and complained of the
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bottleneck caused by manufacturers who failed to foresee the market size. Prozac has diffused
largely without managerial control (once having received regulatory approval). The key point is
that the bigger the technology, in terms of impact, the slower adoption is (since clinicians have
to build risk bearing communities), but that adoption does continue.
With regard to communication channels, it seems apparent that hierarchical and bureaucratic
forms of managerial control are largely ineffective in dealing with the close, extensive, and
informal professional clinical community. The key way in which this effects diffusion is that
innovations quickly travel within the clinical community, whilst managers often seem at a loss to
deal with them quickly and effectively. However, on a related point, clinicians often exist within
specific specialisms, and communication across specialisms appears to be limited. This can
have bizarre repercussions. Thus general surgeons resisted adopting the laparoscope (fearing
association with gynecologists) whilst radiologists have largely been able to seize control of MRI,
even denying nuclear medicine widespread access to Magnetic Resonance Spectrometry. In
some respects, therefore, the internal borders of medicine help to constrain technological
innovation (which may, in fact, have clinical utility).
The main impact of the environment seems to be in the volume of resources available for
innovation and adoption. The US supports a much more vigorous technologically based
economy, and so generates and utilises medical technology to a much greater degree than the
UK. The UK's more centralised, resource constrained and bureaucratic funding mechanisms
exert more control over the adoption of expensive medical technologies. Thus the introduction of
the internal market, which eased hospitals access to finance, can be seen in the rapid adoption
of MRI machines. Similarly, high rates of litigation in the US have encouraged the use of medical
technologies. Generally all societies are supportive of medical technologies (allocating
ideological resources to it) but the UK tends to be more conservative and risk adverse, whilst the
US appears to be premised around change, and so more welcoming of innovation. A final factor
is the degree to which the societies applied bureaucratic controls to their financing and
regulation. Both the US and the UK began experimenting with forms of managed competition,
and (as can be seen from the example of MRI) in the UK the decentralisation of bureaucracy
appears to have increased the degree to which clinicians and managers worked together. In the
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US, by contrast, the introduction of increased bureaucracy (managed care) does not appear to
have dramatically influenced adoption decisions (since technologies adapt to the prevailing
environment e.g. small, office based MRI for use by family practitioners). In some instances, the
bureaucratisation of care may even increase utilisation due to concerns regarding litigation.
The key factors influencing the innovation and adoption of medical technologies are thus mainly
the economic and political concerns of clinicians, although issues of the technologies worth, and
the publics reaction to it, may occasionally influence decision making.
This finding has implications for policy making in regards to medical technology. The theoretical
underpinnings of this policy making appear to be based on a linear and segmented model. It is
assumed that technology develops through definite and distinct stages (innovation,
development, experimental adoption, widespread adoption) conducted by separate groups (e.g.
researchers and scientists, academic clinicians, community clinicians) in a sequential flow.
Technology assessment, within this model is focused on introducing more explicit,
administrative forms of analysis (e.g. RCTs) into the evaluations made by the clinical, collegiate,
community. It is assumed that technology assessment occurs at a specific point
(experimentation and experimental adoption) and can then guide the technologies subsequent
adoption and utilisation. In essence, the policy of technology assessment is really the addition of
new forms of evaluation to a process dominated by the clinical community.
However, as is clear from the case studies, technology assessment seems to be almost
irrelevant to technological adoption and utilisation, since these are driven by non technical
factors, whilst being shaped by the availability of finances and the processes of decision making.
The case studies have shown how the clinical community is able to engineer new risk bearing
communities which can provide alternative forms of finance (e.g. cancer research funding for
MRI when NHS funding was limited, personally buying laparoscopic equipment) and overcome
bureaucratic hurdles (e.g. working with manufacturers to engineer technologies which bypassed
regulation, defining patients maladies as depression so that Prozac prescriptions were
appropriate and warranted). Even on the rare occasions when technology assessments could
definitively indicate appropriate and inappropriate applications, they were often too late (the
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technology having become already well established) and clinicians showed little confidence in
them (believing they could be engineered by biased interests) and trusted information from
colleagues far more.
Beyond this, however, lies a more far reaching criticism of the linear model itself. The case
studies have shown that innovation, development, adoption, application and utilisation are not
separate stages, but occur simultaneously. Thus MRI continues to develop and these
developments are often driven by innovations in utilisation exercised by community radiologists.
Surgeons continue to innovate and develop different surgical techniques, whilst Prozac and the
other SSRIs are prescribed for many off label (i.e. unapproved) applications. Consequently,
different groups are not involved in different stages, with researchers, industrialists, clinicians
and government departments are involved almost continuously in the evolution of technologies
and their applications, as a dynamic ongoing process. For example, the radiological community
can be seen to extend from radiologists and radiographers, through industrial interests (e.g.
Philips), leasing organisations (e.g. the British Technology Group), professional groups (the
Royal Society of Radiologists), lobbying groups (the Society of Radiologists), clinical research
organisations (e.g. MAGnet) and onwards into government departments and agencies (e.g. the
Medical devices Agency). Such communities are not necessarily based on generally common
interests (although this is often the case e.g. industrialists, radiologists and leasing agencies) but
are concerned to manage the risks associated with delivering healthcare, which can be
politically hazardous due to the implicit uncertainty within medical transactions, the high profile of
medical errors, and the intense ideological and emotional issues surrounding health care
delivery. A good example of this is the FDA, which strongly supported Lilly during its conflict with
the Scientologists. Essentially, if the Scientologists were able to sustain their case against Lilly,
then the FDA would also be extensively criticised.
It is thus possible to view the clinical community as the legitimating nexus within the medical
industrial complex. Political and economic interests engulf the production and consumption of
medical technologies, but the decentralised authority and moral legitimacy of the medical
profession enables these to be largely exempt from sustained and effective administrative
(political, and ultimately community) control. Consequently, ethical decisions about resource
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allocation and consumption are made by clinicians not on the basis of technology assessment,
but according to political and economic interests.
The case studies have shown that a common process underlying this distortion has been
professional concerns with maintaining boundaries within the medical community (e.g.
radiologists, neurologists and nuclear medicine vied for control of MRI to control diagnosis,
general surgeons, radiologists and gastroenterologists fought over the gallbladder, and
biological psychiatry has struggled with behavioural psychiatry over definitions of pathology).
Technology, therefore, seems to be a means to manage risk, since any medical doctor can
seemingly move into any area of medicine. This is a consequence of medicine being largely
collegiate controlled. However, if the state defined which sub specialties controlled which areas
of the body (or which processes of the medical transaction e.g. diagnosis), some of this political
conflict would be reduced. The state, then would define the limits of medical practice for each
medical group, and introduce local monopolies within medicine. Such moves, however, would
be strongly resisted (as is shown by the resistance of the surgical community to threats of state
regulated training in the case study of laparoscopic cholecystectomy).
A more feasible short term mechanism would be to introduce community (lay) participation in
the overview of proposed medical research (e.g. ethical review bodies) or the assessment of
technologies in regional testing centres. This would elevate and democratise medical decision
making.
6 Comment
Traditionally, medical sociology has emphasised relationships between medical actors,
managers and the community. This study has extended the focus by drawing out the importance
of boundaries within medicine (between different sub specialists), the communities of industrial
and governmental interests that mesh with specific sub specialist groups, and the ways that
clinicians and managers are often extremely mutually supportive, even drawing on the
legitimacy of the 'public interest' to justify their claims. Consequently, although clinicians are
actors within communities, they also appear to be ideological symbols of community.
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The research conducted has been, necessarily, exploratory, in investigating the interface
between medical sociology, science and technology. The case studies provide a rich seam of
data, generating some emerging hypothesis. However, it is clearly a preliminary study that would
benefit from further multi-disciplinary and collaborative work. Such efforts would provide
stimulating theoretical advances, whilst providing the basis for more effective public policy.
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